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In the twenty-first century, religious violence has become endemic in our world. 
Scholars are divided on the true motivations for such violence, however. While some 
perceive inherent incitements to violence embedded in religion itself, others blame 
other factors—primarily, competition for resources, which then co-opts religious 
feeling in order to justify and escalate conflict. This dissertation proposes that more 
fruitful answers to the riddle of religious violence may lie in the relationship between 
collective identity and religious allegiance. 
Identity construction is liminal and, as such, experiential. Hence, this study applies 
the analytical lens of liminality to explore possible understandings of religious 
violence. Taking the position that liminal passages are natural and unavoidable 
aspects of lived experience, it argues that the fixation on doctrinal certainties and 
religious ideals common among perpetrators of religious violence functions largely 
to oppose the ambivalence and uncertainty characteristic of liminality. It further 
posits the hypothetical phenomena of reactive projection and autonomic liminality as 
reactions to liminal experience, leading to eruptions of violence.  
The Tibetan Buddhist bardo and Sufi barzakh constitute religiously sanctioned 
instances of liminality. Although these passages are conventionally perceived as 
postmortem locales, both systems include broader metaphysical understandings, 
making their transformative potential profoundly relevant to spiritual practice during 
this lifetime. I argue that a close reading of the bardo and the barzakh demonstrates 
the capacity of religious tradition to offer compelling alternatives to the fixation on 
the extreme views typically implicated in religious violence.  
I further propose that the nondualistic, inclusive worldview implicit in 
understandings of the bardo and barzakh may prove useful in promoting a practice of 
“reflective interiority”—not only in disrupting the rigid mindset of those moved to 
perpetrate religious violence, but also in shifting the moral fixity sometimes 
associated with the scholarship on religious violence.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
This dissertation argues that liminality, as a naturally recurring mode of being in 
human dynamics, offers a useful analytical lens through which to view the 
phenomena we have come to call “religious violence”. It uses the Tibetan Buddhist 
bardo and the Islamic barzakh1 as examples of liminal events embedded in 
established religious systems.  
Current scholarship indicates that the jury is out on whether religious allegiance is a 
proximate cause of violence. As detailed in the following chapter, some scholars 
make compelling arguments for religion as inherently violent; others argue as 
convincingly for religion as a secondary, often cynically manipulated, force in 
violence that is more accurately traced to nationalistic interests and/or competition 
for scarce resources. Still other researchers seek triggers for religious violence in 
evolutionary imperatives.  
This dissertation does not presume to enter that debate. Rather, it drills down into the 
dynamics of violence, finding and exploring correspondences between religion and 
violence that hinge on questions of identity. My interest in personal and group 
identity lies in the liminal events intrinsic to its construction and maintenance, for I 
argue that it is precisely in liminality that religious practice, violent activity, and 
identity come together. This is largely because liminality opposes the dualistic 
worldview that often drives divisive understandings of religion, identity, and 
violence. As a primarily experiential passage, liminality also confounds conceptual 
fixation on the perceived distinctions between Us and Them that inform the 
reification of identity. That reification in turn fuels the arrogation of religious purity 
and potentially, corresponding inclinations toward violent elimination of the 
1 It appears that the term “bardo” has entered the English language sufficiently to render italicisation redundant. Francesca Fremantle (2001, 
53), in her book Luminous Emptiness: Understanding The Tibetan Book of the Dead, acknowledges this evolution in her decision to use 
the Tibetan word instead of her translation, “in-between state”, as she had originally intended. Nowhere in the literature reviewed for this 
study could I find the word in italics, except when referenced as a word or term; barzakh, by contrast, is typically italicised. I will follow 
this convention, italicising “bardo” only when referencing it as a Tibetan word. 
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purportedly impure Other.2 Thus, this dissertation begins with an exploration of the 
coincidence of religion, identity, and violence. 
Since its introduction to the academy in the early twentieth century, the study of 
liminality has been applied to a broad range of disciplines. The particular nature of 
religion—specifically, its cultural nuances, historical quarrels with post-
Enlightenment rationality, capacity to inspire vehement devotion, and diverse and 
opposing truth-claims—makes it perhaps a more precarious area than most for the 
application of a given analytic lens. Accordingly, I have sought case studies in the 
form of explicitly liminal understandings within established religious systems. 
I selected the bardo and the barzakh for a number of reasons. First, they are both 
clearly liminal in nature. Second, they fulfil the requirement for examples that are 
thoroughly embedded in their respective religious orthodoxies and hence largely 
accepted by practitioners of those traditions. And third, both the bardo and the 
barzakh are invested with profound metaphysical implications. My argument 
proceeds on the premise that the significance of liminality in religion gains its 
greatest traction in precisely these implications.  
My interest in these two particular spiritual praxes is also personal. My experience as 
a student and teacher of Tibetan Buddhism has prompted a strong interest in the 
bardo. From my earliest times on the Buddhist path, I was coached to regard 
transitional phases as particularly rich opportunities for practice, and so developed a 
growing curiosity about my experience in those moments. The chance to study the 
bardo in an academic context has made for a powerful support to my practice.  
My study of the Sufi mystic Rábi’a of Basra in my Honours thesis left me with an 
enduring curiosity about that religious system. In the course of that project, I became 
2 The term “the Other” is most often attributed to Edward Said, who uses it to characterise the “Them” component of the “Us-and-Them” 
construction (Edward W. Said, Orientalism [London: Penguin Books, 2003], 97). Interestingly, the most concise and straightforward 
description of the Other in Said’s work comes, not from himself, but from Anouar Abdel-Malek (“Orientalism in Crisis”, Diogenes 
44: 107, 1963). Said cites Abdel-Malek’s description of the Oriental Other as manifesting “a constitutive otherness, of an essentialist 
character”. This description largely applies to the Other as understood in the context of this dissertation. 
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aware of the parallels between Sufism and Vajrayana Buddhism, which piqued my 
curiosity about mystical Islam’s internal logics. The views of Ibn al-‘Arabī, in 
particular, intrigued me; and the happy coincidence of my academic supervisor’s 
specialty in Ibn al-‘Arabī scholarship made my decision to pursue his understanding 
of the barzakh a natural choice. 
Narrowly defined, the barzakh and the bardo are postmortem locations where the 
deceased awaits divine judgement or rebirth. However, close readings of both 
phenomena reveal richly nuanced understandings whose implications extend beyond 
the spiritual register to encompass the myriad dimensions of everyday existence. 
Given the historical, cultural, and geographical distances between Tibetan Buddhism 
and Islam, I argue that the commonalities between the barzakh and the bardo suggest 
the discovery of a deeper human reality, and that continuing exploration of this 
reality may potentially amplify our understanding of religion altogether. I argue 
further that the contrast between religious fixation and religious practice evident in 
both the barzakh and the bardo may be of specific interest to researchers in the field 
of religious violence. 
The concept of liminality came to academic attention at the turn of the 20th century, 
through the discipline of anthropology. It has since demonstrated substantial value as 
an analytical tool in fields as varied as history, education, healthcare, political 
science, and international relations. In its simplest construction, “liminality” refers to 
the recursive periods of instability that occur naturally in the course of human 
experience. Scholars have found that recognising the inevitability and transformative 
nature of such passages has enriched their understanding of the dynamics at play in 
their respective disciplines. To the best of my knowledge, this dissertation is the first 
work to propose the application of a liminal lens to the study of religious violence.
The use of liminality as an analytical tool offers the potential for radical shifts in 
academic approaches to the research on religious violence. As an aspect of human 
experience, liminality has thus worked its way ineluctably into the methodology of 
this study. Navigating a doctoral dissertation from the shifty ground of ambiguity and 
paradox has deepened my respect for the benefits of relinquishing ostensible 
certainty in favour of an open-ended research process. My experience in this regard 
prompts me to propose that researchers experiment with incorporating the 
paradoxical inversions of liminal dynamics into their own methodological 
approaches and expectations. 
violence and liminality, respectively, and then devote a chapter each to the specifics 
of the barzakh and the bardo. In each case, I demonstrate the relevance of their 
liminal characteristics and hence their correspondences with the phenomena of 
5  
Methodology 
My methodology is that of textual comparison. I establish the contexts of religious 
violence and liminality, respectively, and then devote a chapter each to the specifics 
of the barzakh and the bardo. In each case, I demonstrate the relevance of their 
liminal characteristics and hence their correspondences with the phenomena of 
religious violence. Those chapters are followed by another devoted to the 
comparison itself; and finally, I conclude with an overall summary of my central 
arguments. I draw on a broad spectrum of existing scholarship throughout, 
presenting rationalisations for my conclusions based on those works. 
Beyond simple comparison, however, a less tidy method is in play. Here I invoke 
British sociologist John Law, who proposes that, while traditional academic 
methodologies might be effective in researching “provisionally stable realities”, 
much of the world addressed by the social sciences is in fact decidedly unstable, if 
not downright chaotic (2004, 2). Consequently, Law argues that “techniques of 
deliberate imprecision” are frequently more properly applicable to the study of social 
realities (3). Law seeks methodologies suited to a fundamentally unstructured reality 
that he describes as “a maelstrom or tide-rip … filled with currents, eddies, flows, 
vortices, unpredictable changes, storms, and with moments of lull and calm” (7).  
This description might well be applied to the contemporary global phenomenon of 
religious violence, which manifests in typically unpredictable forms; erupts in 
apparently random locations; and involves shifting and increasingly complex 
interactions of social, cultural, historical, political, and religious elements. Law’s 
description might further be argued to reflect the frequent and inevitable 
manifestation of liminality across the range of human experience. Consequently, I 
argue that Law’s approach to methodology, one of “tentative and hesitant 
unfolding” (2004, 41–2), accords with both the study of religious violence and the 
use of a liminal analytical lens.  
A central principle informing this dissertation is the inseparability of frame and 
content: that is, the profound influence of the researcher’s often unquestioned 
assumptions on the trajectory and conclusions of her research. Here again, I cite 
Law’s concerns regarding the manner in which scientific method crafts perceived 
realities (2004, 38). Significantly, he points to the ways in which predeterminations 
regarding the relevance or irrelevance of respective findings—“distinctions between 
‘right’ and ‘wrong’ patterns of similarity and difference”—affect scientific 
conclusions, or what Law calls “realities” (110; emphasis original). I argue that his 
use of “right” and “wrong”, although employed here to convey the senses of correct 
and incorrect, in fact reflects my own concerns with respect to the flaws inherent in 
binary moral judgements. In both usages, the words suggest the acceptance or 
rejection of particular concepts, based on the observer’s predispositions. My 
argument for the practice of reflective interiority among academic researchers refers. 
I submit further that this practice is worthy of particular consideration in the study of 
such volatile, variable, and alarming phenomena as instances of religious violence, 
where the temptation to oppose the chaos under investigation through the imposition 
of crisp, conclusive analyses may prove especially seductive. 
Liminality is characteristically chaotic, ambiguous, and paradoxical. As an analytical 
tool, therefore, it perhaps qualifies as one of Law’s “techniques of deliberate 
imprecision”. My application of such techniques in this dissertation might, then, 
correspond to an isthmus or threshold lying between the seas of academic discovery 
and spiritual insight. In this liminal space, the commitment to human authenticity 
implicit in spiritual striving tempers the academic presumption of objective, value-
free conclusions. 
As this dissertation will argue, intellectual engagement alone cannot guarantee a 
thorough investigation of material whose essential nature extends beyond the reach 
of the intellect. Thoughtfully and intelligently applied, the experiential commitment 
characteristic of spiritual engagement can deepen a scholarly understanding of more 
esoteric or metaphysically charged material. 
At the same time, scholarly rigour opposes such tacit biases as may arise from 
spiritual devotion. The conventions of academic discovery, when applied with due 
recognition of the scholar’s personal positionalities, can act to contain spiritual 
fervour when the latter threatens to override factual challenges to literalism, 
idealism, or outright superstition. 
Hence, it could be said that the isthmus dividing academic method from spiritual  
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engagement consists precisely in the self-awareness each side brings to its own 
understanding, in tandem with the respect of each for the intelligence of the other. I 
propose that the extraordinary scholarship of such spiritual masters as Ibn al-‘Arabī 
and Chögyam Trungpa, as expounded in this dissertation, confirm the power 
generated by such meetings of the spiritual and the academic. Their example 
inspires my own endeavours to apply intellectual rigour to such spiritual 
understanding as I have attained over thirty-five years of Buddhist practice and 
study.
The relationship between any two comparands is, as implied by the analysis 
proposed above, always subject to a third element: the researcher’s own 
understanding. Wendy Doniger calls this “the invisible third side in the eternal 
triangle of the comparison of any two other things”. Far from being suspect on 
account of its subjective nature, this element is both requisite and significant. It is 
subjective, to be sure, yet its “arbitrariness is limited by our responsibility to the 
data” (1998, 36–7). Perhaps, then, if subjectivity is implicated in both personal 
spirituality and “responsibility to the data” in academic rigour, the “invisible third 
side” represents, again, the isthmus that both unites and separates the two. My 
method, in this dissertation, is to represent that third side with as much 
responsibility and imagination as have proven available to me. The result will, of 
course, not be “a single prize of Truth” (36) but rather an invitation to further 
exploration.   
Law argues that method is, “most fundamentally, about a way of being” (2004, 10). 
This dissertation explores modes of being as fruitful ways of understanding both 
religion and religious violence. I argue that to be faithful to both my thesis and my 
Buddhist commitment, my academic practice must likewise reflect an approach 
that values practice over conclusion, and uncertainty over resolution.3 I aspire to 
live up to both Doniger’s “responsibility to the data” and Law’s “way of being”. 
This approach lies at the heart of my methodology, and indeed, of this dissertation 
altogether. 
3 The study of religion does not, of course, require religious commitment of any kind. However, attention to the relationship between 
  scholarly work and personal integrity must underlie any meaningful academic project.     
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Religious Violence 
The study begins with an exploration of religious violence.4 In examining the term 
“religion”, I locate my research in the Western tradition of European post-
Enlightenment thinking, grounding it in the foundational work of E.B. Tylor, Emile 
Durkheim, and Friedrich Schleiermacher. As scholars such as Jonathan Z. Smith and 
Brad Gregory argue, the notion of religion as a discrete class of human experience is 
itself a Western invention. Based on this understanding alone, it is difficult to 
examine the phenomenon from any other cultural perspective.5  
That said, this dissertation draws its data from two non-Western traditions invested 
with their own genealogies for the understanding of “religion”. The limitations of a 
doctoral dissertation preclude the ability to do justice to the full implications of this 
fact. While none of these explanations is intended to deny my own embeddedness in 
a Western worldview, I have made a conscious attempt throughout this study to 
recognise the bias inherent in my intellectual positionality and to apply the 
appropriate correctives. 
The scholarship on religious violence is vast and varied. In navigating the field, I 
avail myself of R. Scott Appleby’s helpful categories of “strong”, “weak”, and 
“pathological” religionists.6 Strong religionists, such as Mark Juergensmeyer, 
Charles Selengut, Jan Assmann, and Regina M. Schwartz, are those for whom 
religion unambiguously contains the seeds of violence. Weak religionists consider 
religion an important but secondary factor in violent conflict. Those whose views I 
have cited in this context include William    T. Cavanaugh, Karen Armstrong, and 
Jyrki Käkönen. Pathological religionists—Robert Jay Lifton and Charles B. Strozier 
among them—argue for psychological disturbance as a significant driver of 
religious violence.  
My own view falls largely in the weak religionist camp, in that I do not perceive 
religion as a proximate cause of that violence attributed to religious conflict. Rather, 
by Arnold van Gennep in his work on tripartite rites of passage, and further 
4 As Chapter Two makes clear, I consider the term “religious violence” imprecise and potentially misleading. I employ it throughout this 
  dissertation, however, specifically as referencing a field of academic study. I do so in the interests of avoiding both the syntactic inelegance
  and the implied pedantry that might taint routine repetitions of qualifiers such as “so-called”, “purported”, and so forth.
5 “Culture” is itself a Western concept (Saler 2000, 8), indicating the virtual impossibility of a Western-trained researcher escaping the hall of
    mirrors represented by her own orientation. That said, as indicated later in this chapter, this study proceeds to propose a practice calculated to
    at least ventilate this  conundrum.  
6 Appleby (2015, 42) is careful to avoid reduction to oversimplified categories, proposing that these characterisations represent points on a 
  continuum, rather than fixed positionalities. Indeed, the views of such scholars as Hector Avalos and John Teehan encourage a nuanced
  appreciation of Appleby’s taxonomy.
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I argue for identity as a more powerful factor in such violence. In this respect, I draw 
on studies of terrorism by Jessica Stern and of radicalisation by Ric Coolsaet; 
evolutionary and cognitive factors explored by John Teehan and Loyal Rue; and 
Vamik Volkan’s research on the formation and maintenance of group identity. I 
conclude that the imperative of allegiance to a collective—a family of purportedly 
like-minded others—constitutes a more powerful inducement to defensive violence 
than do doctrinal quarrels, opposing truth-claims, or competing interpretations of 
historical tradition.
Building on the dynamics of group identity, I specifically cite a dualistic, Us-and-
Them worldview as a primary driver of religious violence. I argue that the 
exclusionary nature of this worldview not only cultivates the conditions for conflict, 
but is itself an expression of violence.
Liminality
My third chapter proceeds to an examination of liminality, specifically as proposed by 
Arnold van Gennep in his work on tripartite rites of passage, and further elucidated by 
Victor W. Turner. Although both men were anthropologists, a survey of recent 
scholarship on liminality indicates that Turner’s work on the “threshold” or “liminal” 
phase of the rites of passage, in particular, has been applied in a wide range of 
academic fields.  
In defining and characterising liminality, I cite Bjørn Thomassen  and Arpad 
Szakolczai as arguably pre-eminent among current scholars in this field. They are, 
notwithstanding, part of a much larger community of researchers that includes Agnes 
Horvath, Harald Wydra, Maria Mälksoo, and Bernhard Giesen. In their respective 
fields, these and other scholars have demonstrated that the chaotic inversion of 
familiar norms characteristic of liminality, while typically distressing, is in fact 
essential to transformation. They further establish the value of factoring the cyclical 
manifestation of liminal events into an understanding of the dynamics governing 
personal and social realities. 
The primary goal of this chapter is to demonstrate the utility of liminality as an 
analytical lens. I argue that it is especially applicable to studies of religion—and 
particularly, of religious experience. This is because the scholarship on liminality   
10 
demonstrates that liminal events are inextricably implicated in the structure of 
human experience altogether. My argument foregrounds religion as a largely 
(although not exclusively) experiential phenomenon, and thus especially apposite 
to examination though a liminal lens.
Returning to the relationship between violence and identity construction, I note the 
centrality of a dualistic worldview to both phenomena. I draw on the work of 
Szakolczai and Alberto Melucci to indicate the liminal dynamics central to identity 
construction. Liminality having thus been invoked in connection with both religion 
and identity, I argue for its particular relevance to the study of religious violence. 
Finally, I propose two possible scenarios that come into focus through a liminal 
analysis: reactive projection, a reflexive rejection or denial of the threat of 
liminality through blaming the associated distress on the demonised Other; and 
autonomic liminality, in which compulsive attempts to repress the threat of 
approaching chaos result in an irrepressible eruption of the liminal event in the 
form of violence. I do not necessarily argue for the soundness or practical 
application of either hypothesis. Rather, I offer them as examples of the analytical 
use of liminality in the study of religious violence. In so doing, I invite other 
scholars to experiment with the use of liminality as an exploratory tool in their own 
research. 
The Barzakh 
Chapter Four introduces the Islamic barzakh, proceeding to examine it specifically 
from the viewpoint of thirteenth-century Sufi philosopher and theologian Ibn al-
‘Arabī’. The Qur’ān contains three scant Qur’anic references to the barzakh as a 
postmortem limbo, but on this ground Ibn al-‘Arabī constructs an extensive 
metaphysical argument that uses the concept to explain the relationship between 
humanity and the Divine. In the process, he offers a startling view of the nature of 
reality, featuring the barzakh as a central element.  
Al-‘Arabī’s brilliance and spiritual accomplishment earned him the honorific title 
of “Shaykh al-Akbar” (the Greatest Master). A prolific author, he is believed to 
11 
have written at least eight hundred works. Of the 550 or so extant, al-Futûhât al-
Makkîya (Meccan Revelations) offers his most fully developed exposition of the 
barzakh and  its role in human affairs. I make extensive use of William C. 
Chittick’s translation of and commentaries on this work. I also avail myself of Ibn 
al-‘Arabī’s Fusûs al-Hikam (The Bezels of Wisdom), as translated and expounded 
upon by James W. Morris and Binyamin Abrahamov. 
Others whose research and insight into Ibn al-‘Arabī’s barzakh prove indispensable 
to this chapter include Salman H. Bashir and Titus Burckhardt. For insight into the 
Sufi philosophy central to Ibn al-‘Arabī’s thinking, I consult Annemarie Schimmel 
and Seyyed Hossein Nasr. For the larger Islamic context, I draw on the works of 
Majid Fakhry and Shahab Ahmed.  
My main task in this chapter is to establish the barzakh as a liminal space. This 
might seem a foregone conclusion; however, my argument requires a close 
examination of the liminal characteristics established in the previous chapter in 
order to demonstrate the significance of a liminal event as specifically embedded in 
a longstanding religious praxis. I make a case for the naturalness of this 
juxtaposition, and hence for the relevance of liminality in the context of religious 
studies. 
This chapter further introduces the Sufi notion of the waqt. The word, typically 
translated as “the moment”, references a heightened, immediate experience of 
presence attainable through spiritual practice. As a barzakh, the waqt reflects the 
experiential nature of the liminal, which in turn challenges ideological, theological, 
and historical fixation. Accordingly, I demonstrate that Ibn al-‘Arabī’s barzakh 
locates the disruption and instability characteristic of liminality at the heart of an 
established and respected spiritual imaginary that, by its nature, rejects fixed 
reference points. I suggest that wider recognition of this analysis might prove 
useful in ventilating the static worldview typical of those fixated religionists 
frequently implicated in religious violence. 
I further argue that this same ventilation may benefit the scholarship on religious 
violence. Here, I suggest that a reflexive rejection of violence—and by extension,  
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its perpetrators—may prejudicially nuance our research. This may not be the only 
fixation troubling academic analysis of the problem, for as human beings, we 
scholars are not immune to the influence of unquestioned assumptions. Turning the 
analytical lens of liminality toward our own work, therefore, could help clarify issues 
that may otherwise obstruct the development of badly needed solutions. 
The Bardo 
This chapter introduces the Tibetan Buddhist bardo, which closely parallels the Sufi 
barzakh in both its vernacular sense of a postmortem limbo and its more 
metaphysical application to the human condition. I continue the previous chapter’s 
discussion regarding the implications of liminality as embedded in a religious 
tradition. My main resource with respect to traditional understandings of the bardo is 
the Bardo Thötröl, a text that translator W.Y. Evans-Wentz titled (inaccurately) The 
Tibetan Book of the Dead. Francesca Fremantle and Chögyam Trungpa made their 
own translation of the Tibetan original, and their version is my source of choice. 
Fremantle, Trungpa, Donald S. Lopez, Jr., and Sogyal Rinpoche offer historical 
context and learned commentary on this work. Tibetan cultural and spiritual context 
is provided largely by Matthew Kapstein and Karma Lekshe Tsomo.  
The bardo as liminal event invites the practitioner to embody a mode of being whose 
accomplishment entails significant existential risk. In this, I note the similarities 
between the Buddhist anātman and the Sufi notion of fanā, which designate the 
absence, and thus the loss, of the ego-self. Such loss is intensified by the incapacity 
of the intellect to fix it in a conceptual frame: it is, after all, a mode of being as 
opposed to an ideological stance. I argue that the associated disruption to identity 
reinforces the notion, mentioned earlier, that perpetrators of violence may reflexively 
attempt to evade the approach of an unavoidable liminal passage. 
Another parallel between the barzakh and the bardo consists in the “fourth moment” 
of the bardo, which is roughly equivalent to the waqt. In both cases, the liminal event 
entails a heightened awareness of immediate presence, or what Trungpa calls an 
“experience of nowness” (1992, 3). This moment is devoid of the familiar reference 
points that usually link the past to the present and imply a trajectory into the future. 
Offering neither comfort nor closure, it deprives its subject of reassuring certainties.
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The implied existential risk is once again apparent, and with it, the potential for 
violent resistance. The significance of the bardo as a mode of being, as opposed to 
an ideological positionality, proves central to my argument. 
The chapter concludes with the suggestion that the very existence of the bardo and 
the barzakh as established religious imaginaries challenges the binary thinking that 
fuels exclusionary violence.
Integrations and Resonances 
Chapter Six, “Integrations and Resonances”, examines the trajectory set in motion 
by the previous chapters. In exploring deeper levels of arguments already made, I 
draw on the spiritual insights of masters such as Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn al-
Sulamī and Chögyam Trungpa, as well as the scholarship of James W. Jones, 
Charles Kimball, James Mensch, and Jason A. Springs, among others. Theologian 
Paul Tillich provides helpful reflections from the Christian tradition. 
Returning to the topics of dualism, exclusivity, and hierarchical ranking, I again 
establish their implication in the construction and maintenance of collective identity 
and the corresponding Us-versus-Them mindset.  
The chapter proposes the central necessity of reflective interiority, or the deliberate 
cultivation of radical self-awareness. I demonstrate that ideals of warriorship and 
courage in both Sufism and Vajrayana Buddhism emphasise such internal awareness 
and further, that the practice of reflective interiority entails the personal vulnerability 
attendant on liminal ambiguities and uncertainties. I apply this argument to the 
scholarship on religious violence, suggesting again an embrace of liminality in the 
very process of applying a liminal lens to the academic investigation. 
Conclusion 
The concluding chapter returns to the question of identity, arguing that the dualism 
underlying identity construction and maintenance is powerfully implicated in 
violence. I argue that the particular potency of religion as a marker of identity adds 
weight to the correspondences between identity and religious violence. The
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recognition of identity as a liminal dynamic, rather than a fixed quantity, further 
attests to the relevance of liminality in analyses of religious violence.  
I argue throughout the dissertation for the primacy of experience in understanding 
religious allegiance. In the case of violence, in particular, the role of experience as a 
liminal event can add dimension to the research on religious conflict. Here, the 
practice of immediate presence, as implicated in both the bardo and the barzakh, 
underscores the importance of reflective interiority. 
The concluding chapter further contrasts the role of language with that of experience, 
and suggests that the rich metaphors found in both Sufi and Vajrayana literature may 
help loosen practitioners’ grip on the literalism associated with the fixated religious 
stances implicated in religious violence. 
The chapter proceeds to explore three characteristics of liminality—the 
accommodation of extremes, enantiodromia, and paradox—which, I argue, are 
particularly relevant to the study of religious violence. In examining the indivisibility 
of unity and separation embodied in the liminal event, I demonstrate that 
differentiation between religious groups is paradoxically necessary to the unification 
of their respective aspirations, and hence, at least theoretically, to a mitigation of 
hostilities between them. Here, the significance of experience as a basis for action, 
and specifically for interaction, is made apparent. With respect to my comparison of 
the barzakh and the bardo, this chapter examines the liminal space between the 
comparands. The simultaneous unifying and separating functions of this threshold or 
isthmus help elucidate the paradox of liminality. 
Finally, I again urge scholars to consider the utility of a liminal lens in deepening our 
understanding of religious violence. I further suggest that the inclusive nature of 
liminality might help break down binary assumptions regarding the nature of 
violence, arguing that such assumptions might confound a more multidimensional 
view of our academic pursuit. Accordingly, I encourage my reader to experiment 
with applying the practice of reflective interiority to the study of religious violence. 
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Chapter Two: Religious Violence 
Religion has once again become a force that no government can safely 
ignore. Fundamentalism … is now an essential part of the modern scene 
and will certainly play an important role in the domestic and international 
affairs of the future.  
—Karen Armstrong, The Battle for God 
What is “religious violence”, other than a catch phrase routinely applied to any 
conflict in which religious differences are implicated? In this chapter, I will argue 
that the term “religious violence” is both a misnomer that reflects political and 
academic imprecision, rather than rigorous examination, and an ultimately dangerous 
notion that contributes more to the problem of global violence than to any 
conceivable solution. 
If violence cannot be unequivocally attributed to religious differences, as I argue, 
other causes must clearly be sought. Theoretical studies of violence point to various 
such causes, competition for resources prominent among them.7 A less common view 
links violence with issues of identity. This chapter explores the latter view, with 
particular attention to the interface of identity with religion—and specifically, the 
relationship of this interface to violence. Scholars such as Malise Ruthven, Anthony 
D. Smith, and Catarina Kinnvall are among those I will cite in this regard.
I will argue that the violence attributed to religious conflict derives primarily from 
threats to group identity. I will further demonstrate that religion is a particularly 
powerful basis for group identity. Consequently, while violent reactions to such 
threats are frequently attributed to religion, I submit that they serve primarily to 
defend the group identity, a complex matrix in which religion is intimately woven. 
What Is Religion? 
In this section, I will explore a range of scholarly understandings of religion to argue 
that it cannot reasonably be singled out as a proximate cause of violence. My 
argument is based on (a) the absence of a satisfactory definition of religion; and  
7 See, for example, Armstrong 2014, Avalos 2005, and Käkönen 1986. 
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(b) the fact that religious allegiance is inextricably interwoven with multiple other
societal phenomena. I will further argue that the peculiarly indeterminate nature of
religion makes it especially vulnerable to co-optation by stronger influences—
political power not least among them. I propose that institutionalised religion and
political power are so intertwined that to separate the two in the attribution of
violence is intellectually incoherent and ethically disingenuous.  
Defining Religion 
Whether or not religion is, indeed, a proximate cause of violence, the mere 
designation of religious violence requires that both words be clearly understood. In 
making even the most preliminary gestures toward seeking a definition of religion, 
however, we are immediately confronted with a deeply complex history, whose 
effects continue to vex both popular and academic understandings today. This section 
offers a brief overview of the debates attendant on diverse Western definitions and 
histories of religion. 
British anthropologist Edward B. Tylor famously reduces religion to “the belief in 
spiritual beings” (Tweed 2005, 271). Contemporary scholar of religion Hector Avalos 
follows Tylor’s tradition in proposing that religion is based on a presumed 
relationship with “unverifiable forces and/or beings” (2005, 19; see also Teehan 
2010, 46). For Friedrich Schleiermacher, religion is “sense and taste for the Infinite”: 
an experiential phenomenon, rather than an intellectual or conceptual one (1893, 34). 
According to Emile Durkheim, “[r]eligious beliefs proper are always shared by a 
definite group that professes them and that practices the corresponding rites” ([1912] 
1995, 41). This statement brings together three elements of religion: doctrine 
(“religious beliefs”), community (“shared by a … group”), and ritual (“the 
corresponding rites”). Durkheim sees religion as a “living social reality” that governs 
communal identity and morality (Lynch 2012).  
This chapter will take up the notion of group identity as a driving force in religious 
allegiance. Yet the role of doctrine has proven as powerful, at least in contemporary 
fundamentalist movements, as has the appeal of religious identity. Indeed, the term 
“fundamentalist” originated in an insistence on the literal interpretation of Christian 
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scripture (Armstrong 2000). Thus, the doctrinal component of religion must be 
included in the definition employed in this dissertation.  
It is not my intention to offer my own definition of religion. In the specific context of 
religious violence, rather, I propose that the most useful definition is that which 
foregrounds doctrine and group identity.  
Religion and the Academy 
Academic understandings of religion have inevitably driven research beyond mere 
definitions, into speculation regarding its origins—and, more pertinent in the context 
of this dissertation, into the ways scholars have perceived religion and its place in 
society and culture. This section will demonstrate that academic understandings of 
religion are profoundly influenced by historical trends regarding intellectual 
frameworks, socio-cultural developments, and political power. 
Origins of Religion 
Philosopher of religion John Teehan reports that archaeologists have traced the 
fundamental elements of religious practice to the Upper Palaeolithic period, as long 
as forty thousand years ago (2015, 16). He traces some raw components of religious 
understanding—the perception of unseen, intentional agents, for example—to the 
most fundamental survival imperatives negotiated by early homo sapiens (2017, 
661). Scholar of religion and philosophy Loyal Rue submits that the forms common 
to all religions in fact “indicate species traits” antecedent to historical or cultural 
developments (2005, 10). 
Friedrich Schleiermacher believes that religious feeling is innate to humanity: 
indeed, that “a province of its own in the mind belong to it” (1893, 24). A more 
contemporary version of this approach posits a “God gene” that is hardwired in the 
human makeup (Hamer 2005). Scholar of religion William T. Cavanaugh traces the 
view of Schleiermacher and Hamer to Renaissance thinkers such as Nicholas of Cusa 
and Marsilio Ficino. Both departed from the medieval view of religion as a lifestyle 
informed by scripturally inspired morality, arguing instead that it is a universal 
human impulse (2009, 71).  
Tylor and Scottish anthropologist James G. Frazer propose the so-called 
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“intellectualist” theory that religion arises from the mind’s compulsion to seek 
explanations for the inexplicable (Boyer 2001, 14). This view evolved from a shift 
already underway during the eighteenth century, when the European Enlightenment 
began glossing religion as a system of conceptual beliefs (Smith 1962, 71).  
Many scholars have noted that as “a great objective something” (Smith 1962, 25), 
religion is an invention of the European Enlightenment.8 Scholar of Islam Shahab 
Ahmed argues persuasively that the very category of “religion” is shaped by an 
Enlightenment-era understanding of “European Christianity with its socio-political 
location constitutive of modernity” (2016, 180). From this perspective, any academic 
definition of religion is fundamentally prejudiced in favour of a specifically modern 
Western worldview. Indeed, epistemologist Benson Saler remarks that “[r]eligion is a 
Western folk category that contemporary Western scholars have appropriated” (2000, 
vii). In his view, Western scholarship on religion is heavily and unwittingly 
influenced by culturally promoted understandings imbibed by scholars from early 
childhood. British scholar of comparative religion Gavin Flood concludes that no 
definitive description of religion is ultimately possible (1999, 47).9  
Whatever the provenance of religion, however, Jonathan Z. Smith famously asserts 
that it “is solely the creation of the scholar’s study … It has no independent existence 
apart from the academy” (1982, xi). If religion is nothing but an intellectual 
fabrication, therefore, historian Thomas A. Tweed argues that it must be accountable 
to intellectual analysis (2005, 256).10 This argument derives from a tradition 
established by such venerable scholars as Weber, Durkheim, and Freud, which draws 
any exploration of religious experience into a conceptual framework whose terms of 
reference explicitly reject the lived experience of religious actors (Gregory 2009, 
26).  
Philosopher John Ralston Saul, however, cautions that reason is hardly neutral or 
8 See, for example, Cavanaugh 1995, 398; Ochs 2015, 491–2; and Tweed 2005, 259. 
9 Flood (1999, 47) does, nonetheless, propose that religion may be understood as “value-laden narratives and behaviours that bind people to 
their objectives, to each other, and to non-empirical claims and beings” (emphasis original). 
10 Tweed is citing David N. Livingstone, The Geographical Tradition: Episodes in the History of a Contested Enterprise (Oxford: Blackwell,
   1992), 304.     
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objective: the Nazi Holocaust, for example, “was a perfectly rational act” (1992, 58). 
This view calls into question the functionality of intellectual reasoning as a universal 
measure of human moral action. Historian Brad Gregory, in fact, suggests that 
approaching the content of religious writings with “the proper (post)modern, secular 
intellectual equipment” will do little more than guarantee agreement with prevailing 
academic assumptions (2009, 32). 
I propose that the debate over the academic standing of religion stands on shaky 
ground: namely, the assumption that religion exists as a discrete realm of human 
activity. As historians such as John Coffey and Alister Chapman have observed, this 
view is a product of modernity, and as such, ignores millennia of lived pre-
Enlightenment experience (2009, 5). It also assumes a dualistic understanding 
peculiar to Western thought, which privileges reason, rationality, and mental 
processes over emotions, faith, and sense experience (Plumwood 1993, 19). To 
promote these assumptions as valid grounds for an understanding of religion strikes 
me as intellectually inadequate and ethically questionable.  
The Western View of Religion: A Brief History 
Western assumptions regarding religion include the perception that it occupies a 
clearly bounded space outside of other social endeavours (Teehan 2015, 13). 
Allegiance to a particular religion is further thought to imply identification with a 
collective that comprises “us”, beyond whose boundaries all others are “them” (14; 
Boyer 2001, 265). This understanding, as will become apparent, is of central 
importance to the argument of this dissertation. 
Yet such assumptions are not common to all societies and cultures. Moreover, the 
notion of belonging to a single religion is also not universal. In Java, for example, 
anthropologist Pascal Boyer has noted that a given individual may subscribe to any 
number of creeds, switching freely between them in dependence on social conditions 
and prevailing political winds (2001, 269).  
Gregory reports that “religion”, as Westerners understand it today, traces its origins 
specifically to the Dutch Republic during the early seventeenth century. Several 
conditions contributed to this development, among them liberal Dutch attitudes to 
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confessional diversity; the unifying power of growing material affluence; and 
pluralistic interpretations of Christianity ushered in by the Protestant Reformation 
(2012, 373–4). The influence of shifts in Christian mores is key to modern Western 
understandings of religion altogether, since at the time of the Reformation, 
Christianity was essentially employed as a template for defining religion in general 
(Teehan 2015, 3).  
Prior to Luther’s theological revolution, religious truth-claims were imbricated in 
elite religious scholarship and academic knowledge—this in the Jewish and Muslim 
realms, as well as the Christian. After Martin Luther proclaimed the right of 
individual believers to their own scriptural understandings, however, the academy 
lost its status as an authoritative adjudicator of increasingly contradictory biblical 
interpretations (Gregory 2012, 304–5). Now, religious practitioners no longer needed 
theologians to interpret the Bible, nor priests to mediate their relationship with the 
Divine. 
At around the same time, shifting socio-political influences on European thought 
began demanding more precise philosophical and sociological analysis. Thinkers 
responded by separating faith from reason and intellect from emotion.11 Accordingly, 
universities began distinguishing theology from other academic disciplines—a 
tendency amplified by the most powerful Catholic and Protestant churches of the 
day. These institutions leveraged their political power to privilege theological studies 
and suppress doctrinal debate (Gregory 2012, 304–5).  
This same historical period saw a thriving of scientific and philosophical enquiry in 
new academies. Europe’s leading universities had meanwhile become theological 
islands, driving the pursuit and production of secular knowledge beyond their walls. 
Increasingly insulated, theologians lacked the skills to engage in robust academic 
debate, further deepening the chasm between the religious and secular realms. This 
rift was not due to any innate incompatibility between these realms, but to “an 
inculturated incapacity” to perceive their commonalities (Gregory 2012, 305).  
11 Philosopher Val Plumwood (1993, 43) suggests that while some dualisms (e.g., reason vs. nature) may predate the historical record,     
those mentioned here are most congruent with post-Enlightenment understanding. 
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By the nineteenth century, European rationalist orthodoxy had come to conflate 
theology with anti-intellectualism—a view that continues to influence Western 
understandings of religion. An undercurrent detectable in many contemporary works 
privileges secularism with a monopoly on intellectual rigour, by implication 
consigning religion to the realm of superstition and wishful thinking.12 
The Enlightenment introduced the idea that religious commitment and rational 
analysis are mutually exclusive, such that religious actors are driven by flawed 
reasoning (Cavanaugh 2009, 205). Contemporary Western debates about religious 
violence continue to be characterised by the tendency to separate the practice of 
religion from the exercise of a discriminating intellect. Modern Western 
understandings specifically assert the superiority of the reasoning mind over natural 
experience (Plumwood 1993, 42).13 Accordingly, political and intellectual elites 
often attribute to religious actors “a state of cognitive dissonance”, increasing 
societal and psychological stress on them by trivialising or rejecting the beliefs and 
values they hold sacred (Selengut 2003, 65).  
Yet some secular actors have been known to demonstrate an almost religious 
devotion to their own socio-economic doctrines. Ahmed points out that belief in 
capitalism, liberalism, secularism, and the like is, like religious commitment, based 
on professions of faith. These include declarations of purportedly “self-evident” 
truths, such as the equality of men (sic) proclaimed in the American Constitution. 
Such truth-claims, Ahmed argues, are as “empirically-unverifiable and pseudo-
rational” as is any scriptural dictum (2016, 181). Indeed, scholar of religion Timothy 
Fitzgerald argues that religious and secular ideologies are cut from the same 
conceptual cloth: 
Worship of capital, disguised as the science of economics, is an 
example of what anthropologists and religionists used to call 
12 This line of thought is exemplified in Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (New York: Bantam, 2006); Daniel Dennett, Breaking the      
Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon (New York: Penguin, 2006); and Christopher Hitchens, God Is Not Great: How Religion 
Poisons Everything (New York: Twelve Books, 2007). 
—to “nature”, “body”, and “emotion” in modern Western culture. Particularly in the wake of the European Enlightenment, she 
argues, the former set has been routinely accorded higher social and cultural value. 
13 Plumwood (1993, 43) lists phenomena such as “reason”, “rationality”, and “mind” as dualistically opposed—and implicitly superior  
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animism—belief in the independent autonomy of the products of the 
collective imagination. (Fitzgerald 2007, x) 
From this perspective, economics is indistinguishable from religion in its social 
implications. Both demand of believers a leap of faith in conceptual constructs 
divorced from lived experience. 
Pre-Enlightenment Europeans might have been surprised to encounter such 
distinctions and comparisons, for they were not called upon to differentiate their 
religious commitments from the imperatives of everyday social and political life 
(Armstrong 2014, 236). Ecclesiastical and civil authority were understood to 
constitute “a single body”, with the Church at its head (Cavanaugh 2009, 400). 
Social and political developments during the sixteenth century, however, inverted 
that hierarchy. This movement culminated in the Peace of Westphalia, which is 
widely held to mark the birth of the modern nation-state (Little 2015, 67–8). Now 
civil rulers replaced religious leaders in assuming the pinnacle of social command. 
From there, it was a relatively short step to eliminating the Church from the public 
sphere altogether (Cavanaugh 2009, 400). 
The separation of an intellectual or logical worldview from religious conviction falls 
especially heavily on the Muslim world, which is often accused of confusing the 
political and religious domains. The implication is that the Islamic understanding of 
reality, because religiously informed, is irrational, illogical, and emotionally driven 
(Manzoor 2005). When this approach is designated as the binary opposite of rational, 
logical, intellectually driven secular understanding, the application of Islamic law to 
perceived non-religious activities is glossed as inappropriate.  
However, dīn (religion) and dawla (politics) are clearly distinct in Islamic thought. 
Judeo-Christian confusion on this score lies in the normalisation of inherited 
European structural relationships between these realms, which do not necessarily 
reflect Islamic understanding. Early Muslims were disinclined to perceive such 
realms of activity as discrete or mutually exclusive (Hirschkind 1997; Ahmed 2016, 
187). Concepts of religion, secularity, and politics derived from European 
Enlightenment thought are not always applicable to Islamic traditions that evolved 
under conditions historically imbued with their own culturally contextualised 
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understandings of human activity. 
Religion and Power 
I have argued, above, that religion cannot be separated from the other societal and 
cultural currents in force at any given time and in any given place.14 Political 
interests, in particular, are frequently implicated in religious movements. The 
Crusades represent a case in point: although religious fervour was certainly a 
powerful factor in these bloody rampages, they were arguably as much motivated by 
Pope Urban II’s political aspirations (Armstrong 2014, 398).  
Cavanaugh argues that the designation of “religion” to one or other system of beliefs 
and practices is a reflection of the power dynamics in play at the time and place of 
such designation. “Religion”, in his view, “is a term that constructs and is 
constructed by different kinds of political configurations” (2009, 58). Certainly, 
Michel Foucault would agree. For him, the individual subject comes to her religious 
and other commitments entirely by dint of social, cultural, and political forces. 
Personal beliefs, opinions, aspirations, and behaviours are not expressions of 
autonomous processes, but are shaped by the “relations of power” in play at a given 
historical moment (1982).  
As stated earlier, a definition of religion is required for any thoughtful investigation 
of religious violence. The origins of and reasons for religious commitment, on the 
other hand, seem not particularly relevant to that investigation. I argue that doctrine 
and community—that is, identification with a group of religious compatriots—are 
the factors most pertinent in cases where religion is invoked to justify violent action. 
The ratio of each to each invariably differs under diverse circumstances: the lure of 
group identity, however, appears to hold particular sway in such cases. This theme 
will be explored later in this chapter. 
What Is Violence? 
Violence, the other half of the “religious violence” question, is—like religion—
14 This is of course not an original argument. See Fitzgerald 2000 for a cogent critique of academic religious studies, based on its failure to 
recognise the inseparability of religion and sociopolitical power dynamics. 
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subject to a range of definitions. Legal scholar Quraysha Ismail Sooliman attributes 
this lack of consensus to the diverse conditions, actions, and dynamics that give rise 
to violent behaviour, and cautions that any definition will inevitably affect 
interpretations of the lived experience of those who encounter it (2017, viii). 
Somewhat in line with Foucault’s view of power relations, Hector Avalos defines 
violence as “the act of modifying and/or inflicting pain upon the human body in 
order to express or impose power differentials” (2005, 19). Anthropologists Pamela 
J. Stewart and Andrew Strathern define violence as “harmful acts whose legitimacy
is contested or ambivalent” (2013, 376). The ambivalence referenced here reflects
the liminal nature of violence, which will be explored in a subsequent chapter.
The word “violence” is commonly understood in the context of its etymological 
sibling, “violation”. Violence, from this perspective, is the violation of another’s 
person, property, and/or right to conduct themselves as free social subjects. 
Obviously, being deprived of one’s life or physical agency would qualify in this 
sense as violation. The question arises, then: what prompts people to violate one 
another? 
I have argued elsewhere that violence is dependent on two primary components: 
aggression and a dualistic worldview (Woodhull 2017). Religious traditions 
frequently proclaim their opposition to aggression—from Jesus’ “turn the other 
cheek” and the declaration of Islam’s first caliph, Abū Bakr, that “God purified Islam 
and the Muslims from rashness and excessive wrath” to the belief, in certain African 
traditional religions, that the supreme deity abandoned humankind precisely because 
of its aggressive tendencies.15 More recent examples of spiritual remedies for 
aggression include those offered by diverse religious traditions and practitioners.16 
15 The cited biblical verse is Matthew 5:39. The King James Bible renders it as follows: “But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: but 
whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also.” Abū Bakr’s declaration is quoted by Chaiwat Satha-Anand, 
“Introduction”, in Islam and Nonviolence, ed. Glenn D. Paige, Chaiwat Satha-Anand, and Sarah Gilliat (Honolulu: Center 
for Global Nonviolence, 2011), 11. The reference to African traditional religion can be found in Nathalie Wlodarczyk, “African 
Traditional Religion and Violence”, in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Violence, ed. Mark Juergensmeyer, Margo Kitts, and 
Michael Jerryson, 155. 
16 Examples include Thich Nhat Hanh, Anger: Wisdom for Cooling the Flames (New York: Riverhead Books, 2001); Wayne  A. Mack,     
Anger and Stress Management God’s Way (Phillipsburg, NJ: P and R Publishing, 2017); and Rabbi Avraham Tubolsky, Remove 
Anger from Your Heart: A Torah Guide to Patience, Tolerance, and Emotional Well Being, trans. Zev Reichman (New York: The 
Judaica Press, 2017). 
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Nor are antidotes to aggression confined to the realm of religion. A search for “anger 
management” in amazon.com’s books section in December, 2017 turned up no fewer 
than 101 pages of offerings. Thus, it seems safe to conclude that in the industrialised 
West, at any rate, aggression has been recognised as problematic, and continues to be 
thoroughly addressed from multiple angles.  
Dualism, which I argue constitutes the other primary ingredient of violence, is not as 
easily distinguished from normal human discourse, for it lies at the heart of Western 
cognitive understanding (Wilber 2001, 6).17 Thoroughly normalised as dualistic 
thinking is, this perceptual mode is not widely considered detrimental to accepted 
social mores. I have in my own work argued that the dualistic worldview is not, in 
itself, necessarily problematic. I have further submitted that even the tendency to 
rank the entities separated by such thinking need not inevitably lead to violent 
conduct. Rather, I propose that violence may subsist precisely in the exclusion of the 
non-preferred binary (Woodhull 2017; see also Schwartz 1997, 5 and Jamieson and 
Orr 2009, 134). 
Violence and the Academy 
The argument that religion is hardwired into the human psyche is echoed in the 
scholarship on violence. Among those promoting this approach is historian John 
Docker, who considers violence a legacy of our descent from intrinsically belligerent 
primates (2008, 7). Walter Benjamin declares that “[t]here is no document of 
civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism” ([1955] 2007, 
256). From this perspective, violence is an unavoidable corollary of humanity’s 
historical evolution—“collateral damage”, as modern military spokespersons might 
call it, of perceived social progress. 
Sociologist and peace researcher Johan Galtung offers a typology of three types of 
violence: direct, structural, and cultural. This schema provides a helpful lens through 
17 By “dualism” I mean the tendency to assume that all phenomena may be divided into two basic categories (The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, s.v. “dualism”, accessed November 1, 2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017 /entries/dualism/). 
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which to contemplate the effects of violence on social systems. Direct violence, 
according to this breakdown, includes explicit physical insults such as killing or 
maiming, but also the misery inflicted by means of military siege and economic 
sanctions. Structural violence is characterised by exploitation, and manifests more as 
process than event.18 Cultural violence is “a substratum from which the other two 
can derive their nutrients”—neither event nor process, but a kind of undercurrent 
governing the expression of both direct and structural violence. It consists in the 
customary norms and collective mindset of a given community. The causal chain can 
begin in any of these three forms of violence, or indeed in any combination thereof 
(1990, 293–5). 
Monotheism and Violence 
Galtung is one of several scholars who argue that violence is rooted in the ground of 
Abrahamic religion. For him, the notion of an external, transcendent deity is a 
“catastrophic idea”. The invention of God Most High inevitably leads to the creation 
of his opposite—Satan Most Low—to represent the other extreme of the dualistic 
spectrum. This arrangement represents a metaphorical template whose implications 
pervade every aspect of social configuration (1990, 296–7). Rhetorician William O. 
Saas concurs. The “garb of religion” assumed by the seventeenth-century European 
state ineluctably conferred on secular affairs the binaries of good/God and evil/Satan 
(2012, 70). Saas argues further that these tropes were necessary in order to galvanise 
the citizenry against perceived outsider/enemies (2012, 70).  
Regina M. Schwartz attributes violent exclusion to the exclusive allegiance 
demanded by a monotheistic deity. For her, this dynamic lends an ominous cast to 
the secular notion of “one nation under God” (1997, xi). This view suggests an 
inevitable progression from the adoption of moral binaries to the development of a 
group identity, culminating in the violent exclusion of designated outsiders.  
Yet such arguments fail to account for the incidence of violence prior to the 
establishment of the Abrahamic religions. Docker, for example, reports that the rise 
18 Armstrong (2014, 53) refers to “the inescapable structural violence of civilized life”. Presumably, from this perspective, civilisation itself 
generates the process to which Galtung refers. 
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of agricultural-commercial societies, as long as four to six thousand years before the 
common era, occasioned widespread violence against hunter-gatherer societies 
(2008, 8). This gloss appears to echo Virgil’s identification, in the Aeneid, of the hero 
Aeneas with agricultural interests in Rome’s triumph over the “savage” hunter-
gatherers (Waswo 1997, xi). Such events would have predated the birth of Judaism—
and thus, the emergence of Abrahamic religion—by more than a millennium.  
Wherever violence first appeared in human development, however, it seems in every 
case to be linked to identification with a group of insiders mutually committed to the 
exclusion, if not the eradication, of perceived outsiders. Docker, for example, 
documents the leap from group identity to violence in the French Revolution (2008, 
191). Indeed, the motivational power of religious identity is especially potent when 
invoked to resist political oppression (Ruthven 2004, 197). I would add that the 
potency of religious identity further applies to the justification of political 
oppression.  
Again, as with religion, the origins of violence are less pertinent to this study than 
are its manifestations, specifically in the context of its relationship to religion. Hence 
my own definition of violence—as the sum of aggression and dualism—will suffice, 
at least for the purposes of this chapter. 
Does “Religious Violence” Exist? 
The term “religious violence” has been applied so broadly that a clear, consensual 
definition seems no longer possible. This section will offer an overview of the 
dominant strands of thinking on the topic, concluding that the designation of 
“religious violence” may represent an instance of the “[distortion] into clarity” 
lamented by John Law. I argue, further, that such mistaken confidence in the 
designation complicates efforts to bring true clarity to the phenomenon itself. 
Some scholars believe that religion, by its nature, is a peculiarly compelling 
motivation for violent aggression. From this perspective, the rules of logic, 
judgement, and behaviour governing ordinary conduct—and thus presumably 
inhibiting violence—are no match for a mandate perceived as divinely originated 
(Selengut 2003, 6). Yet this point fails to account for the contextual factors—social, 
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political, psychological, etc.—that may drive religious actors to interpret their divine 
mandate as commanding violence. It further fails to address the preponderance of 
non-violent over violent adherents of a given identical doctrine.  
For Mark Juergensmeyer, Margo Kitts, and Michael Jerryson, “[t]he dark attraction 
between religion and violence is endemic to religious traditions” (2013, 1). 
Juergensmeyer argues that the notion of a cosmic war between good and evil 
underlies “the transcendent moralism … and the ritual intensity” characteristic of 
religiously motivated violence (2000, 10).19 The dualism implicit in this notion is, I 
submit, inseparable from the Us-and-Them mentality associated with group identity. 
We are good, They are evil. Not incidentally, I have argued that this very dualism is 
central to violence itself.  
Other commentators, however, reject the imputation of violence on religion. 
Sooliman characterises religion as a “currency” employed by belligerents in order to 
attract support, sympathy, and legitimation. Religion, she states flatly, “does not 
constitute the motivation for violence” (2017, ix). According to Karen Armstrong, 
“[i]t is simply not true that ‘religion’ is always aggressive” (2014, 1106). She cites 
competition for scarce resources as a more likely trigger for conflict (ii). Indeed, the 
primary cause of global violence over the past five centuries has been the protection 
of existing assets and the struggle for additional resources (Käkönen 1986, 110). 
Hector Avalos argues that religion itself creates scarcity through internal hierarchies 
and unequal access to perceived resources such as scripture, sacred space, and 
salvation (2005, 110). 
Teehan argues for a more nuanced and hence a more complex role for religion in 
eruptions of violence. For him, religious frameworks of meaning give coherence to 
the inchoate experiences of exclusion, deprivation, and humiliation suffered by 
marginalised populations. While powerful prompts to violence may lie in adverse 
social conditions, therefore, religious ideology can perform a crucial function in the 
cultivation and intensification of violent ideation (2015, 16).  
19 The scholars cited here are not alone in imputing to religion an inherently violent orientation. Others include, for example, Regina M. 
Schwartz (1997) and Johan Galtung (1997/8). 
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Ultimately, people bent on violence are as liable to justify their actions with political 
conditions, racial bias, or even science as to cite religious motivations (Sosteric 
2018, 236). Even when violence can be traced to religious differences, as in the 
notorious St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre in late-sixteenth-century France, I concur 
with Niccoló Machiavelli’s view that religious power is effectively indistinguishable 
from secular political power (Avalos 2005, 339). The point is not the ideology 
driving the exercise of power, but the exercise of power itself. 
Secular Violence 
While warfare is often blamed on religion, strong evidence demonstrates that the 
formation of nation-states—itself touted as a remedy for religious violence—was 
itself a source of hostilities.20 The historical genealogy for this argument begins in 
the early agrarian era. While earlier hunter-gatherer societies did not generate 
surpluses that could support an elite class, agricultural surpluses were quickly co-
opted by the strongest social actors. Warfare followed, for territorial conquest was 
the only way to accumulate more of the land and workers necessary to maintain the 
unequal distribution of power. The states that were founded on these conquests 
required military force to protect their plunder. Armstrong attributes to unnamed 
historians the observation that militarism is regarded as “a mark of civilization” 
(2014, 44). If this is so, then civilisation—on the face of it, the expression of 
humanity’s highest aspirations—is in fact founded on humanity’s most brutal 
impulses. 
Cavanaugh’s analysis of the contemporary relationship between religion and the 
secular state prompts him to call religious violence a “myth” (2009). The invention 
of religious violence as a concept spanning human history and cultures, in his view, 
is specifically intended to legitimise the construction of a fanatical “religious Other 
… to contrast with the rational, peace-making secular subject” (4). Here again we 
find religion conflated with dangerous irrationality, in contrast to an assumed secular 
20 Although not all violence is war, all war is violence. The two can be difficult to tease apart. Käkönen (1986, 114–5), for example, refers to 
rebellion against social inequality as “a new form of war”. In this study, accordingly, the word “war” is sometimes—though never 
unthinkingly—used interchangeably with “violence”. 
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sanity. 
In rejecting the notion of religious violence altogether, Cavanaugh argues that (a) 
history has shown secular institutions to be as violent as is any religion; and (b) the 
distinction between religious and secular realms is itself specious (2009, 3–4). 
Armstrong agrees with the latter point, characterising the contemporary Western 
understanding of religion as “idiosyncratic and eccentric” (2014, 3–4). As has 
already been argued, religion’s blurred definitional boundaries lend it all too easily to 
scapegoating. 
Strong, Weak, and Pathological Religionists 
The scholarship on religious violence has generated a wide array of academic 
opinions regarding its causes and potential remedies. R. Scott Appleby offers a 
breakdown of these viewpoints, cited here in guarded recognition of the fine line 
between simplification and reductionism. In the context of this dissertation, 
Appleby’s taxonomy is helpful in sorting out a central difference of opinion in the 
field: namely, the arguments of what he calls “strong” and “weak” religionists. The 
former are those scholars who consider religion a proximate cause of violence, while 
the latter attribute violence to other social, political, and cultural conditions (2015, 
33–57).  
Appleby characterises a third group as “pathological” religionists—researchers who 
have concentrated on the psychological factors implicated in religious violence. In 
this context, he cites a robust history of religion itself being framed as an aberrant 
human impulse (not least, by the venerable Sigmund Freud ([1961, 53]). Appleby 
lists several theorists for whom religious motivations for violence reflect a habitual 
paranoid mindset, exacerbated by alienation through humiliation of the subject or 
others with whom they identify (2015, 45).21 Ultimately, however, James W. Jones 
points out that no credible evidence has yet succeeded in establishing “diagnosable 
21 Scholars who have explored the psychological aspects of religious violence include psychoanalyst and historian Charles Strozier (2007); 
religion and psychology scholar James W. Jones (2008); and psychiatrist Jay Lifton (2003). For the purposes of this study, I include 
Appleby’s “pathological religionists” in the “weak religionist” category, in that both schools argue for factors other than religion as 
proximate causes of violence. 
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psychopathology” in perpetrators of religiously motivated violence (2013, 385–6). 
My point in raising these issues is to suggest that it may not serve us to attribute 
religious violence to any single cause. The arguments of Appleby’s “strong” and 
“weak” religionists can surely not account for all of the layered interests, concerns, 
and motivations of the human beings who commit violence in the name of religion. 
Even Juergensmeyer, notwithstanding his location of violence at the heart of the 
religious impulse, concedes that a particular set of political, social, and ideological 
conditions must be present in order for that violence to erupt (2000, 10).  
Other Triggers 
Even within the religious arena, factors other than piety may constitute an 
individual’s primary identification with the tradition. The political or material 
benefits of allegiance to an affluent institution, social status, or fascination with 
particular rituals have been known to trump devotional fidelity (Hodgson 1974:1, 
360). In eighth-century Tibet, religious factionalism in fact arose out of political 
disputes, rather than the other way around. “Religion”, notes scholar of Tibetan 
Buddhism Matthew Kapstein, “became a means for the representation of political 
difference” (2000, 52). This type of power play is still very much in style. “Hamas22 
uses religion for political purposes”, according to one counter-terrorism operative. 
“They use religion to achieve political objectives” (Stern 2003, 62).  
By the same token, the fervour associated with religious piety can as easily be 
applied to numerous other passions. Anthropologists Tim Dant and Belinda Wheaton 
(2007, 11) report that windsurfers often consider their experience on the water as 
spiritual in nature, and cite sociologist M. Stranger as conflating the thrill of the sport 
with “self-transcendence”.23 Sport historian Barbara Keys argues that the sounds 
associated with sporting events “conjure up the liturgical power of church services”, 
while the sport-specific jargon expressed in live commentary carries the power of 
invocations (2013, 33).  
22 Hamas is a fundamentalist Palestinian Sunni-Islamist military and social services organisation that operates as the de facto government of the 
   Gaza Strip (Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, s.v. “Hamas”, accessed August 1, 2017, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Hamas). 
23 M. Stranger, “The Aesthetics of Risk: A Study of Surfing”, International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 34 no.3 (1999): 265–76 . 
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Political allegiances may also inspire the devotion more commonly associated with 
religion. Cavanaugh has argued that such allegiances—in post-Enlightenment 
Europe, at any rate—have been transferred from the church to the state (2011). Thus 
it is that powerful emotions may precede the objects to which they become attached, 
the latter then representing essentially interchangeable landing places for passionate 
devotion.24  
All of this brings into question what can legitimately be termed “religious 
devotion”—and hence also “religious violence”. In both cases, the word “religious” 
qualifies both the motivation for and the nature of the phenomenon; significantly, 
when applied to that phenomenon, it tends to trump or even outright exclude other 
possible motivations and natures.  
Religious devotion is not seen in the same light as is nationalistic, professional, or 
parental devotion (Carter 1998, 10). Religious violence typically finds itself in a 
different category from sexual, ethnic, or domestic violence. And yet throughout 
human history, both devotion and violence appear to be universal. This raises an 
important epistemological question: does religious fervour, erotic jealousy, ethnic 
territoriality, or national pride precede violent activity? Or, put another way, were 
these allegiances to disappear, would violence vanish with them?  
The answers to these questions might, in part, distinguish the respective positions of 
Appleby’s “strong” and “weak” religionists. Juergensmeyer, Hitchens, and Selengut 
might imagine that the elimination of religious attachments would substantially 
relieve our world of violence. Armstrong, Cavanaugh, and historian Walter Scheidel, 
on the other hand, propose other social, economic, historical, psychological, and 
political factors as at least equally culpable in generating violence.25 
Against Reductionism 
Analysing the radicalisation of aspiring terrorists, Rik Coolsaet notes that the process 
is far from linear or foreseeable. It is, in fact, “messy and full of twists”. Coolsaet 
24 Devotion may, in some cases, follow the flow of resources.  Armstrong (2014, 708) points out that the original meaning of the word 
   “secularisation” referred to the transfer of material goods from the Church to non-ecclesiastical ownership.  
25 See Armstrong 2014, Cavanaugh 2009, and Scheidel 2017. 
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cautions that any accurate analysis of radicalisation must go beyond individuals’ 
motivations to include the socio-cultural context in which the process takes place. He 
laments that the complex interplay between the individual, “a conducive or 
‘instigating’ environment”, and group dynamics following the 9/11 attacks in the 
United States was ignored in favour of declaring Salafist Islam the exclusive cause of 
terrorist activity (2016, 12–13). Law’s “ [distortion] into clarity” comes to mind here, 
as does my previously stated concern that religious violence may constitute a 
particularly tempting target for such distortion. 
Other scholars have also pointed to the inadvisability of reductionist cause-seeking. 
Jean Comaroff, for example, notes that the line between economic and religious 
interests is becoming increasingly blurred, making it difficult to blame social 
movements cleanly on one or the other (2009a, 22).26 As argued above, the 
separation of religion and politics is further a relatively late and arguably artificial 
development, bringing into question various assumptions informing the influence of 
one on the other.  
Nor is religion itself generally understood as a monolithic or exclusive moral force. 
Legal scholar Stephen L. Carter characterises the openly religious appeals of the 
1960s U.S. civil rights movement as transcending religion to invoke a deeper moral 
sense. Indeed, few contemporary accounts of that movement frame it as “religious”, 
per se (1998, 28).  
All of these examples support a view of religious interests as spanning a broad social 
expanse, within which it overlaps with most, if not all, of the other spheres governing 
everyday life. Religion, in other words, is just one among various powerful factors 
responsible for historic shifts in socio-cultural norms and perceptions (Heffner 
1993). This argument demands a broader analysis of those violent episodes in which 
religion is implicated. Perhaps, rather than a cause of violence, religion is what 
Appleby has called “a dependent variable” (2015, 34)—merely one of myriad factors 
26 Rather than viewing contemporary religious movements as ominous factors in escalating global violence, Comaroff (2009a, 22) sees a 
positive role for them in the shifting conditions of Western economic arrangements. Significantly, she rejects the notion that the 
centrality of religious interests represents a departure from the status quo, arguing instead that their prominence in emerging social 
formations arises from the reconfiguration of the fundamental components of capitalism. 
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influencing the othering of and aggression toward perceived outsiders. 
That said, the diversity of scholarship in this area itself points to the inadvisability of 
fixed notions regarding religion, violence, or religious violence. The cases in which 
religion is prominent among the justifications for violence appear no more or less 
numerous than those in which it represents a lesser motivation. Members of the 
groups perpetrating such violence almost certainly vary in their own individual sense 
of religious motivation; and that sense, too, may shift with changing socio-cultural 
conditions. Ultimately, as Appleby himself observes, neither “strong” nor 
“pathological” categories are crisp or mutually exclusive (2015, 42).  
Of the many synergistic and interactive potential triggers for religious violence, then, 
I suggest that Appleby’s taxonomy neglects a particularly important motivation: that 
of group identity. Like most aspects of human conduct, group identity is multi-
dimensional. It maintains a complex relationship with both religion and violence, 
making it difficult to pin down as clearly causal or resultant with respect to either.  
My argument proceeds to explore this relationship, beginning with an enquiry into 
the role of emotion in this richly layered configuration. Emotion, particularly anger, 
is closely bonded with the phenomena of identity formation and maintenance (Stets 
and Tsushima 2001). Such emotion is clearly implicated in violence; but emotional 
experience is also an important component of religious commitment, as this study 
will proceed to demonstrate. 
The Role of Emotion 
Appleby’s three categories of scholarship on religious violence address primarily 
cultural and socio-political conditions. The complexity of human experience, 
however, requires a deeper exploration of the motivations for violent acts. Emotional 
stimuli and inducements are implicated in both religious fervour and the impulse to 
violence. This section posits emotion as a factor linking religion and violence, and 
therefore as a significant undercurrent in the dynamics driving religious violence. 
Emotion and Religion 
The linkage of emotion and religion in the popular mind can be traced at least as far 
back as the French Revolution. Following that momentous historical episode, “civic 
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emotion” became a pressing political issue. Leaders of the emerging, self-
consciously post-religious order applied themselves to channelling the “public 
emotion-culture” into support of revolutionary ideals. To meet this imperative, 
philosopher Auguste Comte proposed a new “religion of humanity”, characterised by 
intense feelings of love and altruism (Nussbaum 2011, 7–8). Although Comte failed 
to impress his civil religion on the popular imagination, his ideas have since 
continued to exert substantial influence on philosophers around the world (2013, 19). 
The debate surrounding Comte’s proposals was part of a larger movement of 
eighteenth-century European Romanticism. Many religious thinkers in that tradition 
embraced emotion and intuition as the essence of religiosity (Jensen 2014, 16). 
Indeed, Comte himself deliberately infused his “religion of humanity” with public 
rituals and symbols calculated to stir up powerful emotions (Nussbaum 2013, 8). It 
was in the spirit of this same European Romanticism that Schleiermacher 
characterised religion as “feeling stirred in the highest direction” (1893, 39n10).  
This view is not without its supporters today. In an article entitled “Religion Is Not a 
Preference”, political scientist Joshua Mitchell plumbs the Hebrew Bible and New 
Testament to describe the experience of Judeo-Christian devotion as characterised by 
“rapture”, “awe”, and “love”. His point is that emotions—specifically those of 
humility and exaltation—more accurately depict religious engagement than do 
doctrinal conviction or ritual activity (2007, 352). Philosopher Stephen T. Asma 
asserts, in fact, that “[e]motional therapy is the animating heart of religion”. For him, 
emotional regulation is in fact the primary function of religion (2018).  
Whether religion calms or inflames the passions, there can be little argument that 
where religion is found, emotion is bound to be close by. Boyer argues that religion 
activates our most powerful emotions because it draws on mental processes 
connected to a combination of central cultural concepts, including social interactivity 
and morality. Among these processes is the capacity to “excite the human mind” 
(Boyer 2001, 329)—perhaps what Mitchell is thinking of when he describes the 
upwelling of “ecstasis”—exaltation—in religious engagement (Mitchell 2007, 353; 
emphasis original).  
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Emotion and Violence 
Military theorist Carl von Clausewitz is among those who consider “violent 
emotion” or “passion” a central motivation for warfare (Bassford 2016). However, 
the primary emotion implicated in violence may not be anger, as one might assume, 
but disgust. While a particular act might generate temporary situational anger, 
disgust goes to the fundamental character of the Other (Matsumoto, Hwang, and 
Frank, 2012). As such, it may represent a more durable and intractable motivation for 
violence than does anger. 
But while anger or disgust might prompt a desire to vanquish or eliminate the Other, 
it appears that violence may also generate positive emotions, such as ecstatic 
experience. Journalist Chris Hedges likens the “god-like” power to kill others in the 
heady ferment of war to “the ecstasy of erotic love” (2002, 88). Mark C. Taylor, too, 
argues for the erotic underpinnings of violence (2007, 176–7). Indeed, philosopher 
Georges Bataille deliberately contemplated images of violent death in order to attain 
ecstatic states (Bush 2011, 302). In these cases, the object of violence would 
presumably be interchangeable. Any victim will suffice to trigger the desired ecstasy. 
Ecstasy 
The etymology of “ecstasy” derives from a sense of “standing outside” of 
conventional consciousness.27 In this sense, ethicist William F. May argues that acts 
of terrorism, specifically, can be said to generate ecstasy: an experience of being 
“beside oneself” in the throes of frenzied outrage. Importantly, such ecstasy is not 
confined to terrorists—actors conventionally understood to be possessed of 
pathological fervour—but also finds expression in state actors. Whatever ideology or 
institution the violent perpetrator is pledged to uphold, a point is reached when the 
emotional force of violence overrides the constraints of reason and the fear of 
consequences (May 1974).  
The experience of heightened exhilaration commonly conflated with ecstasy, then, 
may derive as much from a craving for excitement as from vanquishing an enemy. 
27 See Eric Partridge, Origins, s.v. “stand”. 
37 
The experience of violence presents an invigorating escape from the quotidian. “The 
brush with death relieves men of that other death—boredom”, May remarks, 
suggesting that even the dangerous encounter with mortality may sometimes be 
preferable to the humdrum routines of everyday life (1974, 290).  
Sociologist Bernhard Giesen submits that violent acts generate “ecstatic self-
intensification”, which he argues is a stronger motivation than any other discussed 
thus far. While incentives to violence such as greed, impunity, and social discontents 
can be addressed, no proposed remedies for these ills can penetrate the “utter 
egocentrism” to which Giesen attributes the urge to experience ultimate power 
through destructive agency. The amplification of self and ego Giesen describes here 
would seem to reflect the power of identity as a site of fixation. The relationship 
between identity and religious fervour is further emphasised in his characterisation of 
this egocentric ecstasy as “a deified self-intensification” (2015a, 86). In the intense 
experience described, identity, religion, and violence are seen to participate in a 
potent dialectic that affirms and magnifies all three. 
May traces a religious foundation for ecstasy in violence to the Babylonian creation 
myth, in which Marduk, “the cosmic sheriff”, and Tiamat, representing cosmic 
chaos, engage in brutal combat. The struggle ends with Marduk’s “fevered excess” in 
savagely dismembering his foe (1974, 285–6). Based on this implied synergistic 
interaction of religion and violence, as expressed more than three thousand years 
ago, I am moved to speculate that this relationship is, if not exactly hardwired into 
the human condition, at least long established in custom. Indeed, historian Terry 
Eagleton proposes that “[t]error begins as a religious idea … and religion is all about 
deeply ambivalent powers which both enrapture and annihilate” (2005, 2).28 From 
this point of view—as also argued by Appleby’s strong religionists—violence is 
imbricated in religion. 
Certainly, early poets attributed violent activity to Eagleton’s divine “ambivalent 
28 I am aware of conflating terror with violence here. According to Hannah Arendt (1969), the two are distinct in that terror describes the form 
of government that arises in the wake of unopposed violence. In the context of our contemporary experience of religious violence, 
however, I argue that the vernacular overlap between the meanings of the two terms justifies such conflation. 
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powers”, crediting the gods—or, for that matter, God—for natural disasters. These 
attributions may have led humans to associate extreme fear and calamity with the 
deities they worshiped and tried to appease (Kitts 2013, 411). Nor is the combination 
of divinely inspired disaster and ecstatic release confined to ancient times; the 
Bosnian Serb war criminal Radovan Karadzic, in claiming the godlike power to 
dispense “universal distress”, promised his followers “an ecstasy of vengeance” 
(414). Again, the interweaving of divine agency and ecstatic violence appears to be 
encoded in human experience. 
Religion, Violence, and Identity 
It seems that defining ourselves against the Other sets in motion a cycle of 
violence that no legislation can hold.  
—Regina M. Schwartz, The Curse of Cain 
While both perpetrators and observers frequently attribute violent acts and 
campaigns to religious motivations, the scholarship cited above suggests that 
violence is prompted by a more complex mix of conditions. In this section, I will 
argue that most, if not all, of these conditions can themselves be traced to questions 
of identity. 
I am not, of course, the first to make this argument. Terrorism scholar Jessica Stern 
proposes that religion comprises two imperatives: spirituality and identity, the latter 
“often in opposition to others” (2003, 137). Fundamentalism, in particular, has been 
defined as a strategy employed by religious actors reacting to perceived threats to 
their “distinctive identity as a people or group” (Appleby and Marty 1997, 3). This 
gloss supports my own argument, which ranks threats to identity as more compelling 
motivations for violence than are theological or ideological disputes. 
Rik Coolsaet points out that second- and third-generation Muslims in Europe have 
increasingly identified with “the religious affiliation that society constantly throws in 
their face”. In support of this argument, he cites the growth and popularity of groups 
such as Sharia4Belgium, a radical Islamist collective active in Antwerp, and other 
cells connected with ISIS (2016, 33). 
But the phenomena associated with radicalisation are by no means exclusive to 
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Islamist groups. These are, rather, common to many cliques drawn together by actual 
or perceived common identities. Coolsaet’s description of the process involved is 
worth quoting at length here. 
Radicalisation is first and foremost a socialisation process in which 
group dynamics (kinship and friendship) are more important than 
ideology. … Socialisation into extremism and, eventually, into 
terrorism, happens gradually and requires a more or less prolonged 
group process. Feelings of frustration and inequity first have to be 
interiorised and then lead to a mental separation from society (which 
is held responsible for those feelings). Individuals then reach out to 
others who share the same feelings, and create an “in-group”. Within 
such a group, personal feelings get politicised (“what are we going to 
do about it?”). Groupthink gradually solidifies into an unquestioned 
belief system and attitude, with alternative pathways gradually being 
pushed aside. In this process, ideology helps to dehumanise the 
outside-group and transforms innocents (who bear no responsibility 
for the original feelings of frustration and inequity) into guilty 
accomplices. In this process of gathering extremism, for most of the 
individuals involved, it is not the narrative (i.e., the ideology) that 
eventually lures them into terrorism. (Coolsaet 2016, 12)  
Several key themes of this dissertation are to be found in Coolsaet’s extrapolation. 
First, according to his analysis, the process of radicalisation begins with “feelings of 
frustration and inequity”—that is, emotions. If Boyer is correct in his assessment of 
religion as a source of powerful emotions, it seems not unreasonable to infer that 
Coolsaet’s recruits may well seek it out as anodyne, specifically, for the painful 
experience of the negative emotions cited. “Feelings stirred in the highest direction”, 
as per Schleiermacher, would surely offer relief from those stirred in the very much 
lower direction of powerlessness in the face of injustice. 
Second, Coolsaet argues that identification with the group exerts more power over 
the individual recruit than does the attraction of ideological content. Indeed, in a 
survey of 61 convicted Islamist terrorists in Canada and Europe, terrorism 
researchers Jamie Bartlett and Carl Miller found that “a significant number” of their 
subjects had only a superficial grasp of the religion whose authority they claimed for 
their violent acts (2012, 9). According to Stern’s aforementioned counter-terrorism 
expert, it is not uncommon to find pornographic movies in the homes of leading 
Hamas activists, some of whom are “not so religious” (2003, 61–2). These findings 
40 
support my argument that while religious ideology may well contribute to violent 
acts, the forces of group identification run deeper and stronger than doctrine.29 
Third, the dualistic split between Us, Coolsaet’s “in-group”, and Them, the 
dehumanised “outside-group”, necessarily precedes the move to violence. 
Significantly, this split requires prolonged identification with the perceived “in-
group”—again, highlighting the importance of group identity in fomenting the 
conceptual framework that may eventually justify violence. 
And fourth, Coolsaet’s description touches on the tripartite rites of passage proposed 
by Arnold van Gennep. Briefly, van Gennep’s three phases of such rites describe an 
initial separation from the mainstream social order; a “threshold” passage, 
characterised by an inversion of that order; and finally, a return to stability, albeit one 
in which the transformation of those who have passed across the threshold 
necessarily transforms the society as a whole (Turner 1974a, 196). The next chapter 
of this study will apply van Gennep’s framework to Coolsaet’s depiction of the 
radicalisation process—this in the interests of building my argument that violence 
represents, at least in part, an autonomic response to a societal need for 
transformation.  
Group Identity 
The tendency for human beings to coalesce into groups, and to identify with those 
groups, is deeply rooted in our evolutionary development. An important aspect of 
such identification is the emergence of a moral binary, in which morality is perceived 
as the property of in-group, or Us. Accordingly, the out-group—Them—is 
considered outside this established moral framework (Teehan 2015, 6).30 From this 
perspective, the tendency of humans to form in- and out-groups is encoded in early 
evolutionary imperatives. The orientation to an exclusionary group identity, then, 
may be virtually primal in human psychology. 
29 See also Aly and Striegher (2012, 855–6). These researchers report that recruits to violent extremist groups are typically drawn in by social 
factors, often amending their religious views in order to become more aligned with the group. 
30 Teehan (2015, 14) clarifies that this way of perceiving the Other or Them need not necessarily constitute a bias, as such. It does, however,
  imply a hierarchy of people innately deserving of “moral sensibility”.   
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Contemporary psychological research accords with this view, detecting this same 
fundamental tendency in individual development. The infant develops a sense of 
“we-ness” by identifying with those perceived as most like itself. This trend 
ultimately crystallises in large-group identity, which is by nature exclusive of those 
not perceived as insiders (Volkan 2014, 18–20). Indeed, psychiatrist Vamik Volkan 
conflates this “we-ness” with what he calls “large-group narcissism” (109).  
It would thus appear that the tendency of human beings to form strong group 
identifications is encoded in our earliest evolutionary and psychological 
development. Accordingly, in psychologist Abraham Maslow’s famous hierarchy of 
needs, the yearning for “belongingness” follows immediately on the most basic 
human imperatives for survival and safety (1970, 43). So powerful is the need to 
maintain group integrity that violence against the outsider may at times spring from 
internal disharmonies that are projected outward to avert threats to unity (Kluckhohn 
1960, 177).  
As an individual matures, identification with parental allegiances and values is 
challenged by exposure to a wider world of ideologies, activities, and events. All of 
these influences forge interrelated personal and large-group identities during 
adolescence. According to Volkan, these identities typically continue to inform the 
individual’s lifelong allegiances (2014, 21). One’s personal identity comes to align 
itself with the large group’s ethnic and/or national self-image, and hence also with its 
political positioning. Such identification can give rise to the “‘primitive’ mental 
mechanisms” associated with prejudicial attitudes toward other groups (59–60).  
Not surprisingly, then, emotions are deeply implicated in questions of group identity. 
Stern notes that utter clarity regarding one’s own identity and the superiority of one’s 
own group over all others, and the associated campaign to purify an unbelieving 
world, constitute “a kind of bliss” (Stern 2003, xxviii). This same “bliss”, then, may 
serve to empower the dualism that I have argued is itself a central component of 
violence. It seems, too, that such bliss mirrors the styles of ecstasy described earlier, 
reinforcing emotional motivations for violence. 
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Religion and Identity 
[R]eligions are less about truth-claims and more about identity … less
about abstraction and more about tradition or that which is passed on.
—Gavin Flood, Beyond Phenomenology 
Religious allegiance has proven particularly powerful in consolidating group 
identity. In her study of groups claiming religious motivations for terrorist activity, 
Stern describes the cultivation of group identity by leaders who capitalise on 
experiences of alienation and moral confusion (2003, 30). These experiences, in her 
view, have multiplied as a consequence of globalisation, which has replaced 
relatively simple, localised identities with a profusion of potential identities (156). 
Identity is, of course, closely allied with self-esteem (Herman 1992, 261).31 Given 
this linkage, it could be argued that the current extent of globalisation has made of 
group identity a more urgent imperative than ever before in human history. 
Historian of religion Elaine Pagels points to religion’s moral imperative as especially 
powerful in constructing an Us-versus-Them worldview. When a group views itself 
as “God’s people”, members of any group opposing it are logically “God’s enemies”. 
In the history of Western conflict, Pagels argues, this construct has strengthened the 
identity of Christian groups—and significantly, has further served to justify profound 
antipathy and even bloody massacres (1995, xix).  
Nor is this phenomenon confined to Christian groups. Counter-terrorism researchers 
Anne Aly and Jason-Leigh Striegher, describing the process of Islamist 
radicalisation, characterise religion as “a vehicle for group bonding, a moral template 
for constructing ingroup/outgroup boundaries, a legitimizing ideology that is used to 
authorize the use of violence and the narrative basis for collective victim identity” 
(2012, 859). Religion, in other words, offers a particularly attractive locus of group 
identity, providing as it does not only a shared badge of belonging, but a gratifying 
source of moral righteousness and ideological support for exclusionary aggression. 
31 Esteem, from both self and other, also features prominently in Abraham Maslow’s (1970, 45) hierarchy of needs. 
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Violence and Identity 
I have proposed that a more fundamental condition underlies the expressions of both 
violence and religious allegiance: namely, that of identity. Yet these three human 
dynamics—violence, religion, and identity—can hardly be separated. Religion serves 
as a powerful marker of identity, perceived threats against which provoke violence. 
The dialectical relationship between these three factors informs the central thesis of 
this study.  
Another scholar exploring this triumvirate is social scientist Malise Ruthven, who 
argues that the fundamentalist ideologies to which violence is frequently attributed 
are direct reactions to the perceived threats of modern secularisation to an 
established group identity (2004, 8). Ruthven further suggests that the rise of a 
twentieth-century evangelical Christian movement in the United States was closely 
related to the development of “a core WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) 
identity” in opposition to German, Catholic, Socialist, Jewish, and other perceived 
incursions into American culture (128–9). 
Ruthven’s research focuses on the relationship between religion and identity. Scholar 
of nationalism Anthony D. Smith extends his own observations of this relationship to 
include violence. Smith proposes that identity is as potently invoked by “sustained 
enmities and protracted warfare”—in a word, extended violence—as by religious 
fervour (1998, 79). He tracks the power of such identification to its expression in 
nationalism, which he calls “a ‘political religion’” (98).32 Cultural commentator 
David Brooks, writing nearly two decades later, argues that many contemporary 
Americans are now basing personal identity on political partisanship (2017). John 
Comaroff characterises such partisanship as “a species of ‘fractal’ citizenship” 
(2009b, 197). If Smith’s analysis holds, it may be persuasively argued that the shift 
toward partisan nationalism tracked by Brooks and Comaroff is, if not inherently 
violent, then at least permissive of violent ideation. 
32 Social scientist K.N. Panikkar concurs, suggesting that contemporary India is seeing the construction of “a ‘religious citizenship’ in place of 
political citizenship” (“Nationalism and Its Detractors”, Social Scientist 44, no. 9/10, [September/October 2016]: 7, https://www.jstor.org/
stable/24890298). 
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The commentators cited above specifically link identity with nationalism. Yet as 
political psychologist Catarina Kinnvall has noted, religious and nationalist fervour 
can be difficult to tease apart. She argues that when a blend of religious and 
nationalist allegiances coalesces into a single, monolithic, “stabilizing anchor” of 
identity, it may be reinforced by myths and historical territorial claims in order to 
justify violence (2004, 757–8). The construction and reinterpretation of such 
historical narratives provide alternatives to the more insecure realities of volatile 
socio-political conditions (763).  
Researching nationalistic and religious identity in Taiwan and Hong Kong, 
international relations scholars Edmund Frettingham and Yih-Jye Hwang argue that 
the shifting line between the two allegiances is subject to the prevailing political and 
cultural winds (2017). In other words, the compulsion to establish identity—at least, 
in this example—is more powerful than is the particular substance of that identity. 
Whether an individual cleaves to nationalism or religion, in this view, is a matter of 
expediency rather than of devotion.  
A sense of threat to a particular identity, in particular, tends to increase allegiance to 
that identity. French-Lebanese author Amin Maalouf notes that while an individual 
typically identifies with any number of large groups, which aspect of his identity 
prevails at any given moment is strongly influenced by the perception of a threat to 
that particular aspect. The perceived threat provokes violent efforts to protect it 
(2000, 13). In similar vein, Armstrong argues that it is precisely threats to religious 
identity that drive belligerents to seek selective justifications for violence in 
traditional doctrines and practices (2000, 6).  
Following these arguments, one begins to discern a certain thread. We are compelled 
to seek out group identities; perceived threats to our chosen group strengthen our 
identification with it; such identification requires ever clearer distinctions between 
Us and Them; we then proceed to seek out justifications for rejecting (or even 
eliminating) the perceived outsiders. 
Threats to religious and nationalist identities are further complicated by 
psychological, social, and cultural issues. Criminologist Orla Lynch notes that 
“terrorism, radicalism and extremism have become entangled with notions of 
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identity, integration, segregation and multiculturalism”.33 All of these latter notions 
are specifically implicated in the phenomenon of group identity. Lynch argues that 
young Muslims in Britain have become vulnerable to radicalisation precisely due to 
mainstream interference with the processes central to the establishment of a healthy 
identity. This interference is characterised by an “othering” of such youths, along 
with demands for proofs of loyalty to “Britishness and British values”. In this 
context, Lynch notes, identity has become synonymous with one’s primary loyalty, 
whether to the nation-state or the transnational Islamist movement. This highly 
pressurised binary setup, she argues, pathologises the complex processes entailed in 
adolescent identity formation (2013, 241–4).34 
Conclusion 
I have argued that the notion of religious violence is a distortion of a vastly more 
nuanced and complex reality. Its failure to reflect that reality lies in the sui generis 
nature of religion. With its perceived non-rational glamour—its quasi-magical aura
—religious fervour resists Western scholarship’s Enlightenment-influenced 
insistence on empirical evidence. As such, it is often represented as opposing the 
presumption of secular sanity. To the extent that representations of this sort emerge 
in Western social scientific studies, a given religion may be rendered vulnerable to 
assumptions and projections not native to its internal logic.  
The peculiarly vivid ambience of devotional fervour serves to dazzle the scholarly 
eye, too easily tainting religion with shades of irrationality. With violence itself 
representing the very enactment of irrationality, the leap to “religious violence” can 
seem logical. Yet, I submit, this logic is intellectually flabby—and to the extent that 
it attributes violence to religious allegiance, materially dangerous.  
33 Although terrorism is inherently violent, radicalism and extremism are not necessarily so. In the context of our times, however, it can 
  safely be argued that in combination, these three terms have come to be recognised as corollaries of violence. Indeed, Lynch (2013, 242) 
     herself characterises radicalisation as "socialisation towards violence" and terrorism as "a product of radicalisation". 
34 Lynch’s research is specific to Muslim youths residing in Britain. The assumptions she critiques, however—the insistence that young 
Muslims choose either ISIS or Britain—resonate throughout the academic literature on terrorism. See, for example, M. Sageman, 
Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); C. McCauley and S. Moskalenko, “Mechanisms 
of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism”, Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no.3 (2008): 415–33; and R. Jackson, Writing 
the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005). 
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The flawed logic described here serves to obscure a deeper trigger for violence: the 
urgent human yearning to belong. I submit that religion constitutes an ideal 
scapegoat for violence in that it provides a particularly powerful locus for group 
identity. Those scholars who alight on religion as the cause of violence, from this 
perspective, are missing the wood for the trees. I argue, further, that those who 
attribute religious violence to other socio-political triggers may be overlooking the 
crucial element of group identification.  
Neither religion nor violence can be reliably attributed to fundamental human 
instinct. On the other hand, the urge to establish “we-ness” has been authoritatively 
traced to the earliest stages of human development. The division of the world into Us 
and Them appears to be basic to our species. Thus, threats to Us constitute more than 
mere political or societal menaces: they go to our most fundamental existential 
instincts. I argue that so-called religious violence constitutes an instinctual reaction 
to such threats. The more serious the perceived disruption to or humiliation of one’s 
own group, the deeper the division between Us and Them, and the more necessary 
the outsiders’ otherness becomes to our internal bonding. The violent exclusion of 
the Other thus becomes essential to the survival of group identity. This dynamic, I 
propose, offers a more pertinent and workable explanation for the phenomena 
loosely designated as “religious violence”. 
Whatever the source of religious violence, however, its manifestation clearly opposes 
social stability. In this, it reflects the “rootlessness, instability, [and] rapid transition 
from one state to the next, one fetish to another” characteristic of contemporary 
society (Frosh 1991, 187). Some scholars argue that this generalised turmoil is the 
very nature of modernity (Thomassen 2014)—indeed, that modernity is so 
constituted as to provoke crises of identity (Frosh 1991, 191). The dynamics at play 
under these circumstances, while chaotic, are however not without their own 
particular logic. The next chapter introduces the concept of liminality as a framework 




I believe that ideas about separating, purifying, demarcating and punishing 
transgressions have as their main function to impose system on an 
inherently untidy experience. It is only by exaggerating the difference 
between within and without, about and below, male and female, with and 
against, that a semblance of order is created.  
—Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger 
To the Greek philosopher Heraclitus is attributed the insight that reality is in constant 
flux. At around the same time—the fourth century BCE—Gautama, known to us as 
the Buddha, was thinking along similar lines. Among the Buddha’s fundamental 
teachings is the fact of impermanence. Nothing in our world is fixed: everything is 
perpetually in the process of arising, dwelling, and passing out of existence.  
This worldview is not confined to the realm of philosophical or religious ideology. 
Anthropologist and ethnographer Charles-Arnold Kurr van Gennep notes that “[t]he 
universe itself is governed by a periodicity which has repercussions on human life, 
with stages and transitions, movements forward, and periods of relative inactivity”. 
Van Gennep further submits that this universal process impacts on every area of 
human experience ([1909] 1960, 1–3)—that it is, in fact “the central ‘fact of life’” 
(Thomassen 2014, 59).  
This chapter takes as its starting point the ubiquity and inevitability of van Gennep’s  
stages and transitions—particularly the latter, which he and subsequent scholars 
have classified as recursive “liminal” or “threshold” passages in human experience. 
The definition of liminality as primarily experiential is key to the argument of this 
dissertation. I propose that if clues to the riddle of religious violence are to be found 
in religion itself, the experience of religious actors may offer richer investigative 
possibilities than do examinations of religious doctrine. My search for such clues 
specifically explores the liminal experiences encoded in the Sufi and Tibetan 
Buddhist systems.  
Building on the trifold analysis of identity, religion, and violence explored in the 
previous chapter, this chapter investigates the role of liminality in religious violence. 
The relevance of applying the lens of liminality to religious violence lies in the 
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extended chaos that characterises much of the contemporary conflict in which 
religion is implicated. It concludes by arguing that the explosive emergence of 
violence, particularly violence fuelled by religious dogma and threats to identity, 
may be associated with reactive aversion to liminal imperatives. 
Liminality: The Experience of Transition 
Human society is built around a centre of the stability of the unstable. 
—M. Barnard, “Flows of Worship in the Network Society” 
Van Gennep’s analysis of the processual stages of existential flux first came to 
academic attention through his 1909 book, Les rites de passage (The Rites of 
Passage). A “rite of passage”—a term he is credited with having brought into the 
popular vernacular35—is “a passage from one situation to another or from one 
cosmic or social world to another” ([1909] 1960, 10). A formal rite of passage can 
mark a person’s transition between social statuses—such as the graduation from 
childhood to adulthood, or from the unmarried state to the married; movement 
through time (as in lunar or seasonal ceremonies); or transit across territorial 
boundaries. 
Van Gennep identifies three distinct phases of the rites of passage: separation, 
transition, and incorporation. Having observed these phases in a wide range of social 
and cultural contexts, he determined that this tripartite process was universal to all 
human rituals. He also referred to the three phases as “separation, margin, and 
reaggregation” in order to emphasise “the structural aspects of passage” (Turner 
1969, 166; emphases original). 
In every rite of passage, the same sequence is present: first, separation of the 
neophyte from community life in anticipation of the rite; second, entry into a liminal 
space where the initiand “wavers between two worlds” (van Gennep [1909] 1960, 
18); and finally, incorporation into a new status, such as adulthood, wedlock, 
priesthood, or motherhood. Van Gennep notes that separation, transition, and 
35 New World Encyclopedia, s.v. “Rite of passage”, accessed April 16, 2018, http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/p 
/index.php?title=Rite_of_passageandoldid=989371. 
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incorporation might be accorded varying emphases, respectively, depending on the 
specific ritual ([1909] 1960, 11). In some instances, all three might occur within any 
single phase. 
Van Gennep considers the power of liminality to be pivotal; indeed, he designates all 
three ritual phases in relation to it: 
I propose to call the rites of separation from a previous world, 
preliminal rites, those executed during the transitional stage liminal 
(or threshold) rites, and the ceremonies of incorporation into the new 
world post-liminal rites. (Van Gennep [1909] 1960, 21; emphases 
original) 
According to Turner, van Gennep employs this particular framing in order to 
foreground the spatial and temporal shifts that unsettle conventional norms and 
values; in short, to underscore “the peripheral position of [social] structure” (1969, 
166). The word “liminal” is etymologically related to the notion of a threshold: the 
boundary separating an inner from an outer space.36 Indeed, van Gennep devotes 
significant attention to rites that incorporate actual material portals that separate 
inner and outer or sacred and profane spaces ([1909] 1960, 57–61). Anthropologist 
and social scientist Bjørn Thomassen echoes van Gennep’s view in noting that 
liminality can apply in both spatial and temporal contexts, as also in a combination 
of the two (2009, 16–18).  
Victor Turner 
Van Gennep’s work was taken up after his death by English anthropologist Victor W. 
Turner. Turner describes the first of van Gennep’s three phases, that of separation, as 
a removal of the initiand from their previous stable condition: a marking out of that 
individual (or group) for the transition ahead. During the second, liminal, phase, the 
initiand is bereft of status, “betwixt and between” two stable states. In the third 
phase, the initiand emerges, transformed, to be ritually incorporated into the new 
stable condition. The community confirms her new status by identifying her with this 
emergent cultural position, and expects her to conduct herself according to its norms. 
36 The word is derived from the Latin līmen, “which means both the lintel and the step or threshold of a door affording entry to a house” (Eric 
Partridge, Origins, s.v. “liminal”). 
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Thus, a person previously considered a child is now perceived as an adult, or one in a 
previous state of ritual impurity is now received as purified (1966, 47). 
Turner’s interest in van Gennep’s work focuses primarily on the transitional or 
liminal phase of passage rituals. Echoing van Gennep’s “wavering between two 
worlds”, he describes the dynamic liminal stage as “ambiguous”, “an interstructural 
situation” that occurs “betwixt and between” two distinct states (1966). During this 
passage, the initiand is outside the consensually understood social positions. Turner 
offers an example from his fieldwork with the Ndembu people of present-day 
Zambia, where the person undergoing a male puberty rite is neither boy nor man; he 
is a “structurally indefinable ‘transitional-being’” and, as such, ritually impure (1966, 
46–48). Again reflecting van Gennep’s view, Turner refers to such “liminal 
personae” as “threshold people” (1969, 95; emphasis original). 
Defining Liminality 
The liminal is understood to refer to a zone lying in between two clearly defined 
areas; but its own nature or character is itself not clearly defined, for the liminal is an 
unsettled, imprecise, even amorphous region. Here, the parameters governing past 
experience no longer apply, while those governing future experience have not yet 
taken shape. Thus, the liminal passage is intrinsically unstructured.  
Liminality’s volatile nature prompts some scholars to caution against too fixed a 
definition. Political scientist Bahar Rumelili defines it as a fluid “realm of social 
possibility” that is responsive to the actions of those who enter and claim it. She 
cautions against “essentialising” the concept, i.e., ascribing to it concrete, structured 
definitions. To do so, Rumelili argues, contradicts its anti-structural nature, and 
reproduces the fixed frameworks of meaning that in fact give rise to liminality (2012, 
499–502). International relations scholar Maria Mälksoo concurs, noting that 
liminality, by definition, opposes essentialisation (2012, 482). It may perhaps be the 
case that reflexive attempts to concretise liminality expose a culturally embedded 
distaste for ambiguity and lack of structure.37 
37 Again, Law’s caution regarding attempts to “distort into clarity” would seem to apply. 
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Thomassen defines liminality as simply “the experience of finding oneself at a 
boundary or an in-between position, either spatially or temporally” (2015, 40). 
Significantly, this definition does not locate the liminal in any in-between space or 
time, but rather in the experience of that in-betweenness. Social theorist Arpad 
Szakolczai asserts that the sequence of any rite of passage in fact mirrors the 
structure of lived experience. He further demonstrates that, in representing the death 
of the previous experience and the transition to the next, each experiential sequence 
reflects van Gennep’s tripartite configuration (2015, 16–7). 
Victor Turner calls liminality “a temporal interface whose properties partially invert 
those of the already consolidated order which constitutes any specific cultural 
‘cosmos’” (1974b, 73). It is that which lies “betwixt and between” established 
structures. In separating those ordering structures, Mälksoo argues, liminality 
disrupts them, along with their associated hierarchical relations and traditional 
authority (2012, 481).38  
Ethnologist Jean E. Jackson offers, as one definition of liminality, Mary Douglas’s 
famous description of dirt as “matter out of place” (2005, 333).39 This view is 
somewhat reflected in Katherine Cumings Mansfield’s conflation of liminality with 
“outsiderness” (2014, 129). Turner, his “betwixt and between” definition 
notwithstanding, implicitly supports this notion of the liminal as “outside” (1969, 
111; 1974a, 16). From this perspective, what is out of place is defined in relation to a 
supposed “inside”—where van Gennep’s “separation” phase would presumably 
operate. However, it lacks any terminal, or incorporative, state. Accordingly, 
Thomassen disagrees, stressing that the liminal is not outside recognised structures, 
but specifically in between them (2014, 7–8). 
Szakolczai argues that the tripartite nature of van Gennep’s analysis offers a helpful 
challenge to binary understandings of order versus disorder and structure versus the 
lack of structure. In contrast to those polarised attributes, Szakolczai proposes that a 
“processual model” incorporating the liminal phase provides a more accurate 
38 Indeed, Turner (1969) conflates liminality with “anti-structure”. 
39 Douglas 1966, 36. 
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analytical approach to social dynamics (2000, 210). This model is precisely what I 
propose to apply to the phenomenon of religious violence. 
The same logic prompts Thomassen to reject the term “margin” as a synonym for the 
liminal—this although Turner employs the word to paraphrase van Gennep’s 
understanding of the liminal phase of ritual (1969, 94). Thomassen’s concern, here, is 
that the term “liminal” is too easily conflated with phenomena at the edge of the 
conventionally predictable and expected. Liminality, he stresses, is not a shorthand 
for social exclusion; rather, it should be applied solely to that which is interstitial or 
in between (2014, 7–8). “To think with liminality”, Thomassen asserts, “very 
basically means to realize that human life is organized as a precarious balance 
between the limit and the limitless” (11). Here, the concept of liminality is itself 
delimited.  
The liminal passage is not applicable to the outsider or marginalised entity, whose 
status is lopsidedly defined only by the boundary that lies between itself and the 
“inside”. When an individual is pushed out of the circle, accordingly, she lands in a 
realm unbounded by any outer limit. Van Gennep’s third, aggregative or 
incorporative, phase is expunged from the equation. This approach, ironically, 
reinstates the very binary—insider versus outsider—that the liminal explicitly 
disrupts. 
Following Thomassen’s logic, this study proceeds on the understanding of liminality 
as lying explicitly between two stable states, rather than merely outside or on the 
margin of any given state.  
Liminality and the Academy 
Liminality is … a prism through which to understand transformations in 
the contemporary world. 
          —Agnes Horvath, Bjørn Thomassen, and Harald Wydra, 
“Liminality and the Search for Boundaries” 
The following brief survey of academic understandings of liminality serves a 
threefold purpose. First, it demonstrates how broadly the concept has been applied 
across academic disciplines. Second, it surveys academic views on whether 
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liminality promotes or threatens the individual and social good. And third, it presents 
the concept of permanent liminality, a condition in which the upheaval of the liminal 
passage is extended indefinitely. 
Extending the Scope 
Since van Gennep’s and Turner’s insights entered the anthropological corpus, the 
trope of liminality has expanded into a great many other fields. As Mälksoo 
observes, the concept is easily and helpfully applied to a wide range of disciplines 
(2012, 481).  
Hinting at a broader context for liminality studies, Turner proposes that “the basic 
building blocks of culture” are revealed in the liminal phase of ritual (1967, 110); 
even that culture is somehow encoded in liminality (Thomassen 2014, 82). It is 
believed that academic criticism influenced Turner to restrict the term “liminality” to 
its anthropological context; he coined the alternative “liminoid” for cautious 
applications beyond that discipline (Horvath 2013, 2).  
For humanities scholars Bianca Teodorescu and Răzvan Alexandru Călin, 
“[l]iminality represents a main factor in the development of society” (2015, 98). 
Rumelili proposes that in the field of international relations, it offers an analytical 
framework for the study of emerging and shifting social structures (2012, 498). In 
the social sciences, Thomassen suggests, liminality may prove as fundamental for 
analysis as are the venerable pillars of “structure” and “practice” (2009, 5). 
Szakolczai goes so far as to predict that liminality “is about to become a master 
concept” (2017, 231).  
Sociologist Agnes Horvath offers a pithy argument for the wide applicability of 
liminality as an analytical tool: 
The crucial significance of the term “liminal” … is that it has an 
extremely wide range of applicability in its precise and technical 
capturing of the imprecise and unsettled situation of transitoriness. 
Any situation where borderlines and boundaries that previously were 
stable and taken for granted are dissolved generates a “liminal” 
situation which needs some solution, as the elimination of such 
boundaries generates uncertainties in which a decent and meaningful 
normality becomes impossible, returning the world into chaos. 
(Horvath 2013, 10) 
54 
Not surprisingly, then, many academics have recognised liminality as a fact of life in 
arenas as diverse as education (Mansfield 2014), mind-body studies (Jackson 2005), 
and international relations (Mälksoo 2012). Liminality is invoked in analyses ranging 
from sports (Rowe 1998) to virtual reality (Madge and O’Connor 2005) and 
breastfeeding (Mahon-Daly and Andrews 2002). Exploring the implications of 
liminality for management science, Jennifer Howard-Grenville et al regard it as a 
“cultural apparatus” to be shaped in the service of innovation (2011, 523–8). 
Mythologist Ingvild Sælid Gilhus argues that gnostic mythology relies on liminality 
to effect the transformation to which initiands aspire (1984, 107–10).  
Folklorist Juwen Zhang suggests that van Gennep based his model of the rites of 
passage on “the commonality of human activities” (2012, 122)—in other words, that 
his tripartite template reflects natural social dynamics. Indeed, a number of scholars 
consider the liminal phase of those rites “a fundamental feature of the human 
condition” (Mälksoo 2012, 482), surfacing in their respective arenas precisely 
because it is already present. When the world appears to have attained stability, 
argues sociologist Piotr Sztompka, observers are merely experiencing “cognitively 
frozen phases” in the dynamic flow of natural events (2004, 155). These arguments 
represent a widespread understanding of liminality as a natural property of human 
dynamics. 
The Merits of Liminality 
Scholars do not necessarily agree on whether liminality is helpful or harmful to 
individual or social well-being. This section offers an overview of the debate in this 
regard. 
Both Howard-Grenville et al (2011) and Gilhus (1984) gloss liminality as positive, 
even necessary. Clare Madge and Henrietta O’Connor, analysing online interactions 
among expectant mothers, likewise cast a favourable eye on liminal processes. In 
their view, liminality has the capacity to support “creative possibilities” in 
cyberspace (2005, 93). Stephen Bigger, applying Turner’s research to the field of 
education, sees liminality as “a creative group attitude of mind” that seeks solutions 
beyond the realm of conventional premises (2010, 11). 
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Such favourable reviews of the liminal phase appear to draw inspiration from 
Turner’s own appreciation of the moral and creative value of liminality—what 
Thomassen terms Turner’s “celebratory stance” with respect to the unravelling of 
familiar structures in the service of innovation (2014, 10). Indeed, Turner proposes 
that cultural movements toward free expression transcend the in-between nature of 
ritual liminality to manifest “the holistically developmental” (1974b, 76). This 
approach leads Turner to posit the natural emergence of “communitas”, a nearly 
utopian (albeit temporary) vision of social harmony and action. In communitas, the 
individual is free to explore spontaneity beyond the bounds of socially imposed 
structure (1969, 96). Turner considers liminality dangerous only from the perspective 
of those invested in the perpetuation of structured institutions, which he dismisses as 
having “to be hedged around with prescriptions, prohibitions, and conditions” (109). 
The origins of Turner’s thinking in this regard may be traced to his fieldwork with 
the Ndembu. In that context, he notes that the ritual relaxation of social mores in the 
liminal phase of initiation rites serves to incorporate normally destructive tendencies 
into the beneficial structures underpinning social harmony. Anti-social behaviours 
are understood to simmer below the surface of “man’s mammalian constitution”; 
their invocation, then, is seen as a necessary support to the structures they appear to 
threaten—in the manner of a safety valve, perhaps. For the Ndembu, the ritual 
container acts to restrain the damage typically associated with such behaviours 
(1969, 92–3). 
Rumelili concurs with Turner’s positive view of societal liminality, arguing that 
liminal transitions in international relations should not be regarded as problematic or 
aberrant, but rather as opportunities to analyse social structures and challenges to 
established institutions. Indeed, Rumelili notes, the very existence of liminars40 may 
contest the social status quo by exposing contradictions in the existing order. As 
such, liminal actors are inherently transgressive (2012, 497–502; see also Szakolczai 
2000, 187).  
In contrast to Thomassen’s previously mentioned view of human life as an unsteady 
40 A term for liminal actors employed by Victor Turner (1974, 232). 
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equilibrium between limit and limitlessness, Turner’s vision of communitas appears 
to conflate freedom with the absence of limitation (1974b, 60–1). Thomassen 
concedes that liminality represents “a moment of freedom” between two stable 
states, and acknowledges its capacity for positive socio-cultural transformation 
(2014, 7), but cautions that the timing of Turner’s seminal The Ritual Process—
coinciding, as it did, with the often-exultant social uprisings of the late 1960s—
might have contributed to the perception of liminality as a synonym for necessary 
and positive counter-cultural rebellion (83; see also Szakolczai 2017, 231).41 
Thomassen criticises Turner for downplaying liminality’s fearful connotations in 
favour of an idealised vision of cultural stagnancy properly disturbed in the service 
of positive social evolution (2014, 83).  
Horvath, too, cautions against the “elusive and easily deluding attractiveness” of 
liminality: in other words, the dissolution of boundaries may be mistaken for a self-
indulgent semblance of freedom (2013, 10). She submits that particularly in the 
modern era, liminal passages are characterised by “uncertainty, anguish, even 
existential fear” in a perceived encounter with nothingness (2). Thomassen proposes 
that such unsettling emotions as anxiety, doubt, and fear are “quintessential liminal 
sentiments” (2014, 14); while Szakolczai suggests that entry into a liminal phase 
entails “deep anxiety and suffering” (2015, 34).  
Certainly, such characterisations align with the liminal experiences of nineteenth-
century frontiersmen and -women pushing the boundary between Anglo-Saxon 
“civilization” and the perceived wilderness of western North America, where they 
encountered “extreme dangers” in the form of grizzly bears, rattlesnakes, freezing 
winters, and conflict with indigenous populations (Mennell 2015, 121). The terror 
and bloodshed associated with the French Revolution of 1789–99, likewise, provides 
a stark example of liminality at its most existentially menacing. 
Yet as the earlier definitions of liminality make clear, this “fleeting and slippery” 
41 Szakolczai (2017, 231) further suggests that “professional pressure” inclined Turner to limit the notion of liminality, in its literal sense, to the 
small, indigenous cultures van Gennep ([1909] 1960, 3) characterised as “semicivilized”. Turner, in other words, may have deliberately 
declined to apply his research findings to contemporary social movements for fear of inviting academic opprobrium upon himself and his 
fellow anthropologists. 
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concept (Rumelili 2012, 496) resists the reification necessary to enable either 
positive or negative ascriptions. Its essentially paradoxical nature makes liminality a 
shape-shifter, helpful or harmful only as situationally located. Indeed, liminality may 
sometimes even be simultaneously creative and destructive. It could be argued that 
this indeterminacy deprives the liminal of useful meaning; however, I submit that its 
meaning lies precisely in its negation of binary oppositions. Liminality declines the 
imperative to pick sides, so to speak. In so doing, as will emerge in subsequent 
chapters, it affirms an inclusivity that is central to the argument of this dissertation. 
The debate about liminality’s value in any given context helps to situate the concept 
in the larger frame of academic investigation. For the purposes of the present study, 
however, liminality is instead employed as a theoretical lens: an analytical 
framework derived from observations of human behaviour and social dynamics. In 
this context I submit that liminality is valuable, not necessarily in terms of its impact 
on social dynamics, but in its contribution to the scholarship on religious violence. 
Permanent Liminality 
The foregoing rejection of value judgements with respect to liminality 
notwithstanding, certain manifestations of the phenomenon have been widely 
designated as particularly destructive. In conditions of upheaval or rapid change, the 
chaotic forces liberated in liminality may continue unchecked. When a liminal phase 
fails to resolve in aggregation/incorporation, the ensuing situation has been 
characterised as “permanent liminality”: a state of affairs in which the disruptive, 
chaotic aspects of liminality become normalised (Szakolczai 2014, 34).  
Since liminality is characterised precisely by its temporary nature, the assertion of 
permanent liminality may initially seem oxymoronic. Yet examples abound of the 
ambivalence and uncertainty of the liminal phase continuing without resolution. 
Turner cites religious monastic and mendicant lifestyles as exemplifying such 
extended precariousness (1969, 107). Szakolczai points to the theatrical role-playing 
typical of premodern court culture, likening those engaged in such “games” to stage 
actors who remain onstage and never change out of their costumes; or to participants 
in tribal rituals who retain their masks and role reversals long after the ritual’s 
function has been served (2000, 213). It is precisely the elimination of liminality’s 
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natural transitoriness that transforms it into a sort of monstrous simulacrum of itself. 
Turner argues that increasing fragmentation in social class structures in industrialised 
society has led to an institutionalised, and hence permanent, form of liminality 
(1969, 107). Building on this argument, Thomassen characterises modernity itself as 
an instance of permanent liminality. He argues that the fracturing of community into 
increasingly specialised segments has rendered communal ritual obsolete, driving 
individuals to seek meaning in consumption and the search for extraordinary 
experience (2014, 186). Political theorist Roger Griffin’s emphasis on the 
specifically collective or social significance of ritual activity—its capacity to “refuel 
society with transcendence” (2007, 104)—helps underline the importance of 
Thomassen’s insight. 
The modern tendency toward individual fulfilment and thrill-seeking, in 
Thomassen’s view, springs from a sense that humans are obliged to impose their 
own, contrived order on a fundamentally chaotic reality (2014, 229). According to 
this view, artificial regulation supplants rituals designed to channel the natural forces 
of change. Thomassen identifies such imposition as a central feature of Western 
modernity, which he considers “an institutionalization of liminality” (2015, 55).  
This gloss is supported by Griffin’s view of “modernization as a process of 
disaggregation [and] fragmentation” (2008, 10). Social theorist David Harvey, in 
similar vein, invokes Marx’s view of capitalist modernisation as a shifting social 
dynamic characterised by crisis (1989, 111). Mälksoo cites the recursive nature of the 
Cold War and the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan to argue that permanent liminality 
has become a universal norm (2012, 491–2).  
Where liminal conditions persist, the new order that should properly replace the 
preliminal structure becomes ever more unimaginable. Furthermore, even if such an 
order were to manifest from an extended liminality, its success is by no means 
guaranteed (Szakolczai 2000, 210; see also Thomassen 2014, 7). In losing their 
intermediary status, such phenomena fail to contribute their transformative potential 
to ongoing structural revision. Hence, Thomassen warns of the “pure danger” 
implicit in liminal phenomena that do not proceed to an overt accomplishment of van 
Gennep’s third, post-liminal, phase (2014, 83). 
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Szakolczai cautions against the “entrapment” implicit in such situations, which he 
describes flatly as “fundamentally negative”, even “intolerable”. These conditions 
normalise ongoing disruption, generating an endless series of crises that exhaust 
everyone involved and that make a return to stability increasingly unlikely (2017, 
233–44). Permanent liminality is “a genuine Infernal Machine”, which negates the 
enduring value of liminality itself precisely in the loss of its temporary nature (2000, 
216). Ironically, attempts to implement correctives merely intensify the turmoil by 
introducing further innovations to a situation already reeling from the effects of 
incessant change (2017, 244). 
Turner, even in his celebration of communitas, recognises that liminality should not 
be permanent. As a “regenerative abyss”, communitas provides the richness and 
power necessary for the periodic rejuvenation of stagnant structures; in the absence 
of the courage to transform, however, it will soon be rendered routine and sterile 
(1969, 139). Szakolczai likens liminality to new wine poured into “old bottles”—
presumably, the stable pre- and post-liminal states. If the requisite “bottles” aren’t 
available, however, the wine’s “fermenting power” is lost. Permanent liminality in 
fact opposes transformation, for as Szakolczai drily notes, continuous change is itself 
a form of stagnancy (2000, 217). In both these glosses, the transformational aspect of 
liminality is considered essential to its functionality as a social and personal good.  
The dangers of permanent liminality have been contemplated by scholars in myriad 
fields. Anthropologist Line Richter uses the terms “limbo”, “waithood”, and “on the 
edge of existence” to characterise the extended liminality endured by Malian 
migrants stranded in the Maghreb while trying to reach Europe. Living with scant 
shelter, eating garbage, frequently sick, and continually harassed by police and 
soldiers, these migrants settle into an everyday experience dedicated to visions of a 
profoundly uncertain future (2016). Cultural scholar Paul D’Souza describes the 
demoralising and often dangerous conditions faced by Kashmiri women whose 
husbands have been “disappeared”. Many of these “half-widows” have spent decades 
pondering whether to search for their spouses, to declare them dead, or to remarry—
and most of all, how to define themselves socially (2016, 33–4). In both of these 
instances, people lose their previous identities but lack access to the resources 
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necessary to construct new ones. They remain in transit, with no destination in view. 
Business psychologists Charles Noble and Beth Walker caution that grave emotional 
outcomes may follow when individuals are subjected to prolonged liminal passages 
in the workplace (1997, 32). Management expert Nic Beech explains that temporary 
workers, perennially subject to being replaced and deprived of the satisfaction of 
formal hiring and termination procedures, frequently experience themselves as 
peripheral to their respective industries. Beech argues that such extended liminality 
contributes to social instability, confusion, and a sense of meaninglessness in 
organisational contexts (2011, 288). 
And yet not all scholars consider extended liminality necessarily detrimental. While 
noting its potentially destructive disruptions to personal identity, educationalist 
Katherine Cumings Mansfield nonetheless commends a “purposeful, perpetual 
liminality”42—specifically, in the case of female educators challenging entrenched 
racial and gender leadership in their field (2014, 143; emphasis original). Gloria 
Ladson-Billings applies a similar logic to problems of racism in education, inviting 
progressive educators to “operate from a position of alerity [sic]43 or liminality”. 
This suggestion of perpetual liminality invokes a positionality, rather than a strategic 
passage; indeed, Ladson-Billings cautions that her readers may, in their opposition to 
a racist status quo, become “permanent outsiders” (1998, 22; emphases original). 
In both these examples, liminality is conflated with marginality and outsiderhood. 
Yet, as established earlier, the liminal is defined by its in-betweenness. It is liminal 
precisely because the instability that is its essential attribute is resolved in a new, 
stable state. In their invocation of a preferred, presumably stable new order, 
Mansfield and Ladson-Billings are describing something other than liminality, 
“perpetual” or otherwise.  
Behavioural scientists Frances Mascia-Lees, Patricia Sharpe, and Colleen Cohen take 
42 I have availed myself of Mansfield’s term, “perpetual liminality”, to distinguish such positive glosses from the dark spectre of “permanent 
     liminality” invoked by Thomassen and Szakolczai. 
43 I assume the author means “alterity”. 
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a similar tack in addressing the marginal status of Black women writers. The 
provocation inherent in these writers’ very race and sex to a literary establishment 
historically dominated by white men, these authors argue, represents a “double 
liminality” (1987). By this, I understand them to conflate liminality with jeopardy, as 
in the term “double jeopardy” as applied to Black women.44 This usage foregrounds 
a single dimension of the liminal passage—its danger—at the expense of its more 
layered complexity. These scholars, in my view, overlook the interstitial nature of 
liminality, robbing their analysis of its crucially transformational aspect. 
In this study, therefore, I have chosen to follow Turner’s more narrow definition of 
liminality as a spatial and/or temporal passage specifically bounded on both sides by 
relatively stable states (1966). A given individual undergoing a liminal experience 
may not recognise its interstitial nature—except, perhaps, in retrospect. At the time 
of its occurrence, the liminal passage may feel, instead, like an immutable boundary 
or a zone of unbounded exclusion. Yet liminality preserves its character precisely by 
coming, eventually, upon another boundary at its farther side. Thus, although 
liminality may be perceived as outside or marginal from the perspective of either or 
both boundaries, I understand it to lie between the two. It is precisely the interstitial 
nature of the liminal that frames the argument of this study.  
Liminality and Religious Violence 
[W]here categories do not apply, feelings of insecurity and danger ensue.
—Iver B. Neumann, “Introduction to the Forum on Liminality”
In conditions of permanent liminality, as noted, the inherently volatile, chaotic nature 
of the liminal phase invokes ongoing uncertainty and insecurity. To religious groups 
whose identity is tied to notions of a cosmic war between good and evil, such 
conditions may well be experienced as directly threatening to their cause. The 
foregoing analysis suggests that the reactive attempts of such groups to restore 
stability may actually contribute to a deepening of the disorder they seek to defeat. I 
44 This term is credited to a pamphlet by political activist Frances M. Beal, “Black Women’s Manifesto; Double Jeopardy: To Be Black and 
Female” (New York: Third World Women’s Alliance, 1969). 
62 
argue that the ensuing frustration, coupled with redoubled efforts to impose order, 
paradoxically feeds a cycle of increasing terror and violence. 
Impurity and Pollution 
Significantly, the liminal phase of the Ndembe rituals that Turner studied is 
associated with impurity and pollution. He points out that in traditional ritual, 
impurity is identified with ambiguity: the initiand is considered impure precisely due 
to his lack of a clear status. He is neither boy nor man, but a “transitional being” 
whose role in the social order is undetermined. “The unclear is the unclean”, Turner 
concludes (1966, 48).  
Turner’s ascription of impurity to the transitional phase is echoed in Mary Douglas’s 
summary of the process matter undergoes to become dirt. The material is first 
separated from other matter; then, in decaying, it relinquishes its original identity; 
until finally it becomes identifiable as dirt. To rummage in a pile of refuse, Douglas 
suggests, is repugnant precisely because it restores identity to matter that has passed 
beyond the bounds of identity ([1966] 1984, 161–2). Just as decaying matter loses its 
former identity, Turner’s Ndembe neophyte ritually “dies” to his pre-ritual self 
(1966, 47–8). In both cases, the liminal person or substance is considered impure, 
and contact is avoided during this passage.  
As Turner points out, discomfort with ambiguous identity is also at play in Douglas’s 
explanation of the dietary restrictions proclaimed in the Hebrew book of Leviticus 
(1966, 48). The prohibited creatures are those whose features or behaviour appear at 
odds with their respective anatomies or environments: moles and crocodiles, for 
example, appear to walk on their hands, while eels and worms swim without benefit 
of scales or fins. These animals, in other words, are “betwixt and between” the 
conventional and the impossible. In an imagined, strictly ordered world, they are 
neither fish nor fowl. Douglas argues that the contrast between this ambiguity and 
the “oneness, purity and completeness of God” underlies biblical prohibitions on 
consuming the “unclean” flesh of such animals ([1966] 1984, 57–8). Thus, taint and 
danger arise, not from any essential property of the prohibited substance, but from 
ambiguity itself. 
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Impurity is deplored in the more dualistic strains of orthodox religious traditions.45 
Jan Assmann notes that traditional pre-Abrahamic religion “rests on the distinction 
between the pure and the impure”, and that early Christianity went on to apply this 
distinction in its own construction of the Us-and-Them binary (2010, 60). Emile 
Durkheim proposes that the division of phenomena into the categories of sacred and 
profane is, indeed, “the distinctive trait of religious thought”—and, significantly, that 
the two categories are mutually exclusive ([1912] 1995, 34–8). Those religious 
actors who adopt this line of thinking typically strive to align themselves with the 
sacred—i.e., that which reflects the goodness and purity of the deity. Its opposite, the 
profane, is by definition impure and polluting. French anthropologist Louis Dumont 
argues that the Hindu caste system is “essentially religious”, precisely due to its 
dependence on hierarchical distinctions between the pure and the impure ([1970] 
1980, 270).46  
Purity, in these contexts, is frequently conflated with rigid adherence to a doctrinal 
stance,47 historically mandated conduct,48 or both. Armstrong points out that such 
fixation is typically a response to a perceived crisis in a cosmic war between good 
and evil, in which the perceiver is strongly identified with the forces of good. 
Religious actors who cling to rigid interpretations of their respective traditions, she 
notes, “try to fortify their beleaguered identity by means of a selective retrieval of 
certain doctrines and practices of the past” (2000, 6). In so doing, such actors may be 
said to seek a permanent “pre-liminality”, unsullied by the perceived impurity of 
liminality. The threat of such impurity is projected on the purportedly unclean 
unbelievers who decline to support their efforts. 
Embarking on the first Crusade, Pope Urban II declared Jerusalem “polluted by the 
    14:35, that “it is shameful for a woman to speak in church” (https://religionnews.com/2015/07/09/most-women-belong-to-a-religious-   
  community-that-prohibits-them-from-being-leaders/, accessed September 30, 2017). 
48 One example is the Prophet Muhammed’s purported prohibition on men wearing silk, which an Islamic website deems will still “certainly 
diminish the manly qualities and masculinity” (http:/www.islamweb.net/en/article/135515/the-prophets-guidance-on-treating-skin-rashes-
and-scabies, accessed September 30, 2017). 
45 See, for example, Qur’ān 8:37; Numbers 19:22; and Mark 6:7. I use “orthodox” here to distinguish these religious positions from those of 
 their mystical traditions.
46 Not incidentally, the caste system may reasonably be viewed as an instance of cultural violence, per Galtung. 
47 A number of Christian churches, for example, prohibit women from preaching—presumably, due to St. Paul’s insistence, per 1 Corinthians   
64 
filthiness of an unclean nation”—i.e., Muslim Turks (Kimball 2008, 174). Religious 
concerns regarding purity and impurity endure into the twentieth-century, when 
Sayyid Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood inverted Urban’s Us-and-Them 
designations, calling for the violent imposition of religious—i.e., Islamic—purity in 
Egypt (Selengut 2003, 77–8).  
In these examples, violent means are invoked in order to maintain the perceived 
purity and stability of a religious tradition. This dynamic reflects the power of the 
pure/impure binary to emphasise divisions between Us and Them: the dualistic 
worldview that I have argued is a key component of violence. Although an Us-and-
Them stance may not inevitably lead to violent acts, the added element of purity-
versus-impurity reliably sets the stage for perceptions of impending peril and 
attempts to cleanse the field by eliminating those perceived as impure. 
Such a crisis typically brings danger, chaos, uncertainty, and thus profound 
discomfort. These characteristics, as we have seen, are typical of the transformative, 
liminal phase. Since liminality arises naturally in the course of human affairs, as 
previously noted, the difficulties associated with crisis are unavoidable. My 
argument proceeds on the basis of this analysis to demonstrate that violent collision 
between conditions of permanent liminality and rigid religious identity is virtually 
inevitable.  
Volatility and Resistance 
From another perspective, the volatile ambivalence of liminality actually drives the 
communication indispensable to social interaction. Sociologist Bernhard Giesen 
argues that stable social orders rely on “the acceptance of the unclassifiable, of 
surprises and coincidences, ambiguity and fuzziness” (2015b, 62). In other words, 
liminal passages are not only inevitable; they are actually necessary to healthy 
societal dynamics. I speculate that this is due to the fact, established above, that 
liminality is natural to the human condition. From this perspective, to eliminate it—
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were that possible—would be to impair the proper functioning of social processes.49 
The implications of this view with regard to the construction and maintenance of 
identity, and hence also the relationship of identity to religious violence, are explored 
later in this chapter. 
However, according to sociologist Monica Greco and social psychologist Paul 
Stenner, the volatility Giesen describes generates “a hightened [sic] propensity for 
becoming affected” (2017, 25; emphasis original). In other words, individuals and 
groups engaged in a liminal passage tend to be especially reactive. Not only does 
liminality undermine fixed positionalities; those attempting to hold rigid stances are 
too emotionally triggered to successfully do so. Hence, Giesen submits, fixation on 
flawless morality and absolute truth is “not only merciless and dangerous but 
actually impossible” (2015b, 70).  
Religion is a particularly congenial setting for ideals of morality and truth. Under 
conditions where it becomes impossible to maintain such ideals—such as the 
ineluctable dynamics of cultural change—those who continue to strive for them will 
inevitably be frustrated, inflaming the emotions ordinarily invoked by liminality 
(Szakolczai 2017, 233). This reaction, I argue, sets up a cycle of escalating 
disruption: precisely what Szakolczai has termed “permanent liminality”. 
If Giesen is correct in arguing that uncomfortable liminal phenomena are essential to 
social stability, adherence to a fixed ideology itself disrupts the very security it aims 
to maintain. The liminal passage that religious extremists hope to bypass asserts 
itself in the ensuing collapse of previously dependable certainties. 
Two Hypotheses 
I argue for the utility of a liminal analysis in the study of religious violence. In so 
doing, I propose two ways in which liminality may contribute to new understandings 
of the phenomenon. I call these “reactive projection” and “autonomic liminality”. 
49 There are important differences between liminal passages mediated by traditional rites, as in the African instances studied by van Gennep and 
Turner, and the unmediated liminality of social or personal upheaval. Here I am following the trail blazed by scholars such as Horvath, Thomassen, 
Szakolczai, and Mälksoo in applying a liminal lens to the social realities current in the post-Enlightenment Western context. 
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Reactive projection refers to a rejection of the liminal distress that “We” experience 
by means of projecting it on “Them”, the Other. Particularly if religious doctrine and 
tradition are invoked to provide reassurance regarding the eternal and unchanging 
nature of reality, pious compliance with theological and ritual orthodoxy may be 
perceived as bulwarks against change. When those bulwarks are shaken by the 
approach of an unavoidable liminal passage, reactive projection would explain the 
reflexive blaming of the Other for the threatened instability. The term, then, 
describes a reflexive reaction that seeks to deny natural liminal transformations by 
attacking the external persons and conditions perceived as responsible for the threat 
of change. When change declines to be curbed, the projection of blame intensifies 
and exclusivist positions harden, leading to violent defences of the antagonists’ 
respective views.  
The fearful projection of unapproved impulses, feelings, and doubts on to a vilified 
Other is a well-known and thoroughly documented strategy (Katz 2015, 100–1; 
Robins 1996, 80; Jung 1970, 3,463). My invocation of this phenomenon in the case 
of reactive projection, however, specifically refers to its emergence in response to the 
approach of a liminal passage. I submit that subtler shadings of the projective 
process may come into view when the role of liminality is factored into analyses of 
religious conflict. 
The second hypothetical dynamic I propose, autonomic liminality, describes an event 
in which the pressures generated by resistance to liminality in fact bring about the 
inevitable liminal passage in the form of religious violence. In this scenario, fixated 
religionists shrink from the approach of an unavoidable liminal passage and attempt 
to defuse or control it. Such attempts, however, short-circuit a fundamental human 
need to confront chasms of meaning and cultural challenges (Horvath, Thomassen 
and Wydra 2015, 2). The price for evading the liminal is therefore further confusion 
and misapprehension regarding the nature of events. Autonomic liminality refers to 
the eventual, unavoidable emergence of the liminal in the form of violence, itself—a 
form necessarily distorted by the very repression that sought to deny it. The violence 
that erupts under these conditions may be even less controllable than might have 
been the case in a naturally advancing process. Further, the transformational 
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potentials typically implicated in the liminal passage will almost certainly be 
truncated, if not entirely destroyed. The very imperative of social transformation 
proclaimed by religious extremists, and actively sought through the medium of 
violence, is from this perspective subverted by fear of liminal distress. 
In summary, then: those groups and individuals who find themselves tumbling willy-
nilly into uncontrollable liminality might reasonably be expected to attempt to assert 
control over their fraying reality. One obvious strategy to this end is to reinforce the 
Us-versus-Them narrative that affirms their identity. I term this strategy “reactive 
projection”. I argue, further, that the resistance to liminality—whether by reactive 
projection or some other strategy—merely delays its emergence; and that repression 
distorts its eventual violent eruption. This dynamic, which I call autonomic 
liminality, describes a situation in which those who resist liminality may find 
themselves unwitting agents of the very event they have denied. In this view, the 
violence perpetrated by religious extremists is perhaps itself a helpless expression of 
the liminality it seeks to oppose.  
A further application of the liminal lens to religious violence invites speculation with 
respect to permanent liminality. If, as I argue, violence may be parsed as a liminal 
eruption, then the cycle of liminal distress, followed by rejection and projection, 
followed by an inevitable yet distorted disruption, seems doomed to ongoing 
repetition. Opposition to naturally arising liminality, in other words, easily becomes 
entrenched. The ongoing failure of violent reactivity to eliminate impurity, combined 
with its value in reaffirming group identity, tends to intensify violent rejection of 
liminal events. The ensuing state of permanent liminality, as we have seen, 
introduces Szakolczai’s “genuine Infernal Machine” and resists the transformation 
necessary to bring an end to violence. 
Liminality and Identity 
[W]e do not have a real concept of the self until we arrive at subjective,
self-conscious experience as the principal medium of self-articulation.
This is … a peculiarly modern occurrence in the West. 
—David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Thinking from the Han 
Shifts in identity are central to liminality. In the liminal phases of tribal ritual 
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observed by van Gennep and Turner, the neophyte’s former identity is explicitly and 
deliberately deconstructed in preparation for the emergence of her new social role. If, 
as argued above, the tripartite structure of ritual transformation reflects natural social 
dynamics, and liminality is indeed “a fundamental feature of the human condition”, 
as Mälksoo asserts, identity is implicated wherever liminality is at play. Furthermore, 
as numerous scholars have argued, religious violence may be triggered by perceived 
threats to identity.50 Accordingly, this section will view the connections between 
liminality and religious violence through the lens of identity. 
The index of van Gennep’s Rites of Passage, tellingly, includes no entry for 
“liminal”. Instead, an entry for “Liminal rites” redirects the reader to “Transition, 
rites of”—suggesting that for van Gennep, liminality is synonymous with transition 
([1909] 1960, 196). Thomassen concurs: “If it is not about transition,” he declares, 
“it is not about liminality” (2014, 15). The transformational power of the liminal 
event, as implied in the term “transition”, is central to the argument of this 
dissertation. 
In formal ritual, the initiand passes through the transitional/liminal portal to arrive at 
a new identity. Such transitions may be represented literally, as in a Chinese Taoist 
ceremony in which family members pass through an actual portal to mark the phases 
in a child’s maturation (van Gennep [1909] 1960, 60). Turner’s study of Ndembu 
adolescents documents the “death” of the neophyte to his previous life (1966, 48); 
accordingly, death-related imagery is prominent in Ndembu ritual (1969, 100). Such 
a death is necessary in order for the individual to undergo a spiritual rebirth 
(Teodorescu and Călin 2015, 99). The emergence of a new identity, then, is 
conditional on the experience of a liminal passage following the surrender of the 
previous identity. 
Yet neither identity, before or after the liminal transition, is necessarily fixed or 
monolithic. It is true that the psychological literature has long supported the notion 
of identity as a stable, enduring aspect of personal selfhood (Brubaker and Cooper 
2000, 7). In this sense, identity might be construed to correspond with the notion of 
50 See, for example, Ruthven 2004, 4–5; Cavanaugh 2009, 33; and Juergensmeyer 2000, 224. 
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an eternal “soul”—a religious notion that may help explain the particular concern 
about religious identity reported by Ruthven (2004, 8), Juergensmeyer (2000, 161), 
and others.  
Many scholars, however, consider identity a more malleable phenomenon. In socio-
political contexts, identity is frequently assumed to arise from relational processes. 
Socio-anthropologist Richard Jenkins asserts, in fact, that “[i]dentity is never 
unilateral” (2008, 42; emphasis original). This understanding is especially prominent 
in analyses of group identity, specifically as emerging from social or political activity 
(Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 7–8; Snow 2001). In this sense, argues communications 
scholar Lawrence Grossberg, “[i]dentity is ultimately returned to history”, 
particularly in the context of subaltern groups whose oppression is encoded in their 
collective identity (1996, 92; see also Volkan 2014, 91).  
Social anthropologist Fredrik Barth argues that ethnic identities, at least, are 
inextricably bound to behaviours, which for him define the notion of “culture” 
altogether (1969, 9). Indeed, behaviour—or “agency” or “conduct”—becomes 
central in community transitions during liminal periods (Thomassen 2009, 20). Such 
behaviour expresses the inarticulable, unreplicable nature of human experience, 
which is the central factor in liminal processes. Experiences are by nature 
transformative; hence, to ascribe a fixed identity beyond the realm of experience is to 
deny the nature of the human condition, itself (Szakolczai 2000, 188).  
According to these scholars, then, individual and group identities are forged in the 
contingencies of everyday life, and are expressed in activity. It follows that the 
performance of violent acts, in particular, is profoundly implicated in the 
construction of identity. From this perspective, to abandon violence would threaten 
the identity of the perpetrating group. I argue that such a threat functions to reinforce 
the view driving previously described attempts to replace liminality with certainty 
and stability.  
Identity as Boundary 
Boundaries and borders are, by definition, regions of uncertainty: that is, liminal 
areas. Indeed, national borders in medieval Europe often consisted of ambiguous, so-
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called “debatable lands” ruled, if at all, by whoever seized the power to do so (Jack 
2004, 289). Social scientists Gerhard Preyer and Mathias Bös argue that even today, 
national borders represent “dynamic processes of connection and separation” that 
function to simultaneously include, exclude, and connect (2002, xi). This threefold 
capacity mirrors exactly the nature of the liminal as that which joins two disparate 
states while concurrently excluding them from one another and including both in a 
larger reality.  
Significantly for this study, Barth’s appreciation of the ambiguous nature of 
boundaries underpins his understanding of personal identity as malleable (Jenkins 
2008, 153). Personal identity might thus be considered a “debatable land”, standing, 
as it does, at the boundary between past and future, self and other, here and there. 
Not only are identities pliable; an individual can simultaneously claim more than a 
single identity (Snow 2001; Ferguson and Mansbach 1999, 79). In such cases, 
identity becomes increasingly difficult to pin down. Particularly in the context of 
nationalist discourses, liminars may straddle the self/other divide in ways that 
undermine the very parameters defining these polarities (Rumelili 2012, 503). 
Liminality, in other words, will not be confined to a neatly circumscribed region 
beyond structure, but functions to erode structure itself. Liminality dissolves the 
distinction between structure and agency; yet, paradoxically, the “hyper-reality of 
agency” in the liminal space gives rise to structuration (Thomassen 2009, 5). 
Faced with the inseparability of structure and liminality, liminars may respond to 
transience and volatility by attempting to realign themselves with established social 
structures; they may deliberately subvert those structures; or they may employ both 
strategies. Thus, “liminality unleashes the contending processes of domestication and 
subversion” (Rumelli 2012, 503–4). As that which cannot, by definition, be fixed, 
liminality sparks the potential for reality itself to manifest in hitherto unimagined 
registers and dimensions (Thomassen 2014, 7). 
In this sense, the liminal represents an ideal, shifting ground for the ambivalent 
phenomenon of identity—a ground that, in the complex dynamics of identity 
construction, is relationally implicated in its productions. As literary scholar Helen 
Vella Bonavita notes, what is alien and strange to a community represents internal 
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forces that are themselves shaping and being shaped by social realities (2011, xi). 
Liminality, according to this view, is more accurately understood as an aspect of 
identity construction, rather than as an environment in which that construction 
occurs. 
Perhaps, then, identity is an exemplar of liminality itself: a region of experience in 
continual flux; transformation in action. Indeed, Szakolczai argues that the reality of 
liminal experience precludes the possibility of a fixed identity (2000, 188). This view 
is supported by sociologist Jack Katz, who submits that “[e]veryday life shapes 
individual identity through a constantly problematic lamination of self and person”— 
“self” referring to how one relates to others, and “person” to the ways one is perceived 
by others (2015, 123). In other words, personal identity is continually forged and 
revised through routine experiences of liminality .  . The fact that such experiences are 
routine, however, does not mean that they are necessarily continual. As mentioned, 
liminality that does not resolve into an incorporative or aggregative stability loses its 
transformational power and devolves into meaningless chaos. Katz’s “constantly 
problematic lamination” must be understood not as a relentless disruption of personal 
identity but rather as a process of recursive challenges to stasis.  
Those who oppose the malleability of identities are doomed to ongoing efforts to 
exclude liminal behaviours. Given only the choice between good and bad, right and 
wrong, the individuals and groups thus excluded will naturally find ways to assert 
their goodness and rightness in opposition to social opprobrium. Religious doctrine—
in particular, sectarian interpretations of religious doctrine—provides a peculiarly 
effective source of support for such assertions. The mutual rejection of the more 
extremist Shi’a and Sunni Muslims of each other’s claim to spiritual purity is but one 
example of the co-optation of “good” and “right” at the expense of the Other’s 
“bad” and “wrong” (BBC 2014). Another example lies in the ways Protestants and 
Roman Catholics have historically projected barbarous superstition on each other, in 
contrast to their own, presumably legitimate, religious practices (Fitzgerald 2007, 109).
To the extent that fixed moral binaries continue to be imposed on naturally flexible 
persons and situations, a state of permanent liminality must ensue. Paradoxically,  
Religious violence, while occasionally perpetrated by individuals such as Baruch 
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then, identities subjected to continual demands to stabilise may be subject to an 
artificially extended form of liminality, which solidifies and denatures the otherwise 
fluid nature of selfhood. 
Group Identity
Religious violence, while occasionally perpetrated by individuals such as Baruch 
Goldstein and Eric Rudolph, is more typically associated with groups.51 As 
Juergensmeyer observes, “[t]errorism is seldom a lone act” (2000, 10). Indeed, 
Goldstein was active in Israel’s ultra-orthodox Kach movement (Jpost.com Staff, 
2016); in addition, his action enjoyed “the tacit approval of many of his fellow 
Jewish settlers” (Juergensmeyer 2000, 10). Rudolph, for his part, identified with the 
Christian Identity movement (Anti-Defamation League 2005). While these men 
purportedly conducted their respective murders on their own cognizance, both were 
identified with larger groups, whose aims they aspired to further through their 
violent acts. Certainly, the worst excesses of religious violence in recent times are 
associated with organisations such as the Tamil Tigers, Aum Shinrikyo, and ISIS. 
Thus, this section proceeds with an exploration of the connections between 
liminality, group identity, and religion. 
It appears that like individual identity, group identity is far from fixed. Social theorist 
Alberto Melucci, for one, argues that the latter is interactive and relational, 
continually shifting in response to both internal pressures and the changing 
conditions of its larger environment (1995, 44). Sociologist Rogers Brubaker and 
historian Frederick Cooper cite “certain strands of the ‘new social movement’ 
literature” as attributing collective identity to “discursively mediated” social and 
political dynamics (2000, 16). According to this view, group identities are 
susceptible to the shifting influences at play in their respective societal 
environments. 
51 In 1994, Goldstein shot and killed thirty Muslim men and boys at the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron, Israel (Juergensmeyer 2000, 50). 
Rudolph killed two people and injured more than a hundred others in a series of anti-abortion and anti-LGBTQ bombings in the southern 
United States between 1996 and 1998 (Montaldo 2019). 
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The fluidity of group identity may, however, be opposed by cultural forces. One such 
example can be found in the rise of capitalism, which requires a consistent and 
predictable labour market. Michel Foucault observes that this requirement enforced a 
freeze on the formerly inconsistent and unpredictable contingencies of everyday life. 
The workers who were obliged to conform to newly formulaic schedules and work 
habits perforce adopted a fixed group identity that served the interests of capital, 
rather than reflecting their own existential trajectories. Szakolczai argues that the 
enforcement of such frozen identity is accomplished through the application of moral 
binaries such as true/false and good/bad.52 Identities thus fixed become normative, 
leading to the perception of unfixed identities as marginal and transgressive (2000, 
196). 53
In the worldview of mutually incompatible binaries, there are only two places to go: 
right/good or wrong/bad. The location of formerly liminal identities at either polarity 
derives from a rejection of both the liminality of fluid identity and the possibility of a 
third option beyond the binaries. Such fixation ultimately bears little resemblance to 
the actual nature of a given individual’s or group’s identity; rather, as already 
argued, it serves to reassure its subject of predictability and control. Szakolczai 
proposes that the associated marginalisation of those identities designated as 
transgressive reflects a kind of scapegoating, as modern societies invent such 
identities and then transfer their discomfort with liminal conditions on to the marked 
individuals (2000, 195–6).  
Melucci suggests that the liminal process implicated in the construction of group 
identity is often concealed beneath the appearance of a stable state. Such a relatively 
permanent and delimited self-definition, he argues, is a conception in which both the 
group and its observers conspire. Melucci attributes it, in part, to the semantic 
difficulty of understanding the term “identity” as referencing temporary or variable 
phenomena. Somewhat in agreement with Barth, Thomassen, and other scholars 
52 Szakolczai’s invocation of Foucault refers to the latter’s “Power and Norm: Notes”, in Michel Foucault: Power, Truth, Strategy, eds. M.   
    Morris and P. Patton (Sydney: Feral Publications, 1979), 61.
53 As noted earlier, liminal actors are already characterised as transgressive, owing to their existential challenge to the existing social order.
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cited above, Melucci argues that groups experience their collective identity as a 
multi-level “system of action”, rather than as a condition. As a tool of analysis, he 
argues, identity should be understood as a conceptual lens rather than as an actual 
situation (1995, 46–54).54 Sociologist David Snow accepts the processual 
component of collective identity, but argues that the product of that process—“a 
shared and interactive sense of ‘we-ness’ and ‘collective agency’”—is equally 
central to defining the phenomenon. This product, in Snow’s view, is nonetheless 
possessed of fluidity, impermanence, and contingency (2001). This being the case, it 
is difficult to understand how the process differs from the product; after all, an 
identity that is other than static, enduring, and essential must inevitably engage in a 
mutually influential dance with its environment.  
Cristina Flesher Fominaya, examining collective identity in social movements, 
proposes that the “process” and “product” views of collective identity refer to two 
discrete and equally valid phenomena. For her, the process is the internal dynamic 
that shapes collective actors’ self-understanding, while the product is a shared 
worldview that is apparent to both those actors and external observers (2010, 397). 
Wherever process belongs in the attribution of identity, it appears from the 
foregoing to be instrumental in both individual and collective identity construction. 
While process cannot necessarily be conflated with liminality, the overlap between 
the two appears substantial enough to suggest a close relationship. Process is, by 
definition, unstable: it is a moving dynamic, detached from any presumed point of 
departure and not yet at rest in an outcome. This quality of movement is confirmed 
in the etymological roots of the word “process”, which suggest the dual notions of 
departure and approach.55  
Moreover, the nature of process is transformational. . A  chemical process, such as 
that combining vinegar and baking soda, transforms the substances involved into 
something other than the sum of its parts. In the case of this example, the results can 
be literally explosive. More to the point, however: the process cannot be reversed. 
The same is true of the liminal rites observed by van Gennep and Turner: adolescent 
54 Melucci (1995, 51) proposes that treating identity as an analytical tool rather than as a reified description can “introduce changes in our 
55 Eric Partridge, Origins, s.v. “cede”. 
conceptualization of social movements, and … contribute to a different understanding of the changing significance of social movements 
in contemporary society”. In this sense, identity-as-conceptual-lens might be seen as a liminal force in the evolution of sociological 
scholarship. Indeed, Melucci (62) recognises the necessary “uncertainty”—i.e., liminality—that this approach imposes on researchers. 
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initiands, having once passed through the threshold phase, can never return to 
childhood. I argue, therefore, that the processual nature of identity is in fact liminal 
in nature. I further invoke Melucci’s insight regarding the simultaneous 
manifestation of liminality and apparent stability in the construction of group 
identity (1995, 46). While a group may experience itself, and be perceived, as 
steadfast and durable—as, for example, “African” or “Roman Catholic”—it 
undergoes constant internal shifts that inform its collective activities. What it 
actually means to be African or Catholic is subject to continual intrapersonal and 
sociopolitical dynamics that change the ways identity is perceived by both group 
members and external observers. 
Melucci’s conception of presumed stability as superimposed on naturally unstable 
dynamics highlights a powerful tendency of people in general to deny, ignore, or 
reject the fluid nature of identity. In the case of religious violence, I argue that such 
repression of natural change can lead to eruptions that express themselves in the 
form of violence.  
Liminality and Group Identity 
Sociologists Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt and Bernhard Giesen propose that binary 
“symbolic codes of distinction”—attributes such as inside/outside, left/right, and 
sacred/profane, by means of which communities distinguish between Us and Them
—are in fact “trichotomic” in nature; that is, a boundary inheres in all such 
dichotomies. The dividing line between inside and outside, or sacred and profane, 
itself constitutes a third region. From this perspective, collective identity originates 
in liminality (1995, 75). In other words, the dividing line between Us and Them is 
precisely what makes these designations possible. 
Spatially, the trichotomic boundary region lies “here”, at the midpoint between 
where one has been and where one might go next. Temporally, it is “now”, the 
moment dividing past from future. (This construction assumes a linear 
understanding of time and its operation. See the following two chapters for more 
nuanced approaches to the temporal aspects of existence.) Eisenstadt and Giesen 
further propose a “reflexive” dimension, whose extremes are located in God and the 
world, respectively, and whose centre point is the person who resides between the 
two. Significantly, the authors note that this reflexive register frequently reflects 
traditionally religious distinctions between sacred and profane, transcendental and 
mundane (1995, 75).  
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The conjunction of the subject and her spatial and temporal locations is in fact “the 
phenomenal focus of identity”, for it represents the starting point for any exploration 
of both objective and subjective phenomena. It is the immediate identity from which 
all subsequent construction—including, presumably, group identity—must proceed 
(Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995, 75; emphasis original). 
Individual identity, according to this argument, resides precisely in the trichotomic 
boundary region separating insiders from outsiders; that is, the very rationale for 
group identification resides in individual identity. Yet the two identity locales are 
distinct, for the individual’s perceived insider status is secure only from the 
standpoint of her own subjectivity. She is susceptible to the group’s agenda and 
judgements. Excommunication from insiders, seduction by outsiders, social 
pressures, or a personal change of heart may alter her status at any time. Thus, while 
her identification with a collective may in some sense represent an extension of her 
personal identity, the object of her allegiance may shift. 
Collective or group identity construction, further, uniquely employs the 
aforementioned “symbolic codes of distinction”—i.e., inside/outside, sacred/profane, 
etc. These codes are interleaved with demarcating binaries such as 
included/excluded. Due to their power to clarify distinctions between Us and Them, 
Eisenstadt and Giesen consider these “special combinations” fundamental to the 
analysis of collective identity construction (1995, 76; see also Snow 2001). The leap 
from individual to collective identity, then, requires the assumption of binary 
values—the dualistic worldview that I have argued is fundamental to violence. 
It may be recalled that Szakolczai implicates binary attributions in the freezing of 
personal identities. These attributions, as indicated, are also instrumental in the 
construction of collective identity. Since the latter is less stable than are social or 
personal identities (Snow 2001),56 it may be the case that, in the face of accusations 
placing them in the bad/wrong category, groups feel especially compelled to secure 
their existential ground. The Us-versus-Them conceit at the heart of group identity 
56 Sociologists Verta Taylor and Nancy Whittier (1995, 172) caution against conflating collective and social identity. While the former is 
constructed on the ground of social interaction, the latter is a “social psychological concept” into which, presumably, one is born. 
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makes a compelling prompt to co-optation of the good and true coupled with 
projection of the bad and false on the Other. The fact that religions, in particular, are 
inclined to claim an ultimate understanding of goodness and truth makes religious 
collectives potentially more susceptible to such co-optation and projection.  
It may also be the case that the religious impulse is implicated in evolutionary 
survival. As a marker of identity, from this perspective, religion—more so than other 
affiliations such as ethnic or nationalist allegiances—“primes the dynamics of in-
group/out-group moral psychology” (Teehan 2015, 666). Under these conditions, the 
in-group’s moral bias is employed to elevate its own concerns and to downplay those 
of the out-group. Religion, in other words, constitutes an especially compelling 
cognitive pivot for collective identity. This being the case, the manipulation of 
religious allegiance might be understood to activate primal impulses related to 
survival itself.  
Significantly, the Us-versus-Them distinction functions to mitigate “the fluidity and 
chaos of the world” (Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995, 74). Since liminality is 
characterised by fluidity and chaos, it could be argued that group identity—
particularly in its mandate to include and exclude—is in fact initiated, at least in part, 
in reaction to naturally arising liminal dynamics. 
Group membership is also pursued as a balm for social exclusion. The adoption of 
the group’s ideology can compensate for experiences of low self-esteem and 
devaluation caused by society’s own Us-and-Them protocols: specifically, the 
rejection of non-conforming individuals such as skinheads or members of ethnic or 
religious minorities (Günter 2015, 99). Lynch reports that the British literature on 
terrorism following the 2005 “7/7” London Underground bombings tended to paint 
Muslim and British identities as mutually exclusive—driving young Muslim men, in 
particular, to align themselves more with their Islamic than their British identity 
(2013, 244–50).  
In these examples, the young men in question find themselves very much “betwixt 
and between”. Rejected and/or misbranded by mainstream society, each individual is 
thrown back on his own personal identity—as noted, a liminal region characterised 
by uncertainty and chaos. Here, it is difficult to tell good from bad, for “in a liminal 
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situation, and only then, the borderline between hero and villain is temporarily 
blurred” (Szakolczai 2015, 24). This particular expression of uncertainty will 
necessarily present a particular threat to group identities founded on the distinction 
between good and evil.  
Furthermore, the liminal offers no clear boundaries to contain a sense of self, for it is 
itself “the unlimited” (Szakolczai 2015, 20). Thus, to find oneself in the realm of 
liminality may predictably trigger an existential panic. According to Eisenstadt and 
Giesen’s analysis, a collective identity that offers clear distinctions between inside 
and outside, right and wrong, can offer just the remedy for such distress.  
Problems arise, however, in the discrepancies between insiders’ and outsiders’ 
understandings of goodness and rightness. These discrepancies, in Melucci’s view, 
generate “an unresolved and unresolvable tension” between a group’s self-definition 
and the way it is viewed by the larger society. A mutual denial of identities easily 
spirals into conflict—which serves to reaffirm each group’s self-image, hardening 
attachment to their respective identities and the positions that differentiate them from 
each other (1995, 48). From this perspective, conflict is actually necessary to the 
maintenance of collective identity. 
Not all conflict leads to violence. However, Melucci argues that when groups react to 
conflict by retreating into a rigid identity, the results often manifest violently (1995, 
49). I propose, again, that such violence may constitute what I have termed 
“autonomic liminality”: an unavoidable liminal phase shattering the bounds of its 
repression. 
I argue, therefore, that identification with a group provides relief from social and 
personal liminal passages, in that it offers both of these a sense of clarity and 
reassurance regarding one’s own righteousness relative to the characteristics of 
perceived outsiders. Religious groups have especially potent claims to moral 
superiority, setting them up as havens of certainty in an increasingly uncertain world. 
Identification with such groups generates conflict with perceived outsiders and is 
likely to be fiercely defended, leading in some cases to violence. I submit that 
focused attention to and analysis of these dynamics opens promising potentials for a 
richer understanding of religious violence.  
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Liminality and Religion 
The introduction of religion into a collective identity uniquely shapes the nature of 
that identity—and its relationship to liminality. Eisenstadt and Giesen note that 
adherence to a religious worldview often serves to “overcome the problem of the 
fragility and fluidity of social boundaries by relating the collectivity to an 
unchanging and eternal realm of the sacred”.57 Tracing group identity to a 
supernatural source might further harden distinctions between Us and Them, 
particularly when outsiders are held to be both inferior and profoundly misguided, 
unaware as they are of their true, divinely ordained identity (2000, 82–3). 
Thus, the imposition on our unpredictable and unstable experience of dualistic 
categories is arguably nowhere more handily accomplished than through religious 
institutions. Selengut has observed that these entities function to impart order and 
structure to social conditions. In his view, such normative organisation is central to 
worshipers’ sense of ultimate meaning (2003, 8). The power of such identification is 
augmented by the fact that religions, for the most part, precede and outlast their 
adherents’ lifetimes, adding a sense of continuity and permanence to the 
identification (Moshman 2011, 918). 
For Jan Assmann, the dualism common to the Abrahamic religions precedes doctrine. 
That these religions are all monotheistic and consider themselves “world religions” 
is, for Assmann, secondary. More to the point is that the specifically exclusionary 
nature of the Mosaic religions automatically drives a wedge between Us, the true 
believers, and Them, the champions of false religion (2010, 2). While this analysis 
may justifiably be criticised as essentialising traditions that are in fact diverse and 
layered, Assmann is not alone in observing the exclusion implicated in monotheism. 
Schwartz notes that “the principle of Oneness” entailed in Israelites’ allegiance to a 
single land, people, nation, and deity “threatens with the violence of exclusion” 
(1997, xi). Ruthven argues that “the Abrahamic tradition of Western monotheism”, in 
particular, rests on truth-claims that necessarily exclude all others (2004, 47). These 
57 Eisenstadt and Giesen (2000, 82–3) apply this same dynamic to fixed views about “Reason, Progress, or Rationality”, echoing arguments 
made in the previous chapter regarding the structural similarities between religious and other ideological positions. 
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perspectives notwithstanding, to accuse monotheistic religions wholesale of 
exclusivity seems reductionist. My reading of them foregrounds, instead, the point 
made earlier with respect to the exclusionary nature of group identity and the role of 
religious affiliation in such group identity. It may be the case that the scholars cited 
here, in peering through the lens of monotheism, are seeing the exclusivity common 
to religious allegiance in general.58 
Significantly, Assmann characterises the designated “false religions” as essentially 
undefined. Devoid of orthodoxy, barely differentiated from other cultural arenas, 
these “cults” frequently failed to draw clear distinctions between divine and natural 
phenomena (2010, 11). From the perspective of the “true religion”, with its explicit 
binaries, they must have seemed “inherently untidy”—much like life itself.  
“Life”, Douglas observes, “does not conform to our most simple categories” ([1966] 
1984, 39). Moral regulation, in particular, is ambivalent and contextually conditioned 
(131). This view opposes the clear boundary between the sacred and the profane that 
Emile Durkheim attributes to all religious thinking. Yet Durkheim insists that these 
categories are not inherent in phenomena, but constructed—and specifically so in the 
context of group identity formation (Fields 1995, xlvi). Where the Abrahamic 
distinction upholds binaries such as true (sacred) versus false (profane) doctrine, 
liminality naturally muddles the boundaries between the two (Hetherington 1997, 
33). Given that binary distinctions are precisely what distinguish Us from Them, 
liminality presents a clear threat to religious group identity. 
Yet the sacred continually undergoes renovation to suit the needs of the designating 
community (Fields 1995, xliv). To the extent that group identity is tied to notions of 
the sacred, then, a certain fluidity must inhere in the collective’s self-image. Giesen 
explains that this fluidity is expressed in periods of liminality. Referring to the 
“chosen glories and chosen traumas” constitutive of collective identity (Volkan 2014, 
25), Giesen calls these a “liminal horizon” whose original, experiential inscrutability 
58 My suspicion in this regard brings to mind a similar conflation in Western overlays of Christianity on the concept of religion, mentioned 
earlier (Teehan 2016, 3). Such unwitting biases underscore my argument, elaborated in subsequent chapters, with respect to the 
importance of reflective interiority in scholarship. 
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must be made articulable through the constructions of memory (2004, 112–13). The 
inescapably changeable nature of the sacred, therefore, necessitates narratives that 
reframe the past in newly stable registers.  
Liminality, according to this view, is inseparable from notions of the sacred, placing 
religious extremists in the impossible position of attempting to solidify that which is 
by nature fluid. Thus, I argue that the eruptions of violence associated with religious 
exceptionalism are, in part, generated by a fundamental incompatibility between the 
object of protection—the sacred—and the means of protection, i.e., fixation, in the 
form of triumphant and traumatic narratives. 
Conclusion 
An anthropologically driven theory like liminality can overcome … 
analytical inconsistencies by emphasizing the power of lived-through 
experiences in shaping social situations and stamping historical dynamics. 
—Camil Francisc Roman, “Liminality and the Execution of Louis XVI” 
Liminality is a natural condition that occurs repeatedly in the course of the dynamic 
change fundamental to reality as we know it. As Thomassen observes, liminality is 
inherent in human existence. It is implicated in our social and cultural realities, and 
in our strategies for dealing with change (2015, 40). And yet liminality has only 
relatively recently come to the attention of academic researchers, who are applying it 
to a broad range of disciplinary fields. From the realms of business and healthcare to 
those of sociological and political investigations, liminality is today being employed 
as an analytical tool. I argue that it may similarly prove helpful when applied to the 
study of religious violence. 
While some scholars celebrate the ubiquity and inevitability of liminal dynamics in 
human affairs, others caution against the unstructured, even chaotic conditions 
characteristic of liminality. The normalisation of liminal phases, such that they lose 
their essentially temporary nature, has been dubbed “permanent liminality”, and is 
considered cause for particular concern. Whether extolled or denounced, however, 
liminality is typically uncomfortable. Human beings, like animals (which, in this 
sense, we are), tend to prefer conditions we consider stable and predictable. 
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Yet its chaotic nature is precisely what makes liminality the fertile ground of 
necessary transformation. While definitionally transitional, liminal phases are also 
qualitatively transformational. The nature of transformation is such that it requires 
abandoning established certainties and enduring an often-choppy voyage across 
unknown seas before an unfamiliar but stable harbour comes into view. The liminal 
passage represents just such a voyage. 
Any analysis of a given liminal situation must resist the temptation to define it in 
terms of the polarities it interposes, for liminality operates in a register that defies 
those very polarities. Thus, cultural historian Mark Meyers asserts the paradoxical 
nature of liminality as central to its value as an analytical tool (2008, 80). 
Though it is true that any given polarity is what enables one to conceptualise any 
given liminal position in the first place, it bears noting that, by definition, the liminal 
is also what permits us to sidestep that polarity and to demonstrate its instability. In 
other words, polarity (or its other names: dualism, binary opposition) is at once the 
condition of possibility of a liminal position at the same time that it represents 
precisely that which is exceeded at that position. Thus, a description of liminality 
requires reference to something that exceeds the polarity in question. The terms of 
the polarity are not enough to represent the liminal position; liminality must 
ultimately refer to a third term, indeed to a kind of excess. It is inherently resistant to 
representation and thus frequently elicits paradoxical description: the liminal position 
is both “this” and “its other” at the same time as it is neither one (Meyers 2008, 80). 
Identity, by definition, distinguishes self from others. To fixate on this distinction is 
to cultivate exclusion of the other. The more fiercely an individual or group clings to 
a fixed identity, therefore, the greater the necessity to distinguish between Us and 
Them. At the same time, binary extremes of good/bad and right/wrong are deeply 
implicated in identity construction—particularly, the development of group identity. 
Religious dogma, explicitly structured as it typically is to distinguish good from evil, 
provides an especially useful rationale for exclusion. In order for Us to be aligned 
with the Good, the Other must necessarily embody the requisite contrast in the shape 
of Evil. This is basic dualistic logic. The more rigid a religious stance, the more 
entrenched this binary worldview.  
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The tendency to cling to a fixed identity is a primary strategy employed by those 
who, knowingly or unwittingly, sense the approach of a liminal passage. Particularly 
when a purportedly stable identity is perceived as coming under threat, the prospect 
of liminality can present an unacceptable existential menace. However, since 
liminality is unavoidable in the course of human affairs, the binary cannot hold. The 
historical imperatives of change themselves become threatening, provoking active 
resistance. Central to such resistance is the imperative to eliminate the profane 
Other—a development arising out of what I have described as reactive projection. 
Accordingly, I argue that applying liminality as an analytical device may well help to 
shed light on the intransigence of extreme religious views.  
I further propose that in the case of inflexible belief systems, the suppression of 
inevitable change and transformation can generate explosive tension that erupts in 
violent action. Attempts to deny the natural cycles of liminal change merely postpone 
their eventual emergence in forms distorted—indeed, intensified—by their very 
repression. I have termed this development “autonomic liminality”, and further argue 
that it reliably progresses to a dangerous condition of permanent liminality.  
Its existential uncertainties and the collapse of familiar referents make liminality a 
source of anxiety and distress. Denial of this distress quells its potential to inspire 
innovation (Szakolczai 2015, 34), further prompting intellectual and emotional 
fixation on idealistic, teleological thinking. Add to this dynamic the role of religious 
dogma, and the fruition of this process may well emerge in the state of permanent 
liminality we have come to call “religious violence”. 
As elucidated in the previous chapter, religious violence is too broadly and variously 
defined and understood to be dropped into a neat problem/solution framework. 
Accordingly, I do not intend my argument to be applied in toto to all manifestations 
of violence in which religion is implicated. I do, however, propose that the analytical 
application of liminality to the problem of religious violence may serve to deepen 
our understanding of the phenomenon, and thus perhaps to move us closer to 
effective mitigations. 
The following chapters will examine the manifestation of liminality in two religious 
systems: Sufi Islam and Tibetan, or Vajrayana, Buddhism. By locating the 
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phenomenon of liminality squarely in these diverse spiritual imaginaries, I will 
demonstrate both its credibility in the context of religious orthodoxy and its utility in 
the specific study of religious violence.  
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Chapter Four: The Barzakh 
[A] coincidence of opposite processes and notions in a single
representation characterizes the peculiar unity of the liminal: that which is 
neither this nor that, and yet is both. 
—Victor W. Turner, A Forest of Symbols 
Scholars arguing against the perpetration of violence in the name of religion have 
recourse to many well-known scriptural sources, such as Jesus’ exhortation to “turn 
the other cheek” and similar references in other religious texts and exegeses.59 These 
purportedly demonstrate the fundamentally pacifist orientation of the works cited. 
Scriptural hermeneutics, however, are notoriously inconclusive. Appeals to believers’ 
most aggressive instincts are as easy to find as are entreaties in support of peace.60 
Nonetheless, this dissertation argues that religious traditions contain important clues 
to the understanding, and perhaps even the reduction, of violence. It further argues 
that the experiential aspects of religious observance may prove especially revealing 
in this regard, for liminal events are themselves experiential in nature. The 
correspondences obtaining in this regard may well encode information relevant to the 
research on religious violence. This may be particularly true of those expressions 
articulated in mystical traditions, since the latter tend to privilege experience over 
doctrine as the basis for mystical understanding (King 1988, 258).  
Accordingly, this study proceeds with examinations of the liminal geocosmologies 
articulated in two mystically inclined spiritual traditions. The first, and the focus of 
this chapter, is the Islamic barzakh, specifically as realised in the theology of 
thirteenth-century Sufi master Shaykh Muhyiddīn Ibn al-‘Arabī.  
I have argued that dualism, along with aggression, is key to the practice of violence. 
In this chapter, I will explore Ibn al-‘Arabī’s mystical understanding of the barzakh 
as a challenge to dualistic thinking. In doing so, I submit that Shaykh al-Akbar’s 
non-dual worldview, as expressed in his writings on the barzakh, may provide useful 
59 See Chapter Two of this study for specific references. 
60 See, for example, Psalms 144:1; Matthew 26:52–4; and Qur’ān 2:191. 
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insights into both the phenomenon of religious violence and the scholarship 
addressed to it. 
Ibn al-‘Arabī 
Ibn al-‘Arabī has been credited with articulating “the most eloquent expression of 
mystical experience and the mystical view of reality in Islam”. A native of Murcia, 
Spain, he travelled throughout the East before settling in Damascus, where he died at 
the age of 75. Ibn al-‘Arabī, also known as Shaykh al-Akbar, was a prolific writer 
who is believed to have produced more than eight hundred works, only some 550 of 
which are available today (Fakhry 1997, 80). Of these, probably the best known is 
al-Futûhât al-Makkîya (Meccan Revelations), cited extensively in this chapter.  
Drawing on Neoplatonic thinking, Ibn al-‘Arabī understands creation as emanating 
from “fixed entities” in the mind of God. He differs from other Islamic 
Neoplatonists, however, in attributing the divine motivation for creation to love, 
rather than to “the necessity of nature” cited by such eminent Islamic philosophers as 
Ibn Uzlagh al-Fārābi (Fakhry 1997, 80). 
Arguably Shaykh al-Akbar’s most enduring contribution to Islamic philosophy 
altogether is his doctrine of “oneness of being”, which he bases on the principle of 
tawhīd, or the indivisible unity of the Divine (Nguyen 2016, 332).61 According to 
this view, only God possesses true existence; creation is a shadow or mirror image of 
the “fixed entities” subsisting in the divine imagination. Thus, the multiplicity of the 
phenomenal world is but a reflection of tawhīd.  
This chapter will expound further on Ibn al-‘Arabī’s philosophy and theology, 
particularly with respect to his view of the barzakh. It will explore the non-dualism 
implicit in this view, noting especially its relevance to the phenomenon of religious 
violence. 
61 Nguyen cautions that Ibn al-‘Arabī most probably did not use the term waḥdat al-wujūd, typically translated as “oneness of being”. The 
philosophy it expresses, however, is clearly attributed to him. 
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The Barzakh 
The term barzakh appears three times in the Qur’ān.62 Sura 23:100 employs it to 
describe the boundary through which the Muslim passes at death, and which remains 
impregnable until the Day of Judgement: “[B]ehind them is a barrier till the day they 
are raised from the dead”. 63 In both Suras 25:53 and 55:18–19, barzakh invokes an 
isthmus between two seas: “And it is He Who mixed the two seas, this one sweet and 
pure and that one salty and bitter; and He set up between them a barrier and a firm 
prohibition”;64 and “He has made between them an isthmus, and an utter-
obstruction”.65 Other translations include “limit” (Bashier 2000, iv), “obstacle”, 
“hindrance”, and “separation” (Wardeh 2017, 272).  
Islamic theologians most often describe the barzakh as the intermediate state 
between death and the Day of Judgement (Burckhardt 1979, 1), as invoked in Sura 
23:10066—an interpretation somewhat analogous to the Christian notion of purgatory 
(Archer 2015, iii).67 This understanding apparently arose from the belief in an 
afterlife current during the earliest manifestation of Islam. The notion of the barzakh 
as both a temporal and spatial location between this life and the hereafter, however, 
is a later development in Islamic thought (Smith and Haddad 2002, 8). A more 
nuanced interpretation of the term barzakh arose in subsequent centuries, most 
notably in the writings of Ibn al-‘Arabī. 
Ibn al-‘Arabī’s Barzakh 
Ibn al-‘Arabī grounds his understanding of the barzakh in the conventional 
interpretation: that of an interval between death and resurrection. However, Shaykh 
62 Qur’ān 23:100, 25:53, and 55:20. 
63 Sahi International, Yusuf Ali, Mohammed Marmaduke Pickthall, and Muhammad Habib Shakir favour the translation of barzakh as “barrier” in 
    all three suras.
64 Fakhry, trans. 
65 Literally, “obstruction obstructed”⁠ (Qur’ān 25:53). The translator here is Muhammad Mahmoud Ghali, who also renders barzakh as “isthmus” 
    and offers “obstruction” as a secondary translation in  Qur’ān 23:100.  I have consulted a number of translations; the version offered in any
  given instance represents the one that most simply and directly speaks to the argument under examination.
66 The full sura reads, “‘That I might do righteousness in that which I left behind.’ No! It is only a word he is saying; and behind them is a barrier
    until the Day they are resurrected” (Sahih International translation). Tommaso Tesei (2015, 32) explains that this verse refers to the irreversible
    nature of divine judgement once the sinner has died. 
67 Scholars of Islam are typically reluctant to use the term “purgatory”, more often resorting to “limbo” (Zaki 2001, 207). 
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al-Akbar’s view of the deceased’s experience moves quickly into the realm of 
paradox. Just one example is evident in his gloss on the popular belief that in the 
barzakh, the sinner suffers a terrifying contraction of the grave walls, while the walls 
move apart to accommodate the pious believer’s body. Ibn al-‘Arabī asserts that 
should a sinner and a believer be buried in the same grave, the walls of that grave 
will simultaneously move toward and away from each other (Bashier 2000, 145–6). 
Consistent with this paradoxical bent, Ibn al-‘Arabī defines the barzakh as 
concurrently separative and unitive. Taking the example of the Qur’ān’s two seas, 
salty and sweet, he proposes that the isthmus dividing them meets each on its own 
terms—on the salty side, the isthmus is salty, and on the sweet side, sweet. And yet 
the barzakh is unvarying in its own nature; it cannot have two “faces”, for that would 
imply a barzakh within the barzakh (Bashier 2000, 159).68  
The barzakh, in other words, is not identical with either of its adjacent entities, but 
“has in itself the power of each of them” (Morris 1995, 7).69 This logic may perhaps 
be grasped in a close reading of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s statement that 
separation occurs between two likenesses. Separation has the property 
of the two likenesses, without doubt, because the separation stands 
counter to each likeness through its own essence. Were it not for the 
separation, the likeness would not have become distinct from its 
likeness. (Cited in Chittick 1998, 77)70 
I understand this explanation to mean that the separative article—the barzakh—is 
identical to the two entities it separates in its unlikeness to either of them. This 
unlikeness, relative to the two entities, constitutes the barzakh’s essence.  
But the last of Shaykh al-Akbar’s three sentences above suggests that it is in fact the 
barzakh that keeps the two entities from recognising their oneness—for at the 
ultimate level, all created phenomena are one in their derivation from an 
undifferentiated divine source (Chittick 1998, 168). At the same time, this very 
barzakh functions to dissolve the perception of duality that veils the truth of unity 
68 Bashier is citing Ibn al-‘Arabī’s Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya III 518.1. 
69 Morris is citing Ibn al-‘Arabī’s Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya I 304.16. 
70 Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya III 286.32. 
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(Bashier 2004, 86). As will become evident, Ibn al-‘Arabī’s barzakh enables the 
manifestation of relativity, itself.  
The barzakh, explains Titus Burckhardt, is the point where the absolute and relative 
realms meet. It is that which separates the two oceans of “Quiddity and the 
Qualities”, respectively—that is, the indivisible ipseity of God and the manifestation 
of God’s attributes in created phenomena. But this separation, from an absolute 
standpoint, is a perspectival illusion. Viewed as an ontological phenomenon, the 
barzakh separates relative phenomena; at the absolute level, it is that which mediates 
between the two Qur’anic seas: the Sea of Meanings and the Sea of Sensory Things 
(1979, 1–2; Chittick 1989, 123).71  
The barzakh is … separation only in that it is itself the starting point 
of a separative perspective, in the eyes of which it appears to be a 
limit. And this finds an analogy in what is called the “blind spot” in 
the physical eye, at the very place where the optic nerve perforates it. 
(Burckhardt 1979, 2)  
Thus, at the very point of its agency, the mechanism that makes vision possible 
necessarily negates vision itself. In the same way the barzakh, though imperceptible 
to the senses (Chittick 1989, 118), is indispensable to the operations of our everyday 
sensibility. This portrayal reflects a clear correspondence between the ubiquity and 
unavoidability of the barzakh, on the one hand, and on the other, the nature of 
liminality, as established in the previous chapter. 
A helpful analogy for the barzakh is that of a prism, which transforms the pure light 
of the absolute into the many colours of the created realm (Burckhardt 1979, 1). The 
transformation of the absolute through this mediation is in fact what makes life as we 
know it possible. The essence of God’s pure light is neither compromised nor 
corrupted in its journey through the prism; on the contrary, this passage is precisely 
what transforms that light into the forms of the phenomenal world. All of the divine 
attributes exist in God’s creations, albeit in relative form (Chittick 1989, 16). In this 
sense, the coloured lights emerging from the prism are essentially identical in nature 
to the divine light that gives them form. It is the same light; the mediation of the 
71 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya III 361.5. 
90 
barzakh/prism has merely conditioned it. Not coincidentally, leading scholars in the 
field of liminality use precisely the same metaphor of a prism to illustrate their 
concept (Horvath, Thomassen, and Wydra 2015, 1). 
The streams of light on either side of the prism are not identical, in that one is 
relative or conditioned and the other, absolute or unconditioned. In this, the prism of 
the barzakh performs the transformative function characteristic of the liminal 
passage. Another difference between the two kinds of light is that the 
relative/prismatic is dependent on the absolute/pure, while the reverse is not the case: 
the absolute exists independently of the relative (Chittick 1994, 33; Schimmel 1975, 
5). Also, as with any refracted light, the intensity of (relative) illumination 
diminishes the farther it travels from its (absolute) source (Chittick 2016, 89).72 
Hence, the colourful manifestations of created phenomena are but pale reflections of 
divine glory.73  
A further important distinction differentiates the indivisible unity (tawhīd) of the 
Divine from its multivocal and multivalent expressions. In this context, the barzakh 
could be pictured as an isthmus standing between the oceans of dualistic and non-
dual perception. Here, in particular, the barzakh’s paradoxical function as both 
unifier and divider is worth bearing in mind.  
The first phase of van Gennep’s tripartite ritual structure might be compared to the 
light that enters the transforming liminal phase of the prism, while the relative 
display of colours corresponds to the third, post-liminal phase of aggregation or 
incorporation. The first phase, in predating both the liminal and incorporative phases, 
stands independent of either, while the third phase is meaningless absent the first 
two. 
In its essence, the barzakh is the action of differentiating between any two entities. In 
this, the barzakh limits the definitions of the objects of differentiation. Thus, it is 
72 The theme of the Divine as pure light, and of creation as progressively compromised forms of light, arises at several points in the  
  development of Islamic philosophy, perhaps most explicitly in the Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq of Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardi (Fakhry 1997, 142). 
73 In Ibn al-‘Arabī’s understanding, the prism is human nature itself—specifically as exemplified in the form of the complete human being, 
  discussed below. 
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indispensable to understanding either, since without such limits no entity can be 
clearly perceived. This explains Ibn al-‘Arabī’s use of the term “limit” to describe the 
barzakh. Yet in the very process of differentiating, the barzakh must necessarily 
unify, for “difference itself is a relation, the most unifying of relations” (Bashier 
2004, 87). Here again, in its simultaneous, paradoxical inclusion and exclusion of its 
limiting poles, the barzakh precisely reflects the nature of the liminal passage.  
For Ibn al-‘Arabī, all phenomena are suspended between existence and non-existence 
(Chittick 1989, 94).74 This suspension implies a constantly fluctuating process of 
differentiation, because only God is utterly changeless; and because, as the Qur’ān 
tells us, “Each day He is upon some task”75 (God’s “day”, Ibn al-‘Arabī tells us, is an 
instant, while His “tasks” are His creatures) (18). Any given thing—a rock, a tree, a 
person—is continually “crossing over” between existence and non-existence. Hence, 
that thing stands in continual differentiation from all other things, as well as from 
itself (Bashier 2004, 23). It is from this perspective that Shaykh al-Akbar concludes 
that “the root of all things is difference” (Chittick 1989, 67).76 This being the case, 
the barzakh is an innate function of reality: the “Limit” that enables definition, 
differentiation, and unity (Bashier 2004, 86). This barzakhī function, again, reflects 
the inevitability and ubiquity of the liminal, as previously described. 
In respect of other aspects of the barzakh as described here, of course, the analogy 
does not hold. Nonetheless, I am not arguing that Shaykh al-Akbar’s barzakh 
perfectly reflects van Gennep’s system, only that the correspondences are sufficient 
to offer meaningful connections between the barzakh and the arguments presented in 
the previous chapter. 
Meaning and Metaphor 
Relative phenomena, for Ibn ‘Arabī, are rooted in their meanings, which themselves 
74 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya II 303.28. 
75 Qur’ān 55:29. 
76 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya II 518.12. 
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embody spiritual reality. Meanings inhabit the highest of three Presences or Worlds,77 
which is associated with intellect, intelligence, or reason (‘aql or ma’nā). This 
Presence—“the world of the absent”—is accessible by means of insight. The lowest 
Presence is the sensory world (ḥiss). As “the world of the witnessed”, it is apparent 
to ordinary eyesight (Chittick 1998, 258–9).78 In between these two worlds lies “the 
World of Imagination (khayāl) or Images (mithāl)” (1989, 14)—a barzakh that 
comes into being through the meeting of the other two Presences (1998, 258–9).79 In 
this, the third Presence mirrors Eisenstadt and Giesen’s “trichotomic” dividing line, 
discussed earlier (1995, 78).  
Shaykh al-Akbar asserts that imagination, as “the world of the domination”, is closer 
to meaning than to the senses, as demonstrated by its ability to affect sensory 
experience (as in physical reactions to dream events) while the reverse does not 
obtain80 (Chittick 1998, 260).81 Elsewhere, however, Ibn al-‘Arabī contradicts this 
assertion in submitting that “sense perception is the nearest thing to imagination”. He 
reasons, here, that imagination depends on sensory forms to create its realities (1989, 
122).82
The barzakh, or third Presence, is “the manifestation of meanings in sensory 
molds”— that is, metaphor itself. Ibn al-‘Arabī offers such examples as faith 
represented as a handle, and knowledge as milk83 (Chittick 1998, 258–9).84 
Meanings descend into this barzakh of imagination, or metaphor, where they may 
77
 Chittick (1998, 258) defines a Presence as “the sphere of influence of a specific [divine] attribute [or name]”, and notes that Ibn al-‘Arabī 
  often uses the term synonymously with “world”. 
78 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya III 42.5. 
79 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya III 42.5. 
80 It could perhaps be argued that hypochondria constitutes an instance of sensory cues prompting imaginary realities. Further, the content of 
dreams is not infrequently influenced by sensory experiences such as pain, digestion, and libidinal events. The physical effects of 
hallucinogenic substances also invoke vivid imaginary experience. However, whether imagination prompts sensory experience or the 
reverse is, for the purposes of this study, a technical point not germane to its argument. 
81 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya II 609.17.  
82 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya III 361.5.
83 A reference to a hadith in which the Prophet Muhammad interprets a “dream-vision” in which he was given a cup of milk as indicating the 
   receipt of knowledge (Chittick 1989, 119). 
84 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya III 42.5. 
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remain as imaginal objects or continue to the lower Presence to manifest in sensory 
form. Whichever manifestation obtains, the meanings remain essentially 
unchanged—just as a chameleon retains its identity although its colours shift 
depending on its environment (259).85  
Shaykh al-Akbar’s three-Presence system makes it clear that the barzakh, like the 
visual blind spot, is indispensable to human cognition, since it brings together the 
forms we ordinarily perceive at the gross material level with the meanings abiding in 
the spiritual/intellectual realm (Chittick 1989, 122).86 For Ibn al-‘Arabī, therefore, 
the third Presence is “the centerpiece of the necklace” and “the most perfect world” 
(1998, 259),87 bridging as it does the gap between formless meaning and 
meaningless form. In this sense, says Shaykh al-Akbar, the barzakh “is the root of 
the origin of the cosmos”—a perceptual device God has put in place so that we can 
perceive His meaning in the images we understand as cosmic reality (1989, 124).88 
Yet the barzakh does not always necessarily serve a hierarchical function. Ibn al-
‘Arabī uses the example of a barzakh separating two white objects, for instance, 
explaining that it simultaneously unifies them in manifesting the same essential 
whiteness as both. This, Shaykh al-Akbar continues, demonstrates “the image of the 
true barzakh”: the oneness of the two different objects in their essential whiteness 
(Chittick 1998, 335).89 When any two objects are compared, Ibn al-‘Arabī further 
explains, some common factor must be present in order for the comparison to make 
sense. Thus, in contrasting black and white, “color brings the two together” (184).90 
Black and white, since they are obviously not identical, are separated by a barzakh 
on the basis of their difference. But black and white have equal claim to the 
designation “colour”—which, as the essence of this particular barzakh, unifies the 
85 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya II 677.12. 
86 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya I 306.3. 
87 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya II 390.4. 
88 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya II 183.8. 
89 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya III 518.1.
90 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya III 273.21. 
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two apparent opposites. In the same way, red and green are distinct in their unique 
properties, but “one in their luminous substance” (1994, 16). 
Another metaphor Ibn al-‘Arabī uses to explain the barzakh is the production of ink, 
which in his day was apparently made by combining “gallnuts and vitriol”.91 When 
these two unlike entities are brought together, the result cited here is not, 
significantly, ink itself, but “blackness” (Chittick 1998, 259).92 In other words, the 
task of the barzakh is to enable an effect, rather than to produce a tangible third 
entity. Indeed, cosmic phenomena are, in fact, the “effects” or “properties” of the 
divine names of God—themselves a barzakh between God and humanity (1989, 
39).93 This aspect of the barzakh recalls Greco and Stenner’s understanding of 
liminality, cited in the previous chapter, as provoking specifically experiential events 
(2017, 25). As a liminal phenomenon, the barzakh functions precisely to invoke an 
effect. 
Al-Khayāl, “Imagination” 
As the very stuff of the self, imagination is the encounter between the 
vitality of intelligence and the signs and sediments perceived by the 
senses. 
—William C. Chittick, “The Disclosure of the Intervening Image: Ibn 
‘Arabī on Death” 
According to Ibn al-‘Arabī, “[a]ny two adjacent things” are separated/unified by a 
barzakh he calls al-khayāl (Chittick 1989, 17), most often translated as 
“imagination” (Morris 1995, 1). 94 Imagination, in this sense, manifests at three 
nested levels: in the cosmos, in the macrocosm, and in the microcosm (Akkach 1997, 
103). At the cosmic level, existence is itself imagination—specifically, nondelimited 
imagination, or the divine imaginary (Chittick 1989, 15–16). In the macrocosm, an 
imaginal realm lies between the spiritual and corporeal worlds; this is delimited 
91 Gallnuts are plant growths, caused by insects or parasites, containing concentrations of tannin. “Vitriol” probably refers, here, to the sulfuric 
  acid used to produce ferrous sulfate. 
92 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya III 42.5. 
93 The divine names and their relationship to cosmic reality are explored further below. 
94 At the same time, every phenomenon is itself a barzakh (Chittick 1989, 14). 
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imagination, in that it is constrained by human limitations. In the microcosm, 
imagination is the domain of the soul, which separates/unifies body and spirit (115–
6).  
Significantly, the designation of imagination confirms that the barzakh is not a static 
or passive function, but is actively creative. Far from referring to the mere capacity 
for fantasy, imagination in this sense opens the portal to a “universal reality” (Morris 
1995, 3): an imaginal (versus an imaginary) zone accessible to human consciousness 
through dreams, spiritual epiphany, and prophetic vision (Corbin 1995, 11).95 Henry 
Corbin has famously named this domain the mundus imaginalis: a world as real as 
any available to our physical senses and mental capacities—a “noetic value” that is 
accessible via our cognitive faculties (1–5); but, explicitly, not by means of our 
physical senses (Chittick 1989, 118).96  
For Ibn al-‘Arabī, al-khayāl lies at the heart of a dynamic cosmology. As an 
expression of the divine imagination, it gives rise to creation itself (Chittick 1989, 
118). It is that which separates the knowable from the unknowable, the existent from 
the non-existent, the intelligible from the unintelligible, and objects of affirmation 
from objects of negation. Yet in itself, the imaginal realm as barzakh cannot be 
definitively characterised as existent, non-existent, intelligible, unintelligible, 
affirmed or denied (Morris 1995, 7). Ibn al-‘Arabī illustrates this enigma through the 
example of a mirror. The person regarding herself in the mirror understands that what 
she sees is not, in fact, herself, and yet it is not other than herself. Thus, Shaykh al-
Akbar concludes, for this person to say that she has seen herself is as true a statement 
as to say that she has not (Chittick 1989, 118).97 
Ibn al-‘Arabī was not the first to contemplate the imaginal realm: by the time his 
writings emerged, Muslims had long explored the notion of an intermediate 
95 This realm is also discovered after death (Chittick 1989, 354,  citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya II 295.21 and 296.15). In this, it constitutes a link 
   to the exoteric understanding of the barzakh as a purgatory-like limbo. 
96 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya I 304.16. 
97 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya I 304.16. 
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subjectivity. Earlier Qur’ānic exegesis proposed that the human capacity to produce 
mental images—imagination—entered the newly created Adam when God blew His 
breath, or spirit, into the dense clay of the man’s corporeal form. In this sense, 
Chittick conflates imagination with human identity—that which separates clay from 
conscious existence—and places it precisely at the point where the divine light meets 
the darkness of creation (2002, 54).98 This gloss appears to match the understanding 
of barzakh found in Qur’ān 25:53, as the isthmus separating the “sweet and pure” 
unconditioned Divine from “salty and bitter” conditioned humanity.  
The universe, too, is a barzakh. Neither the self nor the universe can be said to either 
exist or not exist; rather, “[b]oth shimmer endlessly between light and darkness” 
(Chittick 2002, 54). They are suspended between actuality and impossibility; 
between Being and nothingness. Without the intermediary capacity of al-khayāl, the 
chasm between absolute and relative realities could never be bridged.  
The ultimate non-existence of corporeal reality had been proposed somewhat earlier 
by Abū Ḥamid al-Ghazālī, who interpreted the Qur’anic proclamation that 
“[e]verything will perish save His Face”99 to mean that everything other than God “is 
perishable eternally and everlastingly and could not be imagined otherwise”. Here al-
Ghazālī prefigures Ibn al-‘Arabī’s view of the material world hanging suspended 
between existence and non-existence, for in the Mishkāt al-Anwār (Niche of Lights), 
he proposes that all phenomena are in themselves “pure nothing”. They derive their 
existence only through the regard of God, who infuses them with being by turning 
His face toward them (Fakhry 1997, 97–8). 
For Ibn al-‘Arabī, human beings are part of the imaginal realm. He calls this realm 
“discontiguous”—that is, it is not contingent on a human imaginer. It is an “objective 
world ‘out there’ known as imagination” (Chittick 1989, 117). I understand this 
“discontiguous realm” to be a synonym for the cosmos, or the lowest of the three 
98 In this sense, humanity might be glossed as Eisenstadt and Giesen’s “trichotomic boundary” between the Divine and the material world     
     (see Chapter Three and footnote 73, above). 
99 Qur’ān 28:88 (Fakhry, trans.). 
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Presences. Shaykh al-Akbar contrasts this realm with another he calls “contiguous”, 
and which he conflates with the human capacity for imagination. 
As a barzakh, the discontiguous realm cannot be perceived by the physical senses; 
nonetheless, it is intelligible as an ontological phenomenon. Here, again, Ibn al-
‘Arabī resorts to the metaphor of the mirror (Chittick 1989, 117–8).100 The 
discontiguous realm, as a reflection, is a definite manifestation that is available to 
ordinary vision. But at the same time, it is nothing but an image, impossible to bind 
or capture. Both the person before the mirror and her reflection are imaginal; thus, 
the only “fixed entity” (‘ayn thābita) present in this configuration is the surface of 
the mirror, itself. This is, precisely, the barzakh (Bashier 2004, 89).  
Ibn al-‘Arabī sees the “contiguous” realm, the human capacity for imagination, as a 
synonym for the soul (Chittick 1989, 117).101 It is the world of dream images, and as 
such, is constantly fluctuating (1998, 60). This type of imagination is a function of 
human perception, and vanishes with the disappearance of the imaginer. Like the 
light dispersed by a prism, the contiguous realm is dependent on the presence of the 
imaginal/discontiguous, rather than vice versa (1989, 117–8).102  
All of created reality—the subject and its reflection, contiguous and discontiguous 
imagination—is dependent on nondelimited imagination, a synonym for the cosmos 
as God’s “Self-manifestation” (Chittick 1988, 56). This is the “Supreme or Highest 
Barzakh”, for it lies between God and nothingness, making the relationship between 
these two opposing realities possible (1998, xxvi). Chittick explicitly differentiates 
the Supreme Barzakh from the intermediate zone between the spiritual and corporeal 
worlds. The Supreme Barzakh of the imaginal dissolves distinctions between 
opposites of every kind, from exoteric dualities such as depth and surface to more 
metaphysical pairings such as manifestation and non-manifestation. In every case, 
thanks to the intermediary power of the human imagination, all such dyads “coalesce 
100 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya I 304.16. 
101 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya II 311.19. 
102 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya I 304.16. 
98 
and become one” (2002, 54). Thus the self as barzakh brings together body and spirit 
in a single expression.  
In my reading of Bashier (2004, 82),103 the Presence of Imagination is apprehended 
only through Unveiling, which Chittick defines as God-given knowledge untainted 
by rationality or reflection (1989, 63). Chittick’s translation of the relevant passage 
conflates “unveiling” with “insight”, introducing a potentially confusing overlap 
between the means of apprehending the “world of the absent” (the highest of the 
three Presences) and the world of imagination, respectively (119).  
As noted earlier, insight grants access to the highest Presence; thus it would appear, 
at least from this translation, that it is by means of insight that we apprehend both the 
higher realm of the spirit and the barzakh between it and the lower, sensory world, or 
lowest Presence. Perhaps Ibn al-‘Arabī is implying here that the spiritual seeker’s 
valid perception in the intermediary, imaginal realm makes access to the higher 
realm of meaning similarly available.  
There is another possible interpretation of this apparent overlap, however. As noted, 
the imaginal world is described as distinct from the corporeal world of sensory 
perception. Yet the imaginal, for Ibn al-‘Arabī, contains everything we perceive. 
Here we find another overlap: what is the world of the senses, if not the cosmos and 
everything in it? Indeed, Shaykh al-Akbar remarks that “a corporeal body exists 
simultaneously in two places” (Chittick 1989, 124).104 From this perspective, the 
distinction between the material world and the barzakh separating it from the higher 
realm becomes unclear.  
It may be that these apparently blurred lines point precisely to the fluid, ambiguous 
nature of the barzakh itself. For an “outstanding characteristic” of the imaginal is its 
continual fluctuation (Chittick 1998, xxvi)—and, concomitantly, the impossibility of 
identifying clear boundaries. Elsewhere, Ibn al-‘Arabī asserts that the cosmos 
undergoes “constant transmutation” (60), which is a fundamental attribution of 
103 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya III 198.23–28. 
104 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya IV 282.18. 
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liminal dynamics. 
Since it permits of no fixed character or content, the barzakh represents a realm of 
infinite potential—“the most all-embracing of engendered things” (Chittick 1998, 
60).105 In this, it opposes a notion of reality as preoccupied with doctrinal or 
historical phenomena that are perceived as unchanging. The liminal ambiguity of the 
barzakh thus directly contradicts the logic of those actors who assert religious 
orthodoxy through rigid adherence to ideological fixities. 
Existence and Non-Existence 
As indicated, Ibn al-‘Arabī’s “imagination” is simultaneously separative and unitive, 
thereby representing a barzakh that lies between corporeal reality and the spiritual 
realm. It cannot be characterised as either material or discarnate, yet it embodies 
aspects of both realms (Chittick 1988, 53). Although it might seem self-evident that 
the phenomenal world is identical with corporeal reality, for Shaykh al-Akbar the 
cosmos and all it contains—humanity included—is located in the barzakh of 
imagination. As such, the cosmos is suspended between, and equidistant from, 
existence and non-existence (1989, 94).106 
In Ibn al-‘Arabī’s cosmology, everything that comes into existence has a prior 
actuality in God’s imagination. As part of the divine “knowledge”, it subsists as pure 
potential, resting in God’s knowledge as an aspect of His Being (Wujūd)107—until 
God has “clothed it in the robe of existence” (Chittick 1989, 85).108 Ibn al-‘Arabī 
reasons, therefore, that everything other than God is a “possible thing” (1998, xx). Its 
possibility may be realised as existent or non-existent, depending on God’s 
acknowledgement of it in the course of His “Self-finding”. Since every phenomenon 
is an expression of the divine attributes, it comes into existence through God’s 
recognition of it as an expression of His Wujūd (20). In perceiving it thus, God gives 
105 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya II 311.2. 
106 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya II 303.28. 
107 According to Chittick (1998, xix), wujūd “is typically translated as ‘existence’ or ‘being’ but … literally means ‘finding.’ …To speak of 
   wujūd is to speak of finding and what is found, and finding is meaningless without knowledge and consciousness. Wujūd, then, is that  
  which finds and is found.” 
108 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya IV 320.14. 
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“preponderance” to its existence over its non-existence (1989, 82). 
The notion of the “possible thing” is clarified in Ibn al-‘Arabī’s metaphor of the 
universe as shadows cast by God’s light. A shadow depends on the shape of what 
stands between the light and the surface the light shines upon. In the absence of that 
obstruction, the shadow is bereft of form, though it may exist conceptually as a 
potential of the absent obstruction. The universe, from this perspective, is a 
collection of shadows cast by God’s light falling on the divine names (Abramahov 
2015, 8).109 The everyday phenomena we perceive in our world are shadows of 
forms whose true existence subsists in the divine Reality. Ibn al-‘Arabī cautions that 
the distance of these shadows from the Light responsible for their existence further 
distorts our perception of their true character (70). In another passage, Shaykh al-
Akbar warns that to turn away from one’s own shadow is to ignore one’s possibility, 
and thus to turn one’s back on God (Chittick 1989, 94).110  
It is not the case, however, that God’s command—“Be!”111—removes any given 
possible thing from the barzakh and establishes it in true existence. Rather, it 
becomes an “existent possible thing”. Its quiddity as a possible thing is not the same 
as its existence as a cosmic phenomenon, for it has always existed immutably in 
God’s knowledge, where it remains eternally possible. Thus it is that the entire 
cosmos, humanity included, is by its nature located in a field of possibility until 
“clothed in the robe of existence” or subjected to God’s “preponderation”. Non-
existent possible things, from this perspective, are non-existent only from our 
relative perspective, since they have always existed in God’s nondelimited 
imagination (Chittick 1989, 83–6).  
When anything comes into relative existence—that is, becomes an existent possible 
thing—it enjoys that status only for the merest instant.112 This is because everything 
109 See the section titled “The Divine Names”, below. 
110 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya II 303.28. 
111 Qur’ān 16:40. 
112 So swift is the “crossing over” (Bashier 2004, 23) between existence and non-existence that it is essentially instantaneous (Chittick 1975/6, 
   79). According to Abrahamov (2015, 118), in fact, “the moment of a thing’s nonexistence is the same moment of the existence of its like”. 
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other than God undergoes constant change (Chittick 1989, 96). Existence, in its 
essence, is itself movement (1975/6, 117). Ibn al-‘Arabī sees the arising of 
phenomena in each moment as “new creation”.113 Since each emergence reflects 
divine names, the names are necessarily infinite (Chittick 1989, 42). God, as Sheer 
Being (95),114 never ceases to bring the possible things into existence. Since they are 
never the same from one moment to the next, the previous manifestation of each 
entity is destroyed in its re-emergence; thus, God is constantly engaged in 
simultaneous creation and destruction (Abrahamov 2015, 9). Shaykh al-Akbar refers 
to this process as “perpetual renewal” (Chittick 1989, 97).115  
This brings to mind the notion of “perpetual liminality”, which, as described above, 
has been applied in a positive sense to liminal social passages that fail to resolve into 
stability. Shaykh al-Akbar’s “new creation” reflects both the unending change 
characterising cosmic reality as barzakh and the beneficial nature of God’s activity in 
ensuring continual renewal.  
How God determines the fate of any given “possible thing” depends on that thing’s 
relationship to the Divinity. In Ibn al-‘Arabī’s construction: 
If you relate yourself to Me, I receive you; and if you relate yourself 
to nonexistence, it receives you, for you are between Being and 
nonexistence. (Cited by Chittick 1989, 94)116  
In incorporating the potentials of both existence and non-existence, the barzakh of 
possible things unifies these two seas.  
Three categories of existents are evident in this construction: the earthly, the 
imaginal, and the numinous. Henry Corbin proposes two matching triads: the three 
“organs of knowledge” of the senses, imagination, and intellect, related to the body, 
113 “Did we fail in the first creation? But they are in confusion over a new creation” (Qur’ān 50:15; Sahih International trans.). The notion
  of the cosmos as perpetually in the process of creation is not original to Ibn al-‘Arabī; this view was also asserted by Ibn Rushd 
  (Fakhry 1997, 120–1).
114 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya II 216.7. 
115 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya IV 320.3. 
116 Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya II 303.28. 
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soul, and spirit, respectively (1995, 8). 
Ibn al-‘Arabī, too, offers a number of triadic constructions in this context. For 
example, the three levels of “known things” residing in the realm of the possible 
include the sensory (corporeal); meaning (intellectual); and the meeting of meaning 
and the sensory (imaginal), where the rational faculty gives conceptual shape to 
meanings (Chittick 1989, 115).117 The same three levels—bodies, images, and 
spirits—may be glossed as “basic worlds of the cosmos” (1998, 78).  
The diversity of the created world is actualised precisely through the differentiation 
between these three levels, however glossed. In Ibn al-‘Arabī’s words, “He [God] 
gave existence to two sides and a middle so that the entities would become distinct 
within the One Entity” (Chittick 1998, 77–8).118 In other words, there is ultimately 
no reality but God, “the One Entity”; but through God’s tripartite arrangement of 
reality, multiplicity is actualised. Evident in this construction is the crucial role of the 
barzakh as the locus of differentiation. 
The Divine Names 
Any understanding of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s cosmology must rely on at least an elementary 
grasp of his view of the divine attributes or names.119 He submits that God has 
infinite names, of which the ninety-nine commonly assigned to Him120 are merely 
117 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya II 66.14. 
118 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya II 415.18. 
119 Ibn al-‘Arabī uses the term “names” as the legal Islamic designation of God’s qualities. Those of “sound rational faculties”, he proposes, 
call these same qualities “relationships”, for they are dynamic expressions of the barzakh between God and the cosmos. Shaykh al-Akbar 
associates the term “attributes” with those of “imperfect rational faculties”: i.e., the Muslim philosophers whose fixation on rational 
discovery he criticises (Chittick 1989, 34). For the purposes of this study, “names” and “attributes” are used synonymously. 
120 The attribution of “one hundred Names less one” is found in a hadith recorded by Sahih al-Bukhari in his Book of Invocations 
(https://sunnah.com/bukhari/80/105; accessed 5 February, 2019). Which names are included in the 99 differs somewhat according to 
various hadiths. 
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“Mothers”,121 “Presences”,122 or “finite roots”123 (Chittick 1989, 42). 
Ibn al-‘Arabī understands the divine names as relationships between God and the 
cosmos. They have no ontological existence; rather, they are “non-entities within 
entities”, or abstract properties known only by their effects. Lest the believer take the 
multiplicity of the names to imply that God Himself is multiple, Shaykh al-Akbar 
notes that it is only our relative view that attributes diversity to the names. From 
God’s perspective, they are an undivided unity. Each name has two meanings: its 
manifestation as a facet of God’s Essence, and its signification of the relative 
property that distinguishes it from all the other names and designates a unique 
relationship between God and His creation (Chittick 1989, 35–7).124 
For Ibn al-‘Arabī, the divine names constitute a barzakh between ourselves and God 
(Chittick 1989, 39). In becoming manifest, the names fulfil the mirroring capacity of 
the barzakh in reflecting divine Reality back to itself. This process constitutes an 
interpenetration of the Real (which Ibn al-‘Arabī uses as a synonym for God)125 and 
creation (124). This interface is necessitated by God’s divine aspect, which implies 
an inherent relationship between Creator and creation. As Chittick remarks, “[a]s 
soon as we have said ‘Divinity,’ we have also said ‘cosmos’” (65). 
Only God is ultimately real, and it is therefore beyond our capacity to understand 
either God or reality. We are limited by our relative worldview; conditioned by the 
dualistic, either/or functionality of the created world. Thus we misunderstand the 
apparent contradiction in the divine names underlying existence—as, for example, 
The Expediter and The Delayer, or The Avenger and The Forgiver. All apparent 
contradictions arise from this fundamental misapprehension of the divine reality, and 
   “Being is Allāh”.
121 Chittick cites Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya IV 288.1 in support of this designation for all ninety-nine names. However, Abrahamov (2015, 33       
  n35) speculates that Ibn al-‘Arabi’s reference to “the mothers” probably means only the “seven basic attributes”: the Living, the    
  Omniscient, the Willer, the Omnipotent, the Speaker, the All-Seeing, and the All-Hearing.
122 Citing the Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam 65. 
123 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya IV 288.1. 
124 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya IV 419.7. 
125 Chittick (1989, 133) translates al-Ḥaqq as “the Real”, and reports that Ibn al-‘Arabī uses the term synonymously with “Being”—and 
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this error inevitably leads to conflict (Chittick 1989, 67–9).126 
Here, Ibn al-‘Arabī’s worldview offers an intriguing glimpse into the dynamics 
contributing to violence. The names of God constitute the prism through which the 
Real is made manifest to our senses. They derive from a single, non-dual source, or 
pure light, but once that light passes through the prismatic barzakh of the names, it 
splits into multiple and mutually distinct colours, leading inevitably to conflict. “The 
root of conflict and mutual aversion”, says Shaykh al-Akbar, “is the divine names 
…: Life-giver and Slayer, Exalter and Abaser, Harmer and Benefiter.” These 
apparent contradictions prompt quarrels even among angels (Chittick 1989, 68).127 
Since the divine names constitute the sole source of cosmic phenomena, then, 
conflict—and concomitantly, violence—is virtually built into the structure of 
phenomenal reality. 
This imaginary supports my argument that dualism lies at the root of violence. It may 
be concluded that the remedy lies in a shift from fixation on God’s relative attributes 
to an embrace of His essentially indivisible Essence. But from Ibn al-‘Arabī’s point 
of view, our relative angle of vision presents us with an irreconcilable paradox: in 
turning away from the conflictual implications of the apparently contradictory 
names, we perpetrate the very dualistic error that leads to conflict. To oppose 
dualism and non-dualism, in other words, itself constitutes a dualistic error. Happily, 
however, Shaykh al-Akbar offers us an escape route. His is an unconditionally 
inclusive view that accommodates apparent contradictions in the recognition of 
God’s wujūd in all phenomena.  
Ultimately, God and His creation—that is, the unity of the divine light and the 
multiplicity of its manifestations—are not separate (Fakhry 1997, 81). Thus, as in 
Burckhardt’s analysis of the barzakh, the difference between ultimate and relative 
views is merely perspectival. God as the Pure Light and Pure Good is not other than 
His attributes as manifest in the cosmos. The Creator and His creation, while not 
126 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya III 98.19. 
127 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya II 251.29. 
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identical, are inseparable (101). Furthermore, all seeming opposites are reconciled in 
God (Chittick 1989, 70). Accordingly, Ibn al-‘Arabī declares, “[w]e do not say that 
the names are He, nor are they other than He” (Abrahamov 2015, 48).128  
The nature of the imaginary hearkens back to the nature of the liminal, in that 
ordinary logic is defeated in the deconstruction of familiar hierarchies. Dualism may 
be considered the most fundamental of such hierarchies, for as Plumwood argues, the 
mere assertion of binaries implies attributions of superiority and inferiority, 
respectively (1993, 41). As liminal space, the barzakh challenges us instead to see 
the multiplicity of phenomena as a manifestation of their ultimate unity.  
Through the conciliation of perceived contradictions, the distinction between the 
possible and the impossible is erased, for the imaginative faculties of God’s creatures 
are an aspect of, and consequently are empowered by, His nondelimited imagination. 
Thus it is that philosophers can “suppose the impossible” in seeking proof for their 
hypotheses. If the impossible had no relationship to existence, Ibn al-‘Arabī argues, 
it would be inaccessible to supposition (Chittick 1989, 124).129  
What transforms the impossible into the possible is the attribution of meaning, which 
originates in God’s knowledge before being “sent down” to the highest Presence, the 
abstract World of Sovereignty (Chittick 1994, 74). The imagination, as the liminal 
space between this meaning and the sensory realm, joins the two. God may then 
decide to bring this impossibility, now imbued with meaning, into the realm of 
possible things (1989, 124).130  
Meaning is a function of intelligence, while sensory forms are material; thus, the two 
are naturally opposed. It is precisely the strength of the imaginal barzakh that 
accomplishes the impossibility of bringing them together, in the form of the cosmos. 
Hence, according to Ibn al-‘Arabī, imagination expresses God’s divine name as “the 
Strong” (Chittick 1989, 115).  
The cosmos described in this worldview is a dynamic realm that defies fixed 
128 Citing “The bezel of the wisdom of holiness exists in the essence of Enoch”, Chapter 4 in Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam. 
129 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya II 312.4. 
130 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya II 312.4. 
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definition. It neither exists nor does not exist. It cannot be either affirmed or negated. 
It is home to all possible things, yet it also accommodates the impossible. As 
barzakh, it is intelligible, yet “only imagination”; it is an ontological entity sans 
“origin or root”. At the same time, however, the barzakh truly exists as “the root and 
origin of the cosmos”. It is “an objective world ‘out there’”, independent of our 
capacity to imagine it (Chittick 1989, 117–8).131  
As a liminal space, the cosmos as barzakh is a realm of transformation, for it is here 
that humanity has the potential to realise itself as a complete manifestation of the 
divine attributes. As the third Presence, imagination offers the faithful an opportunity 
to receive God’s meanings in the light of possible existence. It is only to the extent 
that they seize this opportunity that they may enter the postmortem barzakh assured 
of entry to Paradise. 
Al-Insān al-Kāmil, “the Complete Human Being” 
Humanity is a microcosm of the universe. Its form is the template on which the 
entire cosmos is configured (Sells 1984, 291). So intimately are the two related that 
Ibn al-‘Arabī refers to the universe as the “great human being”. The cosmos, and the 
beings inhabiting it, are nothing other than the manifestation of God’s attributes or 
names (Chittick 1994, 33–4).  
All worldly phenomena embody certain names in particular combinations, reflecting 
God’s multiplicity. But human beings, uniquely endowed as they are with all of the 
divine names or attributes, reflect His unity. Most humans, however, manifest the 
names unevenly: we may favour Abaser over Exalter, or Avenger over Forgiver. In 
this, we demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of the indivisible nature of the 
unitary source of all the names. Furthermore, we displace the divine attributes with 
human attributes arising from caprice and self-will. The path to perfection entails 
shedding the latter so that the former may properly manifest (Chittick 1994, 32–7).  
131 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya I 304.16. 
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In certain human beings, however, the full range of cosmic functions is manifest in 
perfect balance. The locus of this ideal manifestation is the complete human being, 
or al-insān al-kāmil.132 This pinnacle of God’s creation is exemplified in Adam, 
precisely because of his knowledge of the divine names, which distinguished him 
even from the angels. Each angel embodies only a single name, or attribute (Sells 
1984, 291–2); Adam, by contrast, was entrusted with all of the names.133 In this, the 
complete human being represents the self-disclosure of the Divine (Chittick 1998, 
xxvi).  
Adam’s embodiment of the names made it possible for Reality to see itself reflected 
whole cloth back to itself. God, in other words, perceives His own attributes—the 
qualities intrinsic to the created world—in the reality of the complete human. It is in 
this sense that al-insān al-kāmil serves as the most perfect isthmus between the 
Divine and the cosmos.134 As Michael Sells puts it, before the creation of Adam the 
names “were the keys to a treasure house without the treasure house” (1984, 292). 
For Ibn al-‘Arabī, this pinnacle of human manifestation in fact reflects the true 
nature of every person (Chittick 1989, 27–8) and is realised in the prophets of Islam 
(1994, 31). 
For most human beings, the names are expressed unevenly: some of us lean toward 
names such as Abaser or Creator of the Harmful, while others favour Nourisher or 
Forgiver. In al-insān al-kāmil, all of the names are perfectly balanced (Chittick 1994, 
48). In this, the complete human being affirms the ultimate unity of God; yet at the 
same time, each complete human being is unique in her or his quiddity. While Adam 
and Muhammad (for example) are identical in being perfect embodiments of the 
divine attributes, in their unique aspects as men of their respective times, places, 
132 This Arabic term is more commonly translated as “Perfect Man”. I prefer Sells’s translation of al-insān al-kāmil—“complete human 
being”—for both its gender impartiality and its avoidance of the multivalent and thus imprecise attribution of the term “perfect”. (Ibn 
al-‘Arabī distinguishes between the terms “complete” and “perfect”, ascribing the former to any created entity and the latter to humans who 
have realised their spiritual potential [Chittick 1989, 296–7, citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya III 405.3]). Ibn al-‘Arabī scholar Sa‘diyya Shaikh 
(2012, 82) notes that Shaykh al-Akbar repeatedly asserts the ungendered nature of al-insān al-kāmil and the equal accessibility of this high  
spiritual level to both men and women. 
133 Qur’ān 2:31–3.
134 In another sense, however, a barzakh lies between God and al-insān al-kāmil (Chittick 1998, 77, citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya III 286.32).
This is consistent with Shaykh al-Akbar’s assertion that a barzakh exists between any two phenomena (Chittick 1989, 17). 
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physiologies, and temperaments, they also manifest the diverse forms of creation 
(Chittick 1998, xxvi). Thus it is that al-insān al-kāmil embodies both the divine unity 
and the diversity of creation, for the archetype embodies the very paradox of reality. 
In another sense, the complete person simultaneously expresses God’s 
incomparability (tanzīh) and His similarity with His creation (tashbīh). For al-insān 
al-kāmil at once embodies both the infinity and immutability of divine reality and the 
moment-to-moment finitude of the possible things suspended between existence and 
non-existence. The archetypal complete human being, like God, is eternal, 
unmanifest, divine, and infinite; while at the very same time, al-insān al-kāmil fully 
embraces the temporality, manifest nature, humanity, and finitude of every other 
created person (Chittick 1998, xxvi). In this paradoxical expression, the complete 
human embodies the ultimate barzakh, the Supreme Barzakh: the imaginal space 
between God and the cosmos (1989, 125).135 
Thus it is that al-insān al-kāmil serves as the quintessential prism, not merely 
refracting but actually lending colour to the luminous theophany that is the 
phenomenal world. For this reason, Ibn al-‘Arabī tells us, the world’s “realities and 
archetypes” are subject to al-insān al-kāmil as God’s viceregent (Chittick 1975/6, 5). 
This suggests that the imaginal world, itself, falls under the authority of this perfect 
creation, the complete human being. 
A famous hadith reports that God created the world because He wished to be 
“known”.136 Only human beings are capable of knowing God, because only they are 
endowed with the full complement of God’s divine attributes. In this “knowing”, 
humans reflect the ultimate truth of those attributes back to God. But before the 
creation of al-insān al-kāmil, reflections in the mirror of the world remained merely 
phantasmal (Sells 1984, 308). In order to reveal the big picture of the ultimate 
Reality—the full complement of divine attributes in perfect balance—the mirror 
135 Chittick (1989, 125) identifies this “Supreme Barzakh” with “the Reality of the Perfect Man”. 
136 “I was a hidden treasure and I loved to be known: so I created people—and all the creatures (al-khalq)—so that I might be known”      
(Morris 2003, 330; emphasis original). According to James W. Morris (ibid.), this was among Ibn al-‘Arabī’s favourite “divine sayings”. 
109 
needs polishing. The complete human being embodies the polishing of the mirror of 
the created world (292).137  
As the original complete human being, Adam became the barzakh that, by standing 
between God and creation, united them (Chittick 1998, xxvi). Thus, for Ibn al-
‘Arabī, the calling of the complete human being into existence implies a much 
deeper reality than merely the birth of the human race. It actualises the capacity of 
the created world qua mirror to reflect its own manifestation back to al-Haqq—the 
Truth, the Real, or the Ultimate (Sells 1984, 290–1). Through al-insān al-kāmil 
alone, and specifically through its unique manifestation of all the divine names, God 
is able to view the reflection of Reality. Thus, the complete human being is required 
in order for God to perceive Himself as “known” (292; 293 n10).138  
Good and Evil 
In Ibn al-‘Arabī’s worldview, everything that exists is good—in fact, it is “identical 
with the Sheer Good (al-khayr al-maḥḍ), who is God” (Chittick 1989, 290).139 Since 
all existence derives from God, no essential evil can be attributed to any aspect of the 
phenomenal world. Ultimate evil, as the opposite of God, is “absolute nonexistence 
(al-‘adam al-muṭlaq)”, which by definition is “impossible” (87).140 Ibn al-‘Arabī 
never capitalises the word “evil”, for no ultimate Evil can exist. 
Qur’ān 2:216 cautions that human attributions of good and evil are untrustworthy.141 
In any case, such determinations can apply only to relative situations because at the 
level of our temporally delimited realm, good and evil are strictly relative. Here, evil 
137 Ibn al-‘Arabī’s partiality to visual metaphors perhaps somewhat reflects (!) a double entendre encoded in the Arabic word insān, which can 
mean both “human being” and “pupil” (of the eye) (Sells 1984, 292). 
138 God is self-sufficient, and therefore not in need of anything. His desire to be “known” initiates a reciprocal dynamic in which human and 
   Divine nourish one another. Sells (1984, 308) suggests that absent the complete human being, the universe remains a fixed intellectual  
     construct, or “shadow reality”. In such a reality, God cannot be “known”. 
139 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya III 528.6. 
140 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya II 248.24. 
141 “Fighting is enjoined on you, and it is an object of dislike to you; and it may be that you dislike a thing while it is good for you, and it may 
be that you love a thing while it is evil for you, and Allah knows, while you do not know” (Shakir, trans.). 
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is not the opposite of Good, but rather an “accident”142 or misapplication that befalls 
entities on the basis of human convention or personal preference (Chittick 1989, 
292).143
This logic is clarified in Shaykh al-Akbar’s discussion of “base” versus “noble” 
character traits. The former, he tells us, are accidental, while the latter are essential 
because they are supported by Reality. God’s noble character traits are the very 
nature of the cosmos, and like God, have no opposite. Since God represents the 
whole of the Real, ignoble character traits have no basis in reality. Human beings do, 
of course, manifest traits such as cowardice, avarice, arrogance, and the like, but 
these are simply misapplications. With proper guidance—specifically, the example of 
the Prophet—they can be turned to noble ends (Chittick 1989, 306–7).144 
If evil is merely an accidental non-essential “property” (Chittick 1989, 291)145 
assigned by humans, it follows that evil can also be seen as a relationship. The divine 
names are also described as properties and relationships (39), but their effects are 
seen in the nature of the cosmos itself. As such, the names are “nonexistent 
relationships (and not concrete entities)” (Abrahamov 2015, 45). The names derive 
from the Real, whereas evil is identical with absolute non-existence. This is why the 
properties associated with the names produce tangible effects in the form of cosmic 
phenomena, while evil is incapable of producing any such effects. 
Ibn al-‘Arabī argues that if evil were “an ontological quality”, it would be 
attributable to God, the source of everything (Chittick 1989, 290).146 But a Prophetic 
saying explicitly rejects the possibility of any ontological relationship between God 
and evil: “The good, all of it, is in Thy hands, while evil does not go back to Thee” 
(Murata and Chittick 1994, 107). Or, as Ibn al-‘Arabī remarks, “There is no evil in 
  “arrogant in God toward him who is arrogant toward God’s command” (Chittick 1989, citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya II 687.12). 
145 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya III 389.21.  
146 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya III 528.6. 
142 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya III 315.6.
 143 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya II 576.2.
144 Cowardice, for example, may be applied to fear of committing sin; avarice to desire for religious understanding; and arrogance to being 
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the Root” (Chittick 1989, 291).147 Here Shaykh al-Akbar hints at an almost 
Zoroastrian struggle between good and evil: we human beings, suspended as we are 
between existence and non-existence, are tugged at by both, each of which seeks to 
co-opt us as denizens of its domain. By choosing to obey God’s command, “Be!” we 
“help Him against this nonexistent impossible” (87).148 God, in return, supports 
every entity that has obeyed His call to existence: namely, created phenomena, 
including ourselves. 
Ibn al-‘Arabī does, however, grant the relative existence of evil in the dualistic world 
of opposites (Abrahamov 2015, 13). In fact, he considers it intrinsic to the created 
world: “The world of creation and composition requires evil by its essence” (Chittick 
1998, 310).149 Shaykh al-Akbar bases this observation on the Qur’anic assertions that 
God is light,150 while the created world is dark.151 It follows that all ignorance and 
misdeeds are native to the created world, or “nature”. Yet nature, though dark, is 
receptive to light (311). It is the believer’s obligation, then, to turn toward the divine 
light.152 
Once existent, beings suffer evil only “accidentally”. Such “accidents” occur 
precisely because of the barzakh in which the possible things await existence or non-
existence. In Ibn al-‘Arabī’s system, the accident of evil occurs when non-existence 
“gazes upon the possible thing” as it hangs suspended in the barzakh. The possible 
thing itself experiences happiness or suffering to the extent that it identifies with 
149 At the same time, however, “good belongs to the cosmos in its essence” (Chittick 1989, 289, citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya III 389.21). The 
  apparent contradiction between these two statements may be glossed as a reframing of  Ibn al-‘Arabī’s insistence that good is innate, while evil
     is accidental: while the cosmos “requires evil by its essence”, good “belongs to” it (emphases added).
150 Qur’ān 24:35.
151 Qur’ān 39.6. This verse refers to creation occurring in “three darknesses”. Ibn al-‘Arabī identifies two of these as “the darknesses of the land 
  and sea" mentioned in Qur’ān 6:63. The third darkness is a mixture of these two in the form of the “rationally speaking” human soul (Chittick
     1998, 309, citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya III 141.31). 
152 Once again, this construction seems to reflect a Zoroastrian dualism. It must be recalled, however, that Ibn al-‘Arabī is speaking here to a 
  relative, rather than an ultimate, reality. 
147 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya III 315.6. 
148 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya II 248.24.
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existence or non-existence (Chittick 1989, 291).153 Thus it is that we live suspended 
“between Good and evil” (94).154 As an aspect of God’s creation, however, our 
fundamental disposition inclines us to the Good (1994, 63).155 
Ibn al-‘Arabī also offers a more direct and conventional explanation for evil-doing: 
the work of the Devil. Although it is innate in created existence, evil is not inherent 
to the human soul, which is essentially good. This goodness is rooted in the divine 
breath that enspirited the clay from which Adam was fashioned. Here Ibn al-‘Arabī 
quotes the Prophet’s proclamation that “[g]ood is a habit, and evil is an obstinate 
persistence”—specifically, the Devil’s obstinate persistence in prompting the 
believer to oppose God’s commands and prohibitions. Succumbing to this seduction, 
however, is forgiven as coerced behaviour. In this way, the fundamental goodness of 
the human soul is joined with divine mercy, such that what began well (with God’s 
creation of humanity) ends on the same positive note (Chittick 1998, 313).156 
Shaykh al-Akbar’s approach to questions of good and evil, once again, highlights the 
liminal nature of the cosmic barzakh. Ambiguity remains central to his view of 
human conduct; indeed, “God’s Mercy applies to both the good and the evil. With 
respect to itself, the evil is good and vice versa” (Abrahamov 2015, 179). Thus, Ibn 
al-‘Arabī declines to admit of any fundamental moral dualism. Relative evil, for him, 
is merely “deviation” from humanity’s true disposition, and vanishes when its 
cause—the evil-doer’s unwise choice—is no longer operative (Chittick 1994, 114). 
Heaven, Hell, and the Barzakh 
The Qur’ān issues multiple cautions about the wages of good and evil, respectively. 
The good, we learn—those believers who conduct themselves according to the 
153 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya III 207.33. 
154 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya II 303.28. 
155 Here again, Ibn al-‘Arabī inserts an apparent contradiction, arguing that humans’ origin in non-existence naturally places us closer to 
evil than to good (Chittick 1989, 87, citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya II 248.24). I read this assertion in the context of God’s mercy, rather 
than of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s analysis of basic human nature with respect to good and evil—for “God’s Mercy applies to both the good and the 
evil” (Abrahamov 2015, 179). It may once more be helpful to invoke the distinction between absolute and relative realities. 
156 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya III 182.23. 
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instructions of God as transmitted through the Prophet—will attain the Garden of 
Paradise. 157 Those who do not will be consigned to the Fire of Hell.158  
The Qur’ān identifies both the Garden of Eden and the abode of God and His angels 
as “Paradise”.159 As the postmortem destination of the pious, Paradise is described as 
an actual, arboreal160 location characterised by pleasure and delight.161 The Qur’ān 
prophesies that the Day of Judgement will be heralded by a single shout or trumpet 
blast,162 accompanied by earthquakes and the crumbling of mountains.163 At that 
time, the dead will be sorted into three groups:164 the “Companions of the Right 
Hand”, the “Companions of the Left Hand”, and the elite “Foremost”.165 This 
description appears to promise an end to the ambiguity and chaos of the barzakh, 
with an orderly and predictable “station constantly secure”.166  
Paradise comprises two richly carpeted gardens167 in which the saved will recline on 
silk-lined couches168 and cushions,169 where they will converse without vanity or 
falsehood.170 Here, they will enjoy every variety of low-hanging fruit,171 poultry,172 
delicious wine that neither intoxicates nor toxifies,173 and the company of modest 
God's abode, most other translators refer simply to a “state” and to Eden as “the Garden” (although not always capitalised). In Qur’ān 
89:30, the same Arabic word—aljana—has been variously translated as “garden”, “heaven”, and "Paradise". Linguist Franklin D. Lewis 
(2012, 182) traces the depiction of paradise as a garden to an Iranian word, pairadaeza, meaning “walled enclosure” and referring to a 
park or private garden. 
160 Qur’ān 55:48. 
161 Qur’ān 37:43. 
162 Qur’ān 37:19. 
163 Qur’ān 56:4–5. 
164 Qur’ān 56:7–10. 
165 Ali, trans. 
166 Qur’ān 44:51 (Ghali, trans.). 
167 Qur’ān 88:16. 
168 Qur’ān 55:54. 
169 Qur’ān 88:15.  
157 Qur’ān 78:31–6. 
158 Qur’ān 78:21–2. 
159 Qur’ān 7:13 and 19. The Sahih International and Muhsin Khan translations refer explicitly to “Paradise” in both verses. In the case of
170 Qur’ān 78:35.
171 Qur’ān 55:52. 
172 Qur’ān 56:21. 
173 Qur’ān 37:45–7. 
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and beautiful virgins.174 The denizens of these “everlasting Gardens” will be adorned 
with splendid clothes and precious ornaments,175 and waited upon by “immortal 
boys”.176 A reading of Sura 56 suggests that these rewards are reserved for the 
Foremost, who will dwell closest to Allah. 
The Companions of the Right Hand, although not as richly rewarded as are the 
Foremost, will nonetheless find themselves in a garden fed by underground rivers, 
clothed in silk, and adorned with bracelets of gold and pearl.177 Here, they will enjoy 
refreshing shade under thornless lote and banana trees; pure, gushing water; 
bountiful fruit regardless of season; raised couches; and the ubiquitous “chastely 
amorous” virgins.178  
Those who flout God’s commands and cleave to false beliefs, by contrast, will spend 
aeons in Hell. For them there will be no comfort, only scalding hot water and 
(depending on the translation) either pus or extreme cold.179 For shade, they will 
have black smoke;180 for food, the demon-headed fruit of the Zaqqum tree. This 
hideous meal will be washed down with boiling water.181 Sinners will be dragged on 
their faces into the fires of Hell,182 where they will be clothed in fire while more 
scalding water is poured over their heads and they are tortured with hooked iron 
rods.183 
174 Qur’ān 55:56. The Qur’ān does not detail what delights Paradise may offer the women, who are nowhere depicted as conversing, eating 
fruit, or drinking wine. They do, however, recline on “green cushions and beautiful fine carpets” (Sahih International). These virgins are 
“confined to pavilions” (Shakir), where they are “close guarded” (Pickthall), “cloistered” (Ghali), or “restrained” (Khan) (Qur’ān 55:72–6). 
These cautions raise interesting questions about the extent to which either the male or female denizens of Paradise are trustworthy in respect  
of having attained full moral perfection. 
175 Qur’ān 35:33 (Khan, trans.). 
176 Qur’ān 56:17 (Khan, trans.). 
177 Qur’ān 22:23. 
178 Qur’ān 56:27–37 (Ghali, trans.) 
179 Qur’ān 78:22–5. Muhsin Khan specifically identifies such persons as “polytheists, disbelievers in the Oneness of Allah, hypocrites, sinners, 
 criminals, etc.” 
180 Qur’ān 56:43. 
181 Qur’ān 37:62–7. 
182 Qur’ān 54:48. 
183 Qur’ān 22:19–21 and 44:47–8. 
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The Zaqqum is “the Tree cursed in the Qur’ān”184 and rooted in the bottom of 
Hell.185 The Arabic root of Zaqqum (Z-Q-M) suggests voracious consumption of 
food (Lewis 2012, 185): an image supported by the Qur’anic description of sinners 
filling their bellies with the Zaqqum fruit,186 which boils inside like molten brass (or 
“murky oil”, depending on the translation).187 
In an interesting contemplation on the mirror metaphor, literary scholar Franklin D. 
Lewis speculates that the Zaqqum tree might represent an inversion of the forbidden 
tree in the Garden of Eden, the original earthly paradise. The mirror, in this 
construct, is the temporal world as lodged between heaven above and hell below—a 
barzakh. The Edenic tree is iconographically represented with angelic faces on its 
leaves, while the budding fruit of the Zaqqum resembles the heads of devils.188 
Perhaps, Lewis concludes, the two trees are in fact one, manifesting as either benign 
or demonic in dependence on the spiritual orientation of the viewer (2012, 186).  
If, as Ibn al-‘Arabī asserts, there is a barzakh between any two entities, heaven and 
hell must meet at their own isthmus. The notion of a barzakh separating the Garden 
and the Fire is somewhat affirmed in Qur’ān 57:13:  
On the Day when the hypocrites men and women [sic] will say to the 
believers: “Wait for us! Let us get something from your light!” It will 
be said: “Go back to your rear! Then seek a light!” So a wall will be 
put up between them, with a gate therein. Inside it will be mercy, and 
outside it will be torment.189 
In this verse, the barzakh consists in a gate separating mercy from torment (or doom, 
punishment, or Wrath, depending on the translation). As a barzakh, however, this 
gate can also be understood as a mirror. This possibility offers intriguing possibilities 
with respect to the ultimate non-duality of heaven and hell, and accordingly of good 
and evil. Chittick argues that for Ibn al-‘Arabī, the wall between heaven and hell is 
184 Qur’ān 17:60 (Ghali, trans.). 
186 Qur’ān 37:66 and 56:53. 
187 Qur’ān 44:45. 
189 Khan, trans. 
185 Qur’ān 37:64. 
188 Qur’ān 37:65. 
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itself mercy. He bases this on a translation that describes the gate or door as 
separating the “nonmanifest” side of mercy from the “manifest” side of 
chastisement. Since only the nonmanifest is eternal, according to Shaykh al-Akbar, 
chastisement is delimited and must necessarily end (Chittick 1994, 117). In this view, 
Ibn al-‘Arabī strongly opposes those theologians who predict eternal torment for the 
wicked (114).  
The cosmos is a barzakh, not only between God and materiality, but also between 
heaven and hell. This characterisation goes back to the divine names, specifically 
those of Mercy and Wrath. While Mercy predominates in the Garden, the Fire is a 
manifestation of God’s Wrath. In the temporal world, suspended in between the two, 
we experience a mix of both. Ibn al-‘Arabī takes this to mean that the divine 
attributes manifest similarly in our world as in hell. In neither case is Wrath eternal 
(Chittick 1994, 112)—for Mercy trumps all others in the hierarchy of divine names 
(Abrahamov 2015, 7). 
Following his logic regarding good and evil, Ibn al-‘Arabī declares that the 
punishment of hellfire exists only in the realm of imagination. God will deliver 
sinners from their torment at the end of times, precisely because of the ultimate Good 
inhering in the divine names. Here, Shaykh al-Akbar’s credo merits an extended 
quotation: 
So the All-compassionate takes vengeance upon wrath through His 
mercy, and the All-compassionate is severe in assault. Through mercy 
he abases wrath and holds back its reality.190 Hence the property of 
the mutual contradictoriness of the names subsists in the relationships, 
but the creatures are drowned in mercy. The property of mutual 
contradictoriness remains forever in the names, but not in us. 
(Chittick 1994, 115–6; emphases original)191  
In this way, attributes that at first appear negative are turned to positive effect, for “in 
the divine overview, wrath derives from and leads back to mercy” (Chittick 1989, 
23). Shaykh al-Akbar applies this same logic to ways the pious can utilise attributes 
190 Shaykh al-Akbar’s uncharacteristically inelegant gloss here strikes this reader as his attempt to make the fundamental paradox of his  
       imaginary accessible to the rational, dualistic mind.         
191 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya III 346.14. 
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such as cowardice, arrogance, and avarice in the service of their faith. From this 
perspective, there are no essentially good or bad traits. Because reality is perspectival 
and relational, acts must generally be judged entirely on their effects. 
From the Qur’anic descriptions of the afterlife, it would seem that a stable state of 
incorporation awaits even the evil-doer.192 However, that state will not equal the bliss 
of the pious, for former sinners will never be permitted a vision of God; rather, they 
will remain “veiled” from Him. Thus, while all beings will eventually experience 
bliss, those liberated from the Fire will know a lesser bliss than that bestowed on the 
“people of the Garden”. But even this veiling is an expression of God’s mercy, since 
it accords with the dispositions of those subjected to it. Ibn al-‘Arabī even suggests 
that given a choice, those consigned to hell would choose the Fire, “just as a fish 
chooses water”. For them, the Garden would be a domain of suffering, due to their 
inability to perceive its splendour. Those consigned to the Fire will actually praise 
God for allowing them to “find their joy” in the flames (Chittick 1994, 116–8).  
Paradox and Inclusivity 
Even the most superficial reading of Ibn al-‘Arabī reveals that God’s reality 
embraces both/and.193 Gnosis, in fact, can arise only from combining the apparently 
contradictory notions of God’s incomparability (tanzīh) and similarity (tashbīh) with 
His created forms (Chittick 1989, 69). In the inseparability of these two qualities, 
God is at once “He/not He” (4). 
From this perspective, the barzakh as simultaneously “only imagination” and “an 
autonomous presence” (Chittick 1989, 117)194 is not so difficult to apprehend. This is 
particularly true in the sense that the barzakh, the imaginal, is said to possess the 
characteristics of both existence and non-existence. Hence, the paradox of Ibn al-
192 See e.g. Qur’ān 2:162. 
193 To contrast both/and with either/or would be to insert a barzakh within a barzakh, initiating an infinite regress. To be true to its meaning,  
      both/and necessarily includes either/or.    
194 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya II 311.19. 
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‘Arabī’s barzakh: nothing other than barāzikh195 exist, and existence is itself a 
barzakh (14). It is like a mirror, a prism, a dream (188–9). (And of course, these 
metaphors are themselves barāzikh: Shaykh al-Akbar’s third Presence, the 
“centerpiece of the necklace” that links divine and corporeal realities [Chittick 1998, 
259].196) 
Ibn al-‘Arabī notes that the realm of possible things—i.e., temporal reality—does not 
tolerate opposites (Chittick 1989, 115). And yet without the existence of opposites, 
“nothing would happen in the cosmos”.197 This apparent contradiction serves to 
underline the necessity of the barzakh as mediating “[a]ny two adjacent things” (17). 
Its simultaneously separative and unitive nature is what makes all cosmic opposites 
at once congruent and irreconcilable.198  
The Sufi who has experienced the “unveiling” of God’s truth recognises the unity of 
conventionally perceived oppositions: “the existence of the opposite within its own 
opposite” (Chittick 1989, 243).199 This insight, Ibn al-‘Arabī cautions, is not 
available via rational endeavour; it requires the perspective granted to those of a 
spiritually advanced “waystation”. Here, we meet again the barzakh as only 
ostensibly separative. At the ultimate level—as apparent to Shaykh al-Akbar and 
similarly accomplished practitioners—it is in itself the coincidence of opposites. Just 
as the prism and the mirror are required in order to mediate God’s tanzīh and tashbīh, 
so the barzakh makes possible the particular impossibility of reconciling opposites.  
Further, Ibn al-‘Arabī’s barzakh is more robust than are the entities on either side of 
it, for it is not delimited in its capacity to bring form out of formlessness, possibility 
out of impossibility, and essential subsistence out of essential non-subsistence 
195 The plural of barzakh (Burckhardt 1979, 2). 
196 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya II 390.4. 
197 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya III 462.11, 463 12, 27. 
198 At the ultimate level, the name “Allah” resolves all apparent contradictions between the seemingly opposed divine names (Chittick 1989, 59). 
199 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya II 605.14. 
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(Chittick 1989, 124).200 This function is precisely characteristic of liminality, in its 
role as the anti-structure from which structuration emerges (Thomassen 2009, 5). 
Just as liminality provides an analytical tool capable of clarifying nuanced subject 
matter, the barzakh as “imaginal presence” (Chittick 1989, 116)201 is the most 
reliable lens through which to perceive things as they are. Thus the ambiguous, 
dynamic, non-corporeal, non-conceptual world of the barzakh is paradoxically more 
ontologically stable than are, for example, either good or evil. Perhaps this is why 
Shaykh al-Akbar proclaims it “the most perfect world” (124).202 
This argument relies on the coincidence of opposites in the dualistic mode. It falls 
away in the face of Sheer (or ultimate) Good, which has no opposite. Here again, Ibn 
al-‘Arabī confounds rational attempts to hew reality into opposed dualities. The 
example of good and evil is just one of many examples, which include the divine 
names (Chittick 1989, 59); meanings and sensory forms (115); and existence and 
non-existence (Bashier 2004, 104). All existents, in fact, are “it/not it” (Chittick 
1989, 116). This construction makes nonsense of any rational basis for conflict. As 
simultaneously “it” and “not it”, neither I nor my adversary can be located on either 
side of the barzakh between us. Indeed, we are that barzakh, in the context of which 
no exclusion is possible.  
Exclusion, as argued in a previous chapter, is an essential component of violence. 
Shaykh al-Akbar’s rejection of exclusion as opposing the very nature of the Divine 
is, as has been demonstrated, located precisely in his understanding of the barzakh. 
Accordingly, I argue that an incisive exploration of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s barzakh offers the 
potential for rich arguments against violence that are based in religious ideology. As 
such, these arguments might find more favour in religious extremist circles than do 
exhortations against violence as inimical to piety. 
200 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya II 183. 
201 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya II 379.3. 
202 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya II 183. 
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The Waqt 
The waqt is a class of barzakh typified by immediacy and the presence of the Divine. 
The word has been various translated as “the present moment” (Chittick 1989, 38); 
“time” (Schimmel 1975, 220); “a timeless instant” (Renard 2005, 159); and “the 
eternal Now”.203 It is an instant where time, experience, and identity meet (Sells 
1996, 99).  
The Treatise of Qushayrī offers several descriptions of waqt, including “the moment 
between … the past and the present” (Sells 1996, 100). 204 Similarly, ninth-century 
mystic Abū Sa’īd al-Kharrāz refers to it as a moment lying between past and future. 
Qushayrī further describes this moment as a sword that separates the “two non-
existents” of previous and future experience. The venerable Sufi sage Junayd of 
Baghdad calls it “the breath between two breaths” (Böwering 1992, 83). Clearly, the 
waqt is a barzakh, an ineffable liminal phenomenon lying in between knowables. 
The waqt stands outside the conventional flow of time. It represents, in fact, a 
metaphysical dimension; for in meditation, Sufis “[draw] eternity from its edges in 
pre- and post-existence into the moment of mystical experience” (Böwering 1997, 
61). The waqt is a “time-out-of-time”; “the eternal within time”; “the constantly 
renewed eternal moment”; the locus of the dissolution of distinctions between the 
eternal and the ephemeral (Sells 1994, 106–8).  
Yet the waqt is not simply a temporal phenomenon. Böwering reports that Sufis 
understand human beings “as being, not having, time or waqt” (1997, 61). Here, the 
distinction between being and its dimensional coordinates falls away. Ibn al-‘Arabī 
takes this blurring of boundaries still further, arguing that the waqt encompasses not 
just the human being and her moment of presence, but also the breath of the Divine, 
which gives life to humanity. Moreover, it is the breath of the Sufi, the one who 
receives the divine exhalation as inspiration and pronounces dhikr (remembrance of 
God) with her own outbreath. Thus, 
203 Professor Omid Safi of Duke University’s Islamic Studies Center, email message to author, October 7, 2016. 
204 The Qushayriyyan Treatise is attributed to Abu ‘l-Qasim al-Qushayrī. Sells (1996, 97) calls it “perhaps the most popular classical work  
on Sufism, admired for its subtlety, acuity, and clarity”. 
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the complex terms dhikr, “moment,” and “breath” are fused in a 
unified dynamic of recreation and transformation, a dynamic where 
the moments vary with the subject, as opposed to the uniform instants 
of the physical theory on which the new theory has been 
superimposed. (Sells 1994, 107) 
From this perspective, the waqt is not a temporal or spatial location but a mode of 
being equivalent to fanā, or “nullification of the mystic in the divine presence” 
(Schimmel 1975, 144). In the waqt, the Sufi aspires to “a complete giving over of the 
self to each moment, as if that moment were the totality of one’s existence” (Sells 
1996, 99). The dissolution of conventional boundaries between time, space, person, 
and divinity in the waqt entail the “passing away” of the practitioner’s previous 
identity. Under these conditions, binary distinctions between self and other or Us and 
Them fall away. 
Conclusion 
In the experience of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s barzakh, the Us-versus-Them construct falls 
apart. This is primarily due to his insistence on the non-dual nature of reality, as 
described above. Shaykh al-Akbar obligingly offers a rational explanation for the 
collapse of distinctions between self and other, summarised here by Bashier: 
Something defines itself through a process of differentiating itself 
from all relation to Other. But differentiating is a sort of relation. By 
differentiating itself from Other, Something relates itself to Other. To 
avoid this paradoxical situation, Something seeks to differentiate itself 
from all relations to Other, including the relation of difference from 
Other. But the only way Something can differentiate itself from 
difference to Other is by making Other disappear in it, that is, by 
uniting with Other. Hence, by completely differentiating itself from 
Other, Something completely unites with Other. (Bashier 2004, 88; 
emphasis original) 
The simultaneous activities of differentiation and relation are precisely the function 
of the barzakh. The more ardently Us strives to rid the world of Them, the more 
helplessly it is united with the reviled Other. 
To apply this dynamic to contemporary instances of religious violence is to ask 
probing questions about the verisimilitude of the perceived differences between the 
conflicted parties. Such questions may not be of interest to the parties themselves, as 
122 
it is in the nature of the Us-versus-Them dynamic that any suggested commonalities 
between the two are likely to be roundly rejected. Researchers into entrenched 
hostilities may, however, find such explorations relevant. Might it be the case that 
research into religious violence, by failing to question the reification of the 
combatants’ mutually incompatible positions, contributes to maintaining and even 
deepening these antipathies? I argue that the ferocious continuation of religious 
violence in spite of researchers’ best efforts to mitigate it invites at least 
consideration of this possibility. 
This logic may be extended to the broader binary of violence versus non-violence. In 
this context, I submit that reflexive rejection of violence and the concomitant 
demonisation of its perpetrators may obstruct innovative approaches to both research 
and strategy.205 The fact is that violence exists, continues, and is perhaps intensifying 
(Flannery 2016, 243). Academic analyses are an important resource for those 
activists and mediators whose primary business is the search for remedies, making 
their tone and structure consequential beyond the academic frame of reference 
(Omer, Appleby and Little 2015, ix–x). Were research into religious violence to take 
a bolder and more inclusive approach, this shift could not help but affect the broader 
cultural context. 
Hence, I argue that the barzakh as hermeneutic opens an intriguing possibility of 
radical inclusion, and suggest that it may provide important clues to the riddle of 
human conflict, in which the question of evil—what it is, and to whom is properly 
belongs—becomes central. Given Ibn al-‘Arabī’s view, which conflates evil with 
absolute non-existence, nothing in existence is inherently evil, including violence. 
I am not proposing a re-examination of violence in an attempt to find a presumed  
good in it. In addition to its impracticability, this approach would constitute another 
unreflective recourse to a presumed binary, the very assumption of which may be the 
root of the problem. Rather, I argue that bracketing the automatic ascription of 
wrongness and badness to violence could open promising new research pathways 
205 Historian of religion Catherine Wessinger (2006, 169–72) argues, for example, that a less adversarial and moralistic approach on the part of 
federal authorities to the Branch Davidian group might well have averted the tragedy that occurred in Waco, Texas in 1993. 
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into an enduring and destructive phenomenon. The very difficulty of contemplating 
such an approach speaks eloquently to our deeply embedded tendency, as 
researchers, to resort to the good/bad, right/wrong binaries that Ibn al-‘Arabī so 
incisively critiques. 
Finally, the barzakh as liminal space specifically embraces ambiguity, fluidity, and, 
especially, paradox. These qualities, applied with Doniger’s due “responsibility to the 
data” (1998, 36–7) may add potentially helpful nuance to scholarly research into the 
religiously prejudiced conflict so prominent in current global affairs. 
Ibn al-‘Arabī frequently reminds us that distinctions between relative dualism and 
the non-dual nature of reality are not concrete, but perspectival: fabrications, in fact, 
rooted in dualism itself. Rendering into secular language the assertion that God is 
Himself “the (very) opposites”,206 it might be argued that a vaster, more 
encompassing view of conflict may prove to be more in accord with the dynamics of 
reality than is the conventional understanding of irreconcilable opposition. To cite a 
literary giant of Western culture, F. Scott Fitzgerald, “The test of a first-rate 
intelligence is the ability to hold two opposing ideas in mind at the same time and 
still retain the ability to function.” Hence, I argue that shifting one’s perspective to a 
more inclusive understanding of conflict—mirroring, perhaps, Shaykh al-Akbar’s 
own reconciliation of the apparently contradictory divine names—might conceivably 
reveal a path toward greater inclusivity in the objects of analysis. 
To embrace the antinomian view proposed here will, of course, place the researcher 
in an academic barzakh: an ambiguous realm fraught with risk and devoid of 
guarantees. Yet as is the case with all liminal passages, this barzakh also holds the 
promise of transformation. Further, genuine progress typically demands a departure 
from established orthodoxy. Just as Ibn al-‘Arabī dared to challenge the theological 
status quo of his day, I submit that scholars of religious violence might contemplate 
the relative advantages of exploring an approach that, from a conventional 
perspective, may seem implausible—and further, that a close reading of Ibn al-
206 An assertion by Tāj al-Dīn al-Akhlāṭī that Ibn al-‘Arabī cites in support of his own view (Bashier 2004, 139). 
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‘Arabī’s view of the barzakh may offer promising clues for such exploration. 
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Chapter Five: The Bardo 
If we don’t act on our craving for pleasure or our fear of pain, we’re left in 
the wide-open, unpredictable middle. The instruction is to rest in that 
vulnerable place, to rest in that in-between state, to not hunker down and 
stay fixed in our belief systems but to take a fresh look with a wider 
perspective.  
—Pema Chodron, Living Beautifully with Uncertainty and Change 
Bardo is a Tibetan word commonly applied to the intermediate state between death 
and rebirth.207 As is the case with popular understandings of the Muslim barzakh, the 
bardo has traditionally been presumed to represent a limbo during which the 
deceased encounters the consequences of conduct during their lifetime.208 The word 
itself is translated as “in between” (Goss and Klass 1997, 380), “between two” 
(Lopez 2011, 41), or “intermediate state” (Fremantle and Trungpa 1975, xvii). 
Sogyal Rinpoche translates bardo as “a ‘transition’” or a gap between the 
completion of one situation and the onset of another. Bar means “in between,” and 
do means “suspended” or “thrown” (1992, 102). 
The standard unqualified use of “bardo” in Tibetan Buddhism continues to define the 
period between death and rebirth. However, the word has come to refer to “any 
transitional experience, any state that lies between two other states … an interval, a 
hiatus, a gap” (Fremantle 2001, 54). Contemporary Buddhist teacher Chökyi Nyima 
states definitively: “Bardo means the period between two events” (1991, 33). 
Timothy Scott offers a definition of “bardo” as “the sense of a phase between two 
successive states of being” (2007, 11). Thus, literary theorist Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick refers to “[t]he bardo that extends from diagnosis until death” (2005, 
180).209 Anthropologist Aidan Seale-Feldman, translating bardo as “between two”, 
207 Buddhist scholar Karma Lekshe Tsomo (2006, 40) suggests that the bardo’s terminus is more accurately located at the point of “re-
   conception”; that is, at the moment when egg and sperm meet. 
208 Encyclopedia of Buddhism, s.v. “ancestors”. 
209 Sedgwick was herself in just such a bardo, having been diagnosed in 1991 with the breast cancer that would kill her in 2009 (Sedgwick 2017).
126 
suggests that the term can even be applied to “a pause between words” (2012, 6).210 
According to Bryan J. Cuevas, the notion of an intermediate state following death 
has not been traced to the Buddha himself, but became a topic of debate only several 
hundred years after his death. The first mention of an “existence within the interval” 
appeared as far back as the second century BCE, but it has not been determined 
whether this referred to the consciousness inhabiting an intermediate postmortem 
state. Elaborate Indian exegeses of such a state emerged only in the second century 
CE. The version widely accepted today in Buddhist East Asia and Tibet was 
formulated by the Indian scholar Vasubandhu in the fifth century CE (2004a, 377–8). 
Although all Buddhist schools maintain a belief in rebirth following death, the notion 
of an intermediate period between the two events is confined to adherents of the 
Mahayana school (Tsomo 2006, 40). 211 Cuevas attributes to the later evolution of 
Tantric Buddhism, however, the idea that the individual’s consciousness traverses 
from three to six discrete phases within the intermediate state (2004a, 377–8). 212  
It is within the tantric tradition, too, that the notion of six distinct bardos developed. 
Karma Lekshe Tsomo traces this to the eleventh-century Indian master Naropa, who 
applied the ubiquitous threefold logic of fundamental Buddhist teachings—the 
trikāya,213 the three levels of practitioners,214 etc.—to the process of life, death, and 
rebirth. Naropa’s disciples refined his taxonomy, eventually arriving at the six bardos 
of Yangöngpa, a thirteenth-century yogi and author:  
(1) the natural state, (2) ripening from birth to death, (3) meditative
210 Having frequented Western Vajrayana Buddhist circles for most of my adult life, I can personally attest to the routine use of the term 
“bardo” to refer to any interval between two experiences of relative stability. Examples include the wait between writing exams and 
receiving the results, and the period between jobs, projects, or intimate relationships. The defining characteristic of a bardo, in this context, is 
the insecurity attendant on not knowing—or, as at least one contemporary Buddhist teacher has called it, the experience of “tremendous 
uncertainty and groundlessness” (Simmer-Brown 2001b, 61). 
211 The Mahayana school of Buddhism—the “great vehicle”—is believed to have emerged in India around the beginning of the common era. It 
  is widely practised today in China, Korea, Tibet, and Japan (Encyclopedia of Buddhism, s.v. “Mahayana”). 
212 The term “Tantric Buddhism” has become more or less synonymous with Tibetan, or Vajrayana, Buddhism (see n218, below). 
213 The “threefold pattern of the awakened state”: dharmakaya, sambhogakaya, and nirmanakaya (the bodies of truth, enjoyment, and 
     emanation, respectively) (Fremantle 2001, 174). 
214 Dull, middling, and superior. 
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stabilization, (4) karmic latencies and dreams, (5) dying, and (6) 
becoming. (Tsomo 2006, 108–9) 
 A century later, Karma Lingpa proposed a slightly different distribution of bardos: 
(1) living, (2) dreaming, (3) meditative stabilization, (4) dying, (5)
reality itself, and (6) becoming. (Tsomo 2006, 110)
Lingpa’s understanding of the bardos is authoritative, for he is held to be the terton, 
or “treasure discoverer”, who found the Bardo Thötröl, Padmasambhava’s definitive 
teaching on the bardo following death.215 Yangöngpa’s bardo of the natural state is 
“roughly equivalent” to the bardo of “reality itself” proposed by Lingpa (Tsomo 
2006, 110). Nyima collapses “the bardo of the meditative state” (“meditative 
stabilization” in both Yangöngpa’s and Lingpa’s taxonomies) and “the bardo of 
dreams” into “the bardo of this life”—presumably, referencing the first bardo 
appearing in both lists (1991, 33). This formula produces a total of four bardos: “the 
natural bardo of this life” (35); “the painful bardo of dying” (82); “the luminous 
bardo of dharmata” (112); 216 and “the karmic bardo of becoming” (147). The latter 
two occur between physical death and rebirth, although advanced practitioners may 
achieve realisation in the bardo of dharmata, rendering unnecessary any further 
processing in the bardo of becoming (147).217 Nyima attributes to Tulku Urgyen 
Rinpoche the observation that a “great sinner” experiences no bardo at all, but on 
death descends “directly to the hell realms” (113 n1).  
Today, belief in and practices related to the bardo are largely associated with the 
Tibetan Vajrayana218 school of Buddhism (Benard 1992, 173). Theologian Robert E. 
215 Tibetans credit Padmasambhava with establishing Buddhism in Tibet in the eighth century, and believe that he buried various important 
teachings—the Bardo Thötröl among them—in the Gampo Hills of central  Tibet (Trungpa 1975, xi). A later section of this 
chapter  explores   the Bardo Thötröl and its relevance to this study.      
216 Tsomo translates dharmata variously as “the nature of reality” (2006, 117) and “wisdom of great bliss” (235). Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche 
(2008, 122) calls it “ultimate reality”, while Thinley Norbu Rinpoche (2002, 218) cites “the absolute truth”. Buddhist scholar and teacher 
Judith Simmer-Brown (2001a, 290) refers to the dharmata as “the intimate life-breath of all phenomena”.  Altogether, these various 
glosses suggest a realised understanding of the phenomenal world that transcends relative dualism. (See n233, below, for further 
synonyms.) 
217 Sogyal Rinpoche (1992, 12), whose Tibetan Book of Living and Dying made the bardo teachings widely accessible to Western readers,
  posits these same four bardos. His simplified designations are: life, dying and death; after death; and rebirth.
218 Vajrayana (“diamond’ or ‘indestructible’ vehicle”) Buddhism is also known as Tantric Buddhism, Tantrayana, Mantrayana, and
    Secret Mantra (Oosthuizen 2017, 2). Some scholars consider Vajrayana Buddhism a subset of the Mahayana
(Encyclopedia  of Buddhism, s.v. “Vajrayana”). Vajrayana does not possess its own distinctive philosophical position, but bases  
      its doctrine on the Mahayana view (Ray 2001, 81). 
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Goss and psychologist of religion Dennis Klass suggest that this may be due to the 
Vajrayana’s understanding of the separation of the “life principle” from the body at 
the time of death (1997, 381). 
That said, the notion of an intermediate state between death and rebirth is not 
exclusive to Tibet. As we have seen, the Islamic barzakh represents a similar idea. 
Several scholars have in fact suggested that the bardo is essentially Tibetan 
Buddhism’s version of the barzakh. Scholar of religion Timothy Scott equates the 
two in their shared function as a space in between experiential states, noting that the 
barzakh and bardo both serve as “the archetypal interface between Transcendence 
and Immanence” (2007, 10–11). Ibn al-‘Arabī scholar Gerald Elmore considers the 
barzakh “[m]ore or less parallel” with the Tibetan Buddhist bardo (1998, 158 n125). 
Artist and cultural activist Jalal Toufic goes so far as to conflate the two, thus: 
“barzakh/bardo” (2010, 6). 
Salman Bashir suggests that the bardo holds a place of importance in the Vajrayana 
equivalent to that of the barzakh in Islam,219 and encourages “a comparative study 
between the barzakh and the bardo” (2000, 319–20 n3; emphases original). The 
present study, although not explicitly dedicated to such a comparison, presents a 
preliminary exploration of the two notions and offers some observations on the 
nature of their relationship. 
According to anthropologist Geoffrey Samuel, the intermediate state was known to 
several of India’s philosophical traditions and also found its way to Buddhists in 
China and the Far East. It was in Tibet, however, that the doctrine underwent 
extensive elaboration (1993, 210), and where the understanding of the intermediate 
state in Vajrayana Buddhism was inevitably influenced by pre-Buddhist Tibetan 
beliefs and practices. Matthew Kapstein reports that the bardo, as now understood 
through the lens of Tibetan Buddhism, reflects an ongoing process of 
accommodation in which the alien Buddhist teachings melded with existing 
219 Bashir offers this observation specifically in the context of The Tibetan Book of the Dead. 
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indigenous rites and beliefs (Kapstein 2000, 10). As he explains, 
the Tibetan Buddhist tradition was not … a static replication of Indian 
antiquity, nor, in its dynamic aspects, was it the product of deliberate 
contrivance on the part of Tibetans motivated to construct a uniquely 
Tibetan form of Buddhism. Buddhism in Tibet developed through a 
sustained and subtle process, whereby the foreign religion achieved a 
decisive cultural hegemony but was at the same time, as conquerors 
almost always are, transformed by its own success. (Kapstein 2000, 4) 
Accordingly, much of contemporary Vajrayana doctrine concerning death and 
funerary rites is infused with the shamanistic creeds that predated Buddhism in Tibet 
(Ray 2001, 4). Philosopher and ethicist Carl B. Becker names Bön as the first such 
religion to arise in Tibet. In his view, Bön exercised a significant influence on 
Tibetan Buddhism.220 In particular, the latter tradition’s treatment of death and 
funerary rites has no resonance with Indian Buddhism (1993, 85–6). Samuel argues 
that all Vajrayana ritual incorporates “unstated shamanic implications”, namely, the 
resolution of conflict by means of subduing demonic forces (1993, 212).  
Prior even to its arrival in Tibet, Buddhist doctrine must certainly already have been 
influenced by the ancient Indian system of Vedanta, the precursor of what is today 
called “Hinduism”. German Indologist Helmuth von Glasenapp argues that monism 
is native to the Indian philosophical mindset, giving rise to non-dual doctrines in 
both traditions. Since Vedanta and Buddhism have coexisted for centuries, he 
surmises, mutual influence was inevitable. Von Glasenapp further attributes to 
Vedantic influence the Mahayana assertion that “the highest reality is a pure and 
undifferentiated spiritual element that represents the non-relative substratum of all 
phenomena” (1951 and 57). Again, however, that influence will have gone both 
ways. It has been argued, for example, that the Bhagavad Gītā, a central and 
enduring Hindu text, evidences clear Buddhist influences (Upadhyaya 1968). 
220 Academic debate continues regarding the interactions in Tibet of Bön, other indigenous animistic religions, and Buddhism. Each has 
doubtless exercised some degree of transformation on the others. Translator and commentator Giacomella Orofino (1990, 13–14 n1) offers 
an exhaustive bibliography of works describing the interrelationship between Tibetan Buddhism and Bön. Scholarly attempts to locate 
Tibetan belief systems diachronically have however proven difficult, as “Tibetan history [is] unknown for its transparency” (Tatz 1978, 3). 
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How much of the bardo doctrine can be attributed to the Tibetan cultural mindset 
and/or pre-existing spiritual traditions seems, then, to be largely undecidable. Becker 
considers “non-Buddhist” the notion of “an intermediate period in which the soul 
may return” Becker (1993, 86).221 Kapstein, for his part, notes that the idea of 
repeated births, deaths, and rebirths was “alien to earlier Tibetan belief” (2000, 5)—
at least, in the sense of being universally applicable. He attributes the adoption of 
this view to the Indian cosmology informing Buddhism’s earliest manifestation 
(43).222 Fremantle is unequivocal in attributing the central thrust of the Tibetan bardo 
teachings to Indian Buddhism (2001, 53). Thus the origins of Tibetan Buddhism’s 
bardo tradition remain shrouded in historical ambiguity. 
What Is the Bardo? 
The term “bardo” is used to describe both the transitional period following death and 
the “subtle entity” that inhabits that state (Cuevas 2004a, 377). This entity, also 
sometimes called the “subtle body”, is described as “a complex subtle physiology 
that both coexists with, and functions in constant relationship to, the physical body 
and its cognitive correlate, the mind” (Miller 2013).  
In bridging the corporeal body and the disembodied mind, the subtle body “inhabits 
an ‘in between’ mode of embodiment” (Miller 2013)—a semi-corporeal bardo, 
perhaps, within the temporal bardo of the postmortem passage. Here, what survives 
the dissolution of the physical body retains its relationship with sensory experience, 
precisely because cognition and corporeality are inseparable to begin with. Not only 
are body and mind one within the bardo experience—so, too, are the spatial and 
temporal realms; for the subtle body “is the field of somatic experience, as it occurs 
at the present moment” (ibid.).  
Donald J. Lopez, Jr. describes that which traverses the bardo as a “bardo being” that 
spontaneously arises on death in the form of a five- or six-year-old. Although non-
corporeal, this form is nonetheless equipped with the shape of the body it will inhabit 
221 Certainly, the notion of a soul, in the sense of an enduring essence of self, opposes the Buddha’s insistence on anātman (see the following 
  section). 
222 Pre-Buddhist  Tibetan beliefs apparently accommodated the phenomenon of rebirth under certain conditions (Kapstein 2000, 43). 
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during its next lifetime, complete with fully functioning sense organs. This, Lopez 
explains, is because the bardo being and the person about to experience rebirth are 
created by the same karmic cause (2011, 41). 
Tsomo reports that Tibetans believe “a very subtle consciousness” continues beyond 
death (2006, 24). For Nyima, that which leaves the body at the moment of death and 
passes into the bardo is “the mind” or “consciousness” (1991, 107). W.Y. Evans-
Wentz calls it “the Knower, or principle of consciousness” ([1927] 2000, 100).223 
Restating Evans-Wentz’s characterisation as “the ‘conscious principle’”, Ferdinand 
D. Lessing adds his own gloss: “the Buddhist analogon of our soul concept” (1953,
452). Social scientist Nobuyoshi Yamabe, however, challenges this characterisation,
arguing that where the soul is essential and indestructible, the Buddhist conception of
consciousness is by nature impermanent, fluid, and “momentary” (2004, 1:175).
Significantly in the context of this dissertation, Urgyen refers to whatever continues
into death as “the experiencer” (1991, 110).
Anātman 
Whatever the nature of the entity traversing the bardo, it can ultimately be 
understood only in the context of the Buddhist doctrine of non-self, or anātman. 
Since all phenomena are in constant flux, according to this view, that which we 
consider a “self” is in fact only an impermanent collection of form, sensation, 
perception, habitual tendencies, and consciousness. With these factors subsisting in 
continually shifting relationships with one another and the world external to them, 
there can be no permanent self, soul, or essence—what the Vedic texts call ātman. 
For this reason, the Buddhist doctrine became known as anātman: no-self (Sarao 
2004, 1:18).224 
223 Donald S. Lopez Jr. (2011, 78–9) notes that Evans-Wentz’s 1927 translation of The Tibetan Book of the Dead is deeply flawed by the 
translator’s misleading claim to Buddhist initiation, coupled with a Theosophist overlay on the Tibetan Buddhist teachings he encountered. 
Indeed, Evans-Wentz coined the title The Tibetan Book of the Dead based on its perceived similarities to the then-popular Book of Going Forth 
by Day, also known as The Egyptian Book of the Dead (102). Accordingly, academic researchers might justifiably approach Evan-Wentz’s 
scholarship with caution. 
224 Significantly, in the context of this study, Buddhism ascribes the dualistic understanding of Us and Them precisely to the illusion of a singular, 
independent, non-relational self (Makransky 2005, 53). 
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Who or what then lives and dies? Who or what takes form, experiences sensation, 
and traverses the bardo? The Buddha is said to have brushed aside this query. 
Historian of Buddhism K.T.S. Sarao paraphrases his response: 
The question is not “who feels,” but “with what as condition does 
feeling occur?” The answer is contact, demonstrating … the 
conditioned nature of all experience and the absence of any 
permanent substratum of being. (Sarao 2004, 1:18) 
The invocation of “condition” reflects the Buddhist understanding of all phenomena 
as conditioned by constantly shifting events and relationships. From this perspective, 
birth and death are “nothing more or less than oscillating links in the ongoing chain 
of cause and effect”. In the case of persons, cause and effect is essentially 
synonymous with karma: that is, actions and their consequences (Cuevas 2004b, 
713).  
Francesca Fremantle explains the nature of anātman thus: 
So when we ask who is liberated, it is not the self. Liberation is not of 
the self, but from the self. If we keep on asking “Who?” we shall only 
find another “self” who is released from “self.” Whenever we try to 
identify the final watcher, the ultimate experiencer, we are once again 
creating an imaginary “I.” (Fremantle 2001, 37; emphases original)  
Accordingly, to enquire into the nature of the entity that subsists in the intermediate 
space between death and rebirth is to ask the wrong question. And yet there is 
presumably a presence of some kind suspended between these two events. The 
deceased has not simply ceased to exist, like a flame once it has been doused. Rather, 
that flame lights the wick of a new candle. The ensuing flame maintains the fire of 
the one that lit it, in the form of the previous lifetime’s actions, intentions, and 
aspirations. Yet the new flame has its own identity, so to speak, its own constantly 
shifting configuration of the causes and conditions peculiar to its location in space 
and time. Cuevas explains this transition as a “the movement of a continuum of ever-
changing mental and physical complexes from one physical support to another” 
(2004b, 713). The relationship between previous and subsequent manifestations may 
perhaps be understood to subsist in an energetic trajectory, rather than in a fixed or 
essential consciousness.  
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As with Ibn al-‘Arabī’s barzakh, the bardo is not confined to the postmortem 
passage. From a Vajrayana perspective, we die in every moment (Ponlop 2008, 2). 
Each instant of experience is discrete and discontinuous from those flanking it—that 
is, it endures for a brief instant before dying. In meditation, the practitioner becomes 
aware of a gap between the death of one moment and the arising of the next. Ray 
calls this gap “bardo, the ‘in between state’”. It is here that the true, non-dualistic 
nature of reality is said to be revealed (2001, 330–1; emphasis original). Tibetan 
teacher Chögyam Trungpa asserts that the significance of the bardo holds 
implications much deeper than concerns about death, rebirth, and the period between 
the two. Its greater relevance lies in the passage from birth to death—that is, in how 
we live our lives (1992, 5). 
Fremantle notes that, while the bardo serves to separate the experiences on either 
side of it, it can—like the barzakh—also be regarded as a link between them: “a 
bridge or a meeting place that brings together and unites” (2001, 54). This gloss is 
further illustrated by Trungpa, who explains that the word bardo comprises two 
elements: “bar means ‘in between’ or, you could say, ‘no-man’s-land’, and do is like 
a tower or an island in that no-man’s land”. Trungpa extends this imagery by 
invoking a river that has allegiance to neither shore, “but there is a little island in the 
middle, in between” (1992, 3). Again, the metaphor of land surrounded by water 
brings to mind the isthmus of the Qur’ānic barzakh.  
However the bardo is glossed, it is classically liminal, for “all bardo experiences are 
situations in which we have emerged from the past and we have not yet formulated 
the future, but strangely enough, we happen to be somewhere”. That strangeness lies 
in the paradox that the bardo “belongs to neither that nor this” (Trungpa 1992, 3–4). 
It cannot be pinned down. It is, in short, not subject to fixation. This is precisely what 
makes the bardo a useful and important consideration in the study of religious 
violence. As in the case of the Sufi barzakh, here is an established religious teaching 
that explicitly rejects the rigidity and stasis typical of justifications for religious 
conflict. 
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The Fourth Moment 
Trungpa’s “little island”—the bardo—represents a moment in time that lies between 
past and future (1992, 3). However, this is not the “present moment” so widely 
touted in contemporary self-help circles225 —that is, the shifting of one’s cognitive 
allegiance from the past or future to the present (Black 2014). Rather, it is “the 
immediate experience of nowness” (Trungpa 1992, 3). Trungpa calls this experience 
“the fourth moment”, an appellation traditionally applied to the particular instant in 
the bardo of dharmata when the deceased encounters pure awareness (but does not 
necessarily recognise it as such) (Urgyen 1991, 102). In Trungpa’s gloss, this direct 
encounter with the nature of reality is not confined to the postmortem experience; 
rather, it begins to assert itself in the bardo of this life, most especially with the 
ripening of spiritual practice (2017). 
Trungpa’s invocation of experience holds particular significance in the context of 
liminality, which, as noted previously, concerns an inescapable phase in the structure 
of lived experience (Szakolczai 2015, 16). The fourth moment, as an instance of 
liminality, is not a conceptual event but “an experience that comes from the 
unconscious mind … a sense of ape instinct or radar instinct” (Trungpa 2017).  
“A very precise something or other is happening”, Trungpa explains. 
That is the ultimate state of awareness. It is nonverbal, nonconceptual, 
and very electric. It is neither ecstasy nor a state of dullness. Rather, a 
state of “here-ness” is taking place, which we have referred to earlier 
as nowness. (Trungpa 2015, 117) 
Trungpa’s refutation of the fourth moment as ecstatic is echoed in Qushayri’s 
description of the waqt as equally likely to be a moment of sorrow as of happiness 
(Sells 1996, 100). And it may be both: tenth-century Sufi martyr Ḥusayn bin Manṣūr 
Hallāj calls the waqt “a breeze of joy blown by pain”. His biographer Louis 
Massignon interprets this to mean that anguish and “a divine touch of hope” occur 
simultaneously (Böwering 1992, 83). Both the waqt and the fourth moment, then, 
225 See, for example, The Present Moment: 365 Daily Affirmations, by Louise Hay (Carlsbad, CA: Hay House, 2007) and The Present Moment 
Wall Calendar (Portland, OR: Amber Lotus Publishing, 2018), which features quotations from such spiritual celebrities as Alan Watts and Jon 
Kabat-Zinn. 
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transcend binary distinctions to accommodate experiences that would conventionally 
be regarded as mutually exclusive. 
As “fourth moment”, the bardo differs from “the present moment” in the important 
respect that it does not refer to an identifiable point in time, but rather to an ineffable 
experience. The “present moment” offers no challenge to the consciousness typically 
dedicated to past and future ruminations. In fact, it grounds that consciousness: when 
one is present, one knows who and where one is. The bardo consciousness has 
neither past nor future—nor, for that matter, a present. Like the waqt, the fourth 
moment lies outside the dimensions of time and space (Sells 1992, 66). It is “a state 
of totality” (Trungpa 2017); “a ‘highlight in the middle of nowhere’” (Simmer-
Brown 2001b, 61).226 As such, it may be understood as the experience of 
simultaneous presence and awareness that lies “beyond the linear succession of 
thoughts that creates time” and “outside the three times” of past, present, and future 
(Reynolds 2000, 48–50). Here again, the fourth moment echoes the waqt: “a 
complete giving over of the self to each moment, as if that moment were the totality 
of one’s existence” (Sells 1992, 66).  
The fourth moment occurs spontaneously, without intention or effort (Trungpa 2015, 
120). This is also true of the waqt, which Qushayri defines as “that which happens to 
them through the dispositions of the real that come upon them without any choice on 
their part” (Sells 1996, 100). Such moments, according to Junayd, befall the Sufi as 
“[s]udden gleams of light”, and Qushayri quotes the words of an anonymous poet: 
“O lightning flashing/which folds out of the sky” (70). The fourth moment of the 
bardo, likewise, manifests as a “brilliant spark or flash” (Trungpa 1992, 3). 
The fourth moment reveals the bardo as a mode of being. This gloss makes sense of 
Cuevas’s characterisation of the bardo as both a location or passage and the “subtle 
entity” undergoing it. Again, much as with the waqt, the practitioner is the fourth 
moment, rather than a subject undergoing it. The subject/object duality separating 
experiencer from experience no longer applies. This phenomenon might be 
226 Simmer-Brown is citing Chögyam Trungpa’s description of the bardo. Having failed to find an original source for this quotation, I presume 
that Simmer-Brown, an early student of Trungpa’s, was present when he offered this definition. 
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considered the Vajrayana equivalent of the Sufi fanā (“annihilation” or “passing 
away”). 
As with the waqt, the dissolution of conventional boundaries in the bardo has 
important implications for identity. The entity that both inhabits and is the bardo does 
not retain the attributes of solidity, duration, or singularity typically associated with a 
self. Whatever is present for the fourth moment—whether “Knower”, “conscious 
principle”, or “very subtle consciousness”—it neither retains its previous sense of 
being nor anticipates its future orientation. The illusory “I” loses its definition, but 
declines to establish an alternative form. The bardo is, after all, a specifically liminal 
realm, such that what used to be no longer obtains, but what lies ahead has not yet 
taken shape. The liminal passage is also specifically transformative; hence, the 
consciousness undergoing the bardo undergoes a change in what Szakolczai, 
referring to the tripartite rites of passage overall, calls its very “mode of being” 
(2000, 188).  
Yet as non-dual consciousness, “the state of non-ego”, the bardo cannot be seen as 
purely a portal to spiritual liberation. “Nothing dissolves into a love-and-lighty [sic] 
beautiful creamy honey lotus lake”, Trungpa cautions. The fourth moment is 
characterised by the simultaneous manifestations of clear insight and egoic delusion 
(2017). Even the “clear light” of the awakened state can manifest as “egohood” 
(1992, 59). This, according to Trungpa, is precisely because it is “experience”, which 
is necessarily the product of “both black and white, sweet and sour working 
together” (2017). This, he explains, 
seems to be the whole idea of bardo altogether, being in no-man’s-
land, experiencing both at the same time … When you are in such a 
peak of experience, there is the possibility of absolute sanity and there 
is also the possibility of complete madness. That is being experienced 
simultaneously—in one situation, one second, one moment. That 
seems to be the highlight of the bardo experience, because bardo is in 
between the two experiences. (Trungpa 1992, 68) 
Sufis are familiar with the blurring of lines between sanity and madness. “When a 
person speaks out of a state of wajd (ecstasy)”, Sells reports, “no one who is not in 
the same state (ḥāl) or moment (waqt) can understand what that person is saying” 
(1996, 226). Such utterances express “absolute sanity”, in that they presumably 
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reflect an immediate dialogue with the Divine; yet from a conventional point of 
view, they give voice to “complete madness”.227 
Thus it is, Sogyal Rinpoche explains, that “deep uncertainty” is also an essential 
feature of the bardo. 
[T]he bardo is … a continuous, unnerving oscillation between clarity
and confusion, bewilderment and insight, certainty and uncertainty,
sanity and insanity. … This means that we face a continuous state of
choice between the two, and that everything depends on which we
will choose. (Sogyal 1992, 104–5)
Trungpa cautions that the notion of such a choice is a red herring. The real choice, he 
suggests, lies between the reification of belief and the leap into a reality beyond 
dualities (1992, 59). Therefore, the practitioner is invited to abandon the illusion of 
linear spiritual progression and to situate herself, instead, on the “razor’s edge” 
between the desirable and the undesirable, the celebrated and the feared (2017). 
Here, again, the bardo presents a stark alternative to fixation on religious doctrine, 
ritual, fellowship, or even experience itself. It opens a realm of potential, a gap in 
which the possibility of transformation continuously arises (Sogyal 1992, 105). That 
the bardo reoccurs throughout life and after death means that heightened possibilities 
of spiritual realisation are continually available.  
And yet this potential is available only to the extent that it is paired with profound 
existential risk. I argue that it is precisely this risk that religious fixation functions to 
resist. Insistence on a purportedly unchanging reality—whether that ideal is 
packaged as ideological dogma, religious doctrine, ethnic/nationalistic tradition, or 
nature—seeks to secure firm, predictable ground in the face of constant change. Yet 
liminal ambivalence, chaos, and unpredictability are inevitable aspects of human 
experience. In fact, as argued in Chapter Three, liminal passages are necessary to 
continuing social transformation, which is itself unavoidable. Attempts to banish 
them can only stave off their ineluctable emergence; and like the mythical Greek 
227 The Sufi martyr Ḥusayn ibn Manṣūr al-Hallāj is exemplary of such paradoxical expression. Rejected by the esteemed Sufi master Junayd as 
a madman, al-Hallāj was nonetheless regarded by many of his contemporaries as a worker of miracles, able to relieve suffering and fulfil 
wishes (Ansari 2000). 
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giant Antaeus, liminality ultimately manifests in human affairs the stronger for 
having been pushed down. It is precisely this dynamic and its outcome that I have 
termed “autonomic liminality”.  
The Bardo Thötröl
It is apparent from the foregoing that the Vajrayana Buddhist understanding of the 
bardo is metaphysically charged. It is “a mysterious ground” (Trungpa 1992, 4). The 
mystery is surveyed in some detail in a fourteenth-century Tibetan Buddhist text 
called the Bardo Thötröl, more commonly known to Western readers as The Tibetan 
Book of the Dead.228  
Of the six bardos mentioned by Karma Lingpa, only three apply to the transitional 
period during and following physical death (Cuevas 2004a, 378–9). The other 
three—dreaming, meditating, and “the bardo of this life (or birth)”—refer to our 
experiences in the period between birth and death. Thus, “the whole span from birth 
to death is to be seen as an intermediate state” (Lauf 1989, 36). The bardos of dying, 
dharmata, and becoming arise in the intermediate state between death and rebirth 
(Fremantle 2001, 55). 
The Bardo Thötröl presents each bardo as an opportunity to realise “the dissolution 
of the sense of self in the light of reality” (Fremantle 1987, xvii). Sedgwick explains 
that such realisation consists in recognising all aspects of phenomena as identical to 
oneself—including Buddhist doctrine and the apparitions said to appear in the bardo 
after death. “Clearly,” she remarks drily, “such recognition can be no perfunctory 
cognitive event” (2005, 175). Or, as Trungpa notes, study of the bardos “is not based 
on trying to prove logical conclusions”. Although he acknowledges the value of 
speculation, Trungpa cautions against fixating on “the pleasurable point of 
intellectualization”. Such fixation, he suggests, means that “the intellect is not being 
properly cared for” (1992, 5–8). Indeed, wisdom based solely on ratiocination is 
incapable of ultimate understanding (Lauf 1989, 216).  
228 The full formal translation of the title is Self Liberation Through Hearing, During the Intermediate Period that Follows Death (Norbu 1990, 1).
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In other words, the true meaning of the bardo is to be discovered experientally, not 
rationally. In this, it again faithfully reflects the nature of the liminal, which, as 
previously noted, manifests as experience, rather than as an object of thought. Like 
the bardo, the liminal moment precludes access to rational capacity, for liminality 
subverts the logical basis of ratiocination. The stress and emotional turmoil of a 
liminal passage also make it difficult to think clearly (Szakolczai 2015, 25). These 
conditions return the liminar to pure experience, without primary recourse to 
intellectual analysis or theological speculation. She finds herself on “mysterious 
ground”: a realm that is devoid of both previous and future certainties, unfamiliar, 
ineffable, and unpredictable. As Szakolczai remarks, “the very structure of society 
[is] temporarily suspended” (2009, 142). 
Here we find, again, the profound difference between the “fourth moment” of the 
bardo and the conventional “present moment”. The present moment may offer one a 
more immediate and authentic experience of reality than does dwelling on the past or 
future, but it does not challenge one’s consciousness of being located in a stream of 
linear time. From a Vajrayana perspective, this consciousness is deluded by the 
apparent continuity of experience. The bardo transcends that delusion by disrupting 
perceived continuity. It “refers to an aspect of the dynamics of each moment of 
experience” (Ray 2001, 330–3). Such an event occurs outside both linear time and 
the dualistic assumptions that structure it. As Szakolczai argues, “experience has a 
structure of its own” (2009, 146). Ray’s “dynamics” also suggest a fluidity that 
precludes fixed structure. It would seem that Turner’s “anti-structure” (Turner 1966) 
applies to the bardo as to all genuinely liminal moments. 
Tibetologist Detlef Ingo Lauf notes that for Tibetans, the bardo “was the moment not 
only of uniting past and present but also of consciously forming the future” (1989, 
47). This may suggest a linear understanding of time, but it could also express a 
more nuanced recognition of the inseparability of past, present, and future. In the 
spirit of the bardo, Lauf’s gloss may reflect a simultaneous separation and joining of 
these three elements. I propose that it returns us to Trungpa’s “fourth moment”, in 
that the agency to transform one’s karmic trajectory arises only in “the experience of 
nowness”. To the extent that consciousness is directed to a perceived external 
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location—whether that be the past, present, or future—the subject of that 
consciousness cannot be aware of where she stands relative to suffering or freedom. 
Consequently, she is bereft of the most immediate and crucial information necessary 
to direct her course. 
Professor of religion Masao Abe proposes that, in Buddhism, transformation occurs 
in the realisation of the true nature of this moment. 
The realization of the beginninglessness and endlessness of living-
dying is inseparably linked with the realization of our living-dying at 
each and every moment. This is because if we clearly realize the 
beginninglessness and endlessness of the process of living-dying at 
this moment, the whole process of living-dying is concentrated into 
this moment. In other words, this moment embraces the whole process 
of living-dying by virtue of the clear realization of the 
beginninglessness and endlessness of the process of living-dying. 
Here, in this point, we can overcome saṃsāra, and realize nirvāna 
right in the midst of saṃsāra. (Abe 1987, 11; emphases original)229 
Abe’s reference to “the process of living-dying” means to undo the dualistic notion 
of life and death as separate events. “In truth,” he asserts, “at each and every moment 
we are ‘living-dying’” (1987, 6). This view recalls Turner’s experience with the 
Ndembu, whose rituals explicitly invoked the death of the initiand to her former life 
(1966, 48). Death, then, is central to the liminal passage. Without it, the implied 
rebirth or transformation is not possible. 
I understand Abe’s emphasis on the suffix “-ness” in the words “beginninglessness” 
and “endlessness” to point beyond the conceptual content of these words to an 
immediate, direct engagement with the nature of beginning and ending—that is, the 
felt experience of these phenomena. Tulku Urgyen affirms this reading in his 
explanation of emptiness, a central trope in Mahayana Buddhism. The “-ness” in 
“emptiness”, he submits, “is the cognizant quality, so emptiness here should be 
understood as ‘empty cognizance’” (Urgyen 2001, 59). In other words, “emptiness” 
is not an abstract conceptual overlay on the nature of reality, but an unmediated 
experience. The “empty cognizance” is a direct engagement with the way things are: 
229 Saṃsāra (Skt.) refers to “the continued round of painful rebirth driven by ignorance and craving” (Critical Terms for the Study of Buddhism, 
s.v. “death”). Nirvāna describes liberation from this cycle.
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Abe’s “living-dying … concentrated into this moment”. From this perspective, to 
attend “the total living-dying at this moment of the absolute present” (Abe 1987, 10) 
is to enter a profoundly experiential spiritual truth.  
Abe’s contemplation of transcendence in the context of living and dying places it 
squarely in the domain of the bardo, which both separates and unites the events on 
either side of it. Although we conventionally recognise life and death as mutually 
exclusive phenomena, the Buddhist worldview sees such separation as merely 
conceptual. The bardo between life and death holds them separate only 
conventionally and relatively, while simultaneously uniting them at the level of 
ultimate understanding (Abe 1987, 6). This recalls Ibn al-‘Arabī’s barzakh, which 
appears to separate the phenomena flanking it only from a relative perspective. In an 
ultimate or absolute sense, it unifies them.  
Another pertinent aspect of Abe’s argument lies in his location of nirvāna “right in 
the midst of saṃsāra”. Saṃsāra, “the immense ocean of suffering” (Patrul 1998, 16), 
is not the binary opposite of nirvāna; they are coexistent and interdependent 
(Kyabgon 2015, 75). As with life and death, the bardo between them distinguishes 
the two from a relative perspective, while uniting them at the absolute level. The 
bardo between the relative and ultimate views also separates and unites.230 
Relative and Ultimate Truth 
The distinctions between saṃsāra and nirvāna closely parallel those found in 
Tibetan Buddhist texts treating the relationship between dualistic and non-dual 
realities. The second-century sage Nāgārjuna, founder of the Mādhyamaka thought 
system, described this pairing as follows: 
Doctrines taught by the Buddha  
Rely wholly on the two truths: 
Worldly concealer-truths 
And truths that are ultimate. (Newland 1992, 3) 
Scholar and translator Guy Newland defines the “ultimate” truth proclaimed here as 
“an emptiness—that is, an absence of inherent existence”, while “concealer-truths” 
230 Perceiving the relative and absolute levels of reality as binaries is itself considered mistaken (Newland 1992, 59). 
142 
refer to phenomena. These concealer-truths, lacking inherent existence, are 
necessarily concomitant with emptiness, for they make the attribution of emptiness 
possible (Newland 1992, 3). Without the relative, phenomenal world, nothing could 
be considered empty. Thus, the “two truths”—relative and ultimate—while 
conceptually distinct, are in reality inseparable.  
This construction might be glossed as another way of describing the inseparability of 
saṃsāra and nirvāna. Saṃsāra, or the unsatisfactory, conditioned nature of everyday 
life, relies on nirvāna, a state in which “all cogitation, all worry and rumination, all 
me-making and mine-making as well as the penchant to conceit are extinguished, no 
longer desired, stopped, abandoned, no longer grasped”.231 These undesirable mind 
states precisely describe the nature of saṃsāra, demonstrating through apophatic 
locution the dependence of nirvāna on saṃsāra. In a binary mindset, neither makes 
sense except with reference to its opposite. Indeed, this mindset might itself be 
described as the essence of saṃsāra, for “[s]uffering is one’s enduring of all forms of 
opposites, in view of the knowledge of an indescribable absolute, of something 
deathless, called nirvana” (Lauf 1989, 16).232 
Saṃsāra and nirvāna are separated by the aforementioned “karmic bardo of 
becoming”, which is held to follow the “luminous bardo of dharmata”. It is here that 
the practitioner confronts the ultimate choice between rebirth in saṃsāra and the 
attainment of nirvāna. In the bardo of becoming, consciousness encounters two types 
of light: one blindingly, frighteningly brilliant, and the other dull, familiar, and 
seductive. The brighter light illuminates the path to the higher realms while the softer 
light leads to rebirth in saṃsāra (Fremantle and Trungpa 1987, 41–2). This is a 
distinctly binary choice, reminiscent of particular Christian and Islamic 
understandings of heaven and hell. 
231 Encyclopedia of Buddhism, s.v. “nirvana”, citing the Majjhima Nikāya (the Middle-Length Discourses of the Buddha) 1, 486. 
232 “It may be useful to note that the terms emptiness, ultimate bodhicitta, absolute truth, prajnaparamita, clear light, radiant clarity, cognitive 
lucidity, cognitive clarity, luminosity, luminosity of the ground, mother luminosity, dharmata, dharmadhatu, dharmakaya, basic nature, 
true nature, true nature of mind, true nature of reality, primordial wisdom, primordial awareness, primordial purity, great non-conceptual 
wisdom and rigpa, while not totally synonymous, are simply various ways of referring to and conceptualizing from a dualistic perspective 
the same ineffable truth that transcends dualistic and varying perceptions and conceptuality and is the essence or true nature of 
everything” (Thrangu 1997, v–vi). 
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Yet the bardo is also what makes saṃsāra and nirvāna inseparable. Contemporary 
Buddhist teacher and scholar Thrangu Rinpoche explains that the luminous bardo of 
dharmata constitutes a gap or space between the relative appearances of the previous 
life and those of the future life about to arise from rebirth. In this liminal passage 
between the familiar, knowable conditions of samsaric existence, “there is a direct 
experience of the absolute truth or dharmata, the nature of things” (1997, 99). The 
ultimate or absolute truth, in other words, mediates the passage between relative 
truths.  
More than merely a link between samsaric realms, however, nirvāna is not other than 
saṃsāra. The difference between them is, like the light passing through Ibn al-
‘Arabī’s prism, merely perspectival. The Bardo Thötröl is explicit on this point, 
emphasising the importance of recognising both peaceful and wrathful or terrifying 
apparitions as projections of one’s own mind, a feat only possible attendant on 
diligent spiritual practice during the foregoing lifetime. A practitioner’s 
consciousness will experience the apparitions of the bardo quite differently from that 
of a non-practitioner. For the former, these will be evident as one’s own mental 
projections, while the identical apparitions will appear to the latter as external 
seductions or threats. The respective perspectives will function according to the ways 
they have been conditioned during the lifetime of the deceased.  
“Perception is a two-way process of communication”, Fremantle elucidates. 
From an ordinary point of view, it provides a link between subject and 
object, connecting the observer with the external world. But from an 
absolute viewpoint in which there has never been any division 
between self and other, perception separates them and emphasizes the 
gap between them. (Fremantle 2001, 100) 
Thus, after death the accomplished practitioner will recognise the inseparability of 
the bardo’s apparitions from her own mental reality. A consciousness that remains 
convinced of relative appearances will perceive those appearances as separate from 
itself, for relative truth is by definition separative. Here, Burckhardt’s description of 
the barzakh applies as credibly to the bardo, in presenting “separation only in that it 
is itself the starting point of a separative perspective, in the eyes of which it appears 
to be a limit” (1979, 2).  
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The same logic is expressed by the venerable Tsong-ka-pa, founder of the 
scholastically inclined Gelukpa school of Tibetan Buddhism.233 According to Tsong-
ka-pa, “conventional phenomena are truths only for the perspective of an ignorant 
consciousness that conceals reality” (Newland 1992, 3). As Lauf notes, “[b]ardo 
unites two states, as a continuity of forms of existence, which only our 
discriminating consciousness tends to separate” (1989, 34–5). In this sense, both 
barzakh and bardo serve as lenses through which the absolute and relative realms are 
at the same time identical and distinct.  
I have not found any traditional assertion of a bardo specifically separating/uniting 
Buddhism’s two truths. Yet the bardo, like the barzakh, serves to separate the 
phenomena on either side of it while simultaneously bridging them (Fremantle 2001, 
54). Lauf expresses a similar insight in noting that “the intermediate state binds 
together both ends of past and future” (1989, 35). The bardo, then, appears to share 
the attribute of simultaneous separation and joining with the barzakh that lies 
between Ibn al-‘Arabī’s absolute and relative realms. I argue, therefore, that the 
bardo can justifiably be understood to serve a similar twofold function with respect 
to the absolute and relative realms posited by Tibetan Buddhism. This argument is 
further strengthened by the implied conflation of saṃsāra with the relative and 
nirvāna with the ultimate. Since the bardo is explicitly invoked as separating/uniting 
saṃsāra and nirvāna, it follows that it also separates/unites the two truths: relative 
and absolute or ultimate. 
This paradox is expressed in Tsong-ka-pa’s assertion that the relative and ultimate 
truths are both “mutually exclusive” and “a single entity” (Newland 1992, 3). 
Making the same point in theistic language, a Sufi text proclaims that “you are not 
God/but are not other than he” (Al-Burhānpūrī 1965, 73). While neither instance 
explicitly cites the bardo or barzakh, both reflect the characteristic refusal of the 
liminal to privilege either side of a perceived logical contradiction. And the liminal 
is, again, the nature of both bardo and barzakh.  
The fusion of ultimate and conventional views is evident in Trungpa’s depiction of 
233 Encyclopedia of Buddhism, s.v. “Dge Lugs (Geluk)”. 
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the bardos. Each one is a “peak experience” in which it is unclear whether one has 
broken through to some form of enlightened realisation or is merely insane (1992, 
76). For the Sufi, the distinction between sanity and insanity at the height of intense 
spiritual experience is likewise obscure: “The highest point of intoxication becomes, 
dialectically, the point of most lucid and sober wakefulness” (Sells 1996, 126). 
This paradoxical inversion is not a mere doctrinal sideline. Trungpa submits that 
“this very faint line between sanity and insanity” actually comprises an important 
teaching, regarding not only the bardo but also the larger Buddhist canon (1992, 76). 
For, as Lauf explains, “[s]amsara, the world of changes, and nirvana, the condition of 
highest liberation and salvation from the perishable, are two inseparable poles of 
Being” (1989, 34). Interestingly, Burckhardt quotes a fourteenth-century Sufi mystic, 
Muhammad Tadilī of Djadīdah, as describing the barzakh as “nothing other than the 
pole that governs this realm and gives it its growth” (1979, 2).  
The idea of a pole as a liminal indicator is not confined to the two traditions treated 
in this study. Drawing on broader mystical scholarship, Scott cites Frithjof Schuon as 
designating Essence and Substance—synonyms for absolute and relative—as “the 
poles of Existence: the ontological poles of the Axis Mundi”. Again, these poles exist 
only in “their essential complementarity or biunity” (2007, 6–7; emphasis original). 
While a pole can serve as a force that grounds the eternal movement of the cosmos 
and everything in it (4), it can also represent a binary extreme, as in the expression 
“poles apart”. That being the case, the poles of “subject” and “object” might function 
as dualistic enforcers or as prismatic conciliators—or perhaps, at one and the same 
time, as both. The same would then be true of any binary pair, including the poles of 
good and evil. As the Persian mystic Ahmad al-Ghazālī proclaims, “Who does not 
learn tauhid234 from Satan, is an infidel” (Schimmel 1975, 195).  
Lest we imagine that the bardo as liminal space implies only the coexistence of 
inseparability and mutual exclusivity, it should be understood that both barzakh and 
bardo traverse much vaster realms of paradox. In the case of the barzakh, for 
example, Burckhardt’s metaphor of the necessary blind spot in the physical eye 
234 God’s indivisible unity, a fundamental doctrinal principle of Islam. Also transliterated as tawhīd. 
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invokes the futility of logical deduction through apparent certainties (1979, 2). It 
may be that Lauf is attempting to express a similar futility in the Tibetan Buddhist 
idiom when he notes that “the other-worldly state of the inexplicable is a bardo” 
(1989, 45). 
Thus it is that the notions of both barzakh and bardo profoundly trouble the 
compulsive tendency to categorise experiences as good or bad, desirable or 
undesirable. Both the “lightning flashing” of the Sufi waqt and the “brilliant spark or 
flash” of the fourth moment accommodate the full range of human experience, from 
agony to ecstasy. Moreover, the hardship associated with any given state by no 
means diminishes the spiritual potency of the moment. On the contrary, the 
practitioner considers such difficulties grist for the mill, for “[w]ithout ego you 
cannot attain enlightenment” (Trungpa 1992, 156). Binaries such as pleasant/painful 
and accept/reject fall away in the light of liminality, whether manifesting as bardo or 
barzakh.  
The Self 
Both Tibetan Buddhist and Sufi traditions point to the annihilation of the 
conventionally experienced self as the path to the discovery of ultimate authenticity. 
The Bardo Thötröl presents each bardo as an opportunity to realise the “dissolution 
of the sense of self in the light of reality” (Fremantle and Trungpa 1975, xxii). For 
Sufis, the goal is “the passing away (fanā) of the ego-self in mystical union” (Sells 
1994, 68). In both cases, exposure to absolute (in Sufi terms, “divine”) reality 
dissolves the seeker’s identification with the illusory self. 
Yet paradoxically, this self is the subject—the actual condition—of the perceptual 
function, without which spiritual practice would be impossible. Here again, the 
interdependent action of the two truths is in evidence. As historian William Pietz 
notes, in Buddhism “[p]ersons do truly exist as real entities subject to moral (karmic) 
accountability, but only in this sphere, not that of ultimate reality … In reality, the 
self never did, does not, and never will exist” (2005, 197). 
What is it, then, that experiences either the waqt or the fourth moment? Following 
the earlier descriptions of the experiencing subject as simultaneously inhabiting and 
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being these phenomena, I argue that it is an ontological presence, a mode of being 
unconditioned by known existential markers. 235 Such presence cannot be willed or 
contrived: it manifests as the ripening of diligent spiritual practice. In this presence, 
mutually exclusive binaries give way to the inclusivity of paradox. The dualistic 
basis for Us-versus-Them falls away. 
Accordingly, I argue that the mode of being or presence of the waqt/fourth moment 
holds the potential for a profound reconsideration of the basis for religious violence. 
The fact that it is common to the barzakh and the bardo is not incidental, for by 
virtue of its manifestation in two established spiritual traditions separated by 
temporal, cultural, and geographical expanses, it indicates an authentic basis in 
actual experience. 236 This suggests that while perpetrators of religious violence may 
consider themselves fiercely committed to their respective traditions, they may be 
overlooking an important and authoritatively documented aspect of religious 
principle. The teachings on the bardo and barzakh invite a spiritual engagement far 
more profound than that possible through dualistic ratiocination or physical violence. 
Such engagement requires a level of existential courage exceeding the doomed 
attempt to eliminate the Other. The following chapter will explore the invitation to 
spiritual warriorship implicit in the bardo and barzakh. 
Conclusion 
The bardo, like the barzakh, is an imaginary that exemplifies a chaotic and 
uncontrollable experience. As a liminal passage, it entails the death of previous 
certainties, the unavoidable imperative of transformation, and the emergence of a 
new reality that can be neither perceived nor understood from the perspective of the 
235 I am grateful to my academic supervisor, Associate Professor Sa‘diyya Shaikh, for the insight that presence, while a variety of experience,       
is not  synonymous with it. According to a revered Vajrayana Buddhist text, however, “immediate presence” is synonymous with “primal” 
      or “intrinsic awareness” (Reynolds 2000, 52). 
236 Although Sufism and Tibetan Buddhism are separated by both geography and historical eras, certain coincidences do invite speculation.  
The composition of the Qur’ān predates Padmasambhava’s presumed lifetime by a mere century, while Karma Lingpa was born less than a 
hundred years after the death of Ibn al-‘Arabī. It is not beyond the realm of possibility, therefore, that Islamic understandings may have 
exerted some influence on Tibetan Buddhism. For a scholarly analysis of mutual influences in Sufism and Buddhism, see Alexander Berzin, 
“The Relation between Buddhism and Sufism”, accessed September 9, 2019, http://studybuddhism.com/en/advanced-studies/history-culture/
buddhism-islam/the-relation-between-buddhism-and-sufism. 
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consciousness that enters it. All of this makes the prospect of entering the bardo 
unappealing, at best. At worst, it is terrifying. 
And yet it may be that the bardo, like the barzakh, precisely represents a remedy for 
the chaos and ungovernability of lived experience. The examples of tribal ritual 
studied by van Gennep and Turner demonstrate that such inevitable and recursive 
passages can be channelled and directed to serve the interests of both the individuals 
involved and their communities.  
Szakolczai notes that liminal ritual must be clearly and predictably scripted in order 
to fufill this function, and it must be overseen by a figure who holds unconditional 
authority for the duration of the passage (2015, 18). I submit that the bardo’s 
embeddedness in religious tradition and the Bardo Thötröl’s detailed descriptions of 
what the practitioner should expect during that passage meet the first of these 
criteria. 
As for supervision by an unquestioned authority figure, I point to the mandatory 
submission to a qualified teacher, or guru, implicit in the Vajrayana tradition.237 Any 
practitioner whose allegiance to that tradition leads her to expect a passage through 
the bardo will have made a vow expressing unwavering devotion to such a spiritual 
supervisor (Lief 2013, xlii). Thus, the bardo tradition fulfills Szakolczai’s criteria for 
a liminal passage so structured as to support positive transformation. I argue that this 
offers an instructive alternative to religious fixation in the face of inevitable and 
uncontrollable change.  
A similar argument may be made for the barzakh. In this case, although the 
practitioner’s shaykh may meet the requirement for a qualified “master of 
ceremonies” (Szakolczai 2015, 18), Sufis have recourse to an even higher authority: 
the divine Presence. The ritual script may not be as clearly established as it is with 
the bardo, for although the Qur’ān offers detailed descriptions of the destinations 
awaiting the pious and the sinner, it lacks substantive or detailed accounts of the 
passage in between death and judgement. Yet the texts of Ibn al-‘Arabī devote 
237 Encyclopedia of Buddhism, s.v. “lama”. 
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tremendous time and attention to his explanations of the barzakh, and these 
constitute as precise a set of guidelines as is possible in the context of the ineffable. 
The barzakh is also, as we have seen, the very condition of humanity relative to the 
Divine, and Sufis have recourse to an abundance of scripts to guide this passage. Not 
least among these is the Qur’ān itself. Finally, the barzakh is not a location, but a 
function of reality. In the guise of the waqt, it is in fact an ontological disposition. As 
such, it may be argued that it neither requires nor lends itself to scripting. Thus the 
barzakh tradition, like that of the bardo, fulfills Szakolczai’s conditions for 
successful transformation through liminal rites of passage. 
Both the fourth moment of the bardo and the waqt of the barzakh manifest the 
paradoxical—and thus inclusive—nature of the liminal. Where binary thinking 
entails mutually exclusive opposites such as good/evil and sacred/profane, thinking 
in terms of the bardo and barzakh worldviews accommodates the full spectrum of 
attributes and experiences. Both do so by abandoning the familiar limits of three-
dimensional relativity in favour of a direct, immediate, and fearless presence. I argue 
that this presence offers the religious adherent a compelling alternative to the 
conceptual exclusivism central to violent defences of faith. It may be the case that 
this imaginary in fact reflects a kind of spiritual genius in turning to face the reality 
of liminality with religiously sanctioned protections that are specifically designed to 
enhance its transformative potential. 
The following chapter will explore overlaps and contrasts between the barzakh and 
the bardo, specifically in the context of their shared liminal attributes. It will further 
introduce the notion of existential courage as essential to both passages and argue for 
the application of precisely this kind of courage to the scholarship on religious 
violence. 
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 Chapter Six: Integrations and Resonances 
Stay with the contradiction. If you stay, you will see that there is always 
something more than two opposing truths. The whole truth always 
includes a third part, which is the reconciliation. 
—Jacob Needleman, I Am not I 
Whether or not religion is a proximate cause of violence, it is widely implicated in 
contemporary global conflict. Thus, the relationship between religion and violence 
bears close examination, and I propose that the scholarship on liminality offers a 
novel and useful analytical tool for exploring that relationship. In my view, the 
inclusion of explicitly liminal passages in at least two established global religions 
suggests that analyses informed by liminality may open potentially generative 
avenues of exploration into the relationship between religion and violence. This 
chapter will examine this potential as represented by the barzakh in Sufi Islam and 
the bardo in Tibetan Buddhism.  
Dualism 
Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that dualistic modes of thinking and 
being fluently lend themselves to violent articulations. Dualism’s centrality in this 
dynamic reflects its exclusionary nature, since such formulations typically demand 
that one side of a binary pair must necessarily cancel out the other. Narratives of this 
kind suggest that goodness is the absence of evil, and vice versa. Further, binary 
attributes are relational; we understand goodness only in contrast to evil. Such 
binaries, when viewed categorically, mean that when any one group claims 
privileged access to goodness, other groups must necessarily be associated with evil. 
As in the case of good and evil, conventional dualistic understanding does not 
generally accommodate simultaneous incidences of purity and impurity, or of sanity 
and madness. These sets of opposites are further imbued with hierarchical value: 
goodness trumps evil; purity is prized over impurity; sanity is preferable to madness. 
As has been argued, imputations of superiority and inferiority are inherent in the very 
nature of dualistic distinctions (Plumwood 1993, 42).  
Both of these hallmarks of dualism—mutual exclusivity and hierarchical ranking—
have been linked to the formation and maintenance of collective identity. Any group 
necessarily defines itself in contradistinction to other groups: a German is not an 
Italian, nor is an Anglican a Presbyterian. Us exists, precisely, as other-than-Them. 
Since hierarchy is innate to the binary construction, Us and Them must be ranked. 
One will naturally want to perceive one’s own group as superior. 
This implication may not necessarily apply to all identities, as is evident in those 
cases where a given group may internalise a decidedly inferior projection 
(Spellmeyer 2018). Yet, as Weber has noted, the assumption of a distinct religious 
identity typically implies “superiority in propaganda”—i.e., in doctrine (1968, 
I:460). In such cases, the “out-group” will just as naturally claim the high ground for 
itself. Thus, an oppositional dynamic enters the configuration: Us versus Them.  
Regina M. Schwartz offers a neat summary of this dynamic: “Violence is the very 
construction of the Other … acts of identity formation are themselves acts of 
violence” (1997, 5). The very designation of self and other—the fundamental 
dualistic stance—can significantly inform and enable acts of violent exclusion.238 
From this perspective, violence is the logical concomitant of a dualistic worldview. 
Further, it precedes doctrinal, ethnic, or ideological conflicts. Religious violence, as 
viewed through this lens, is not the product of quarrels regarding scriptural exegesis, 
ritual performance, or interpretations of tradition. It is built into the assumption that 
the world runs on mutually exclusive binaries.  
If violence is indeed the inevitable outgrowth of identity formation, as Schwartz 
argues, then violence must logically be as fundamental to human nature as is the 
construction of both personal and group identities. From this perspective, the idea of 
mitigating violent conflict, religious or otherwise, might be considered doomed in its 
very conception. As I have argued, however, both the barzakh and the bardo reveal 
challenges to binary thinking in the very heart of religious orthodoxy. Hence, I take 
the position that dualism is not, in fact, constitutionally inherent in human 
Galtung’s understanding of violence as implicit in social and cultural structures, as 
explored in Chapter Two of this study. It may also help explain why attempts to 
mitigate aggression have, for the most part, failed to solve the problem of violence 
(see, e.g., Hassner and Aran 2013, 82 and Carrasco 2013, 223–4). 
238 This assertion may apply more to group or collective identity than to personal identity, which is arguably more accommodating of the 
African principle of ubuntu—“I am because you are” (https://walkoutwalkon.net/south-africa/ubuntu-i-am-because-you-are/).
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understanding; and further, that the teachings of the barzakh and the bardo suggest 
the potential for a naturally non-dual worldview at the core of our experience. 
The view that religious violence springs from a dualistic worldview, rather than 
from doctrinal or historical disagreements, revises the assumed relationship between 
aggression and violence. Conventional logic proposes a linear progression from an 
aggressive stance to violent acting-out (see, e.g., Galtung 1964, 98–9). If this is so, 
it makes sense to focus remedial efforts on the aggression assumed to precede 
violence. But if violence is inherent in dualism, then dualism occurs prior to 
aggression. In other words, dualism underlies the self-and-other construction that 
establishes the subject and object of aggressive action. This argument supports 
Galtung’s understanding of violence as implicit in social and cultural structures, as 
explored in Chapter Two of this study. It may also help explain why attempts to 
mitigate aggression have, for the most part, failed to solve the problem of violence 
(see, e.g., Hassner and Aran 2013, 82 and Carrasco 2013, 223–4).
Dualism and Religion 
Jan Assmann argues that “traditional religion … rests on the distinction between the 
pure and the impure” (2010, 60).239   Psychotherapist James W. Jones, in similar 
vein, explains that notions of purity versus impurity are often implicated in religious 
terrorism (2008, 132). As another psychologically informed scholar of religious 
violence has pointed out, “the genocidal impulse is grounded in perverse forms of 
idealism and deep yearnings for spiritual purity” (Strozier 1994, 253). Shoko 
Asahara, the founder of the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult, is but one example of a 
violent extremist driven by the compulsion to “purify” the world (Lifton 2003, 63). 
While the co-optation of purity and the projection of impurity is not the only 
ideological   basis for religious violence, it seems   to at least empower an explicitly 
arrogated the attribute of purity to itself, designating other traditions as implicitly impure. Here, I cite Assmann in this regard to demonstrate 
an overall theological emphasis on purity versus impurity (see, e.g., Douglas 1966, 5–7 and Appleby and Marty 2002, 16).
239 By “traditional religion”, Assmann means pre-Abrahamic traditions. As noted earlier, however, he points out that early Christianity
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hardly a workable solution. To blame a dualistic worldview for our troubles is, as 
mentioned earlier, simply to fall back into the dualistic trap. Happily, certain 
religious traditions offer frameworks of praxis that avoid deepening the perspectival 
chasm between duality and non-duality. I argue that these frameworks present 
themselves vividly and usefully in the form of the Sufi barzakh and the Tibetan 
Buddhist bardo.  
Liminality
Liminality is an experiential phenomenon. The transformation it invokes is an 
ontological rather than a conceptual or intellectual event. Accordingly, the subject 
undergoing the barzakh or the bardo experiences a shift in her mode of being—a 
shift over which she has little control. Because the liminal dynamics of both bardo 
Us-versus-Them stance. When the pure and the impure are couched in binary terms, 
religious actors tend to identify themselves with purity. In such cases the ostensibly 
impure Them may embody a material insult, if not an outright existential threat, to 
that purity. Religious extremists who hold this view tend to believe that impurity 
must be eliminated in order for purity to flourish (Jones 2008, 140). The co-optation 
of purity in the service of a religious group identity may thus lead to the violent 
exclusion of those perceived as impure.240  
Assmann argues that monotheistic religions, in rejecting all but a single deity, are 
necessarily exclusionary (2010, 21; see also Schwartz 1997, xi). Whether or not one 
accepts that the exclusion of deities extends to the exclusion of other human beings, 
however, it is not uncommon for adherents of various global religious traditions—
monotheistic and otherwise—to interpret their own doctrinal understandings in ways 
that exclude non-adherents (Kimball 2008, 7). Religious actors may accordingly 
reject the truth-claims of others, which Assmann argues imbues their very raison 
d’être with an “antagonistic energy” (2010, 3–4)—that is, violent ideation. Scholar 
of comparative religion Charles Kimball notes that although narrow, exclusivist 
interpretations do not always erupt in violence, they do “lead more easily” in that 
direction (2008, 35).
From this perspective, the practice of exclusion may in fact preempt its object; that 
is, it may well be the case that the designation of Them, the purportedly inferior 
Other, may arise only after, and in dependence on, the adoption of an exclusivist 
stance. It may then be inferred that establishing an Us-and-Them binary compels the 
designation of an out-group, or Other. If so, exclusion—whether of deities or rival 
religionists—might be something of a foregone conclusion.  
This dynamic follows Schwartz’s argument that negation and exclusion are 
expressions of a more fundamental violence inherent in the very construction of the 
Other (1997, 5). My own view coincides with this approach: namely, that the 
presumption of the subject-object duality underlying the construction of the Other 
lays the groundwork for an antagonistic division of humanity into Us and Them. 
Following this logic, the violence implicit in that division informs the subsequent 
eruption of explicitly violent acts. 
240 For similar observations in the context of religious violence, see, for example, Jamel Velji, “Apocalyptic Religion and Violence”, in The      
Oxford Handbook of Religion and Violence, ed. Mark Juergensmeyer, Margo Kitts, and Michael Jerryson, 253; and Jones 2008, 151.
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Yet dualistic thinking is deeply embedded in the way we understand our world. 
Although some religious conventions—as found within Sufism and Tibetan 
Buddhism—suggest that a dualistic worldview may be transcended, that 
accomplishment requires lifelong commitment and diligence. Such advanced levels 
of spiritual practice are typically limited to a small elite. The question then arises of 
how the identification of dualism as central to violence can be helpful in dealing 
with a worldwide pandemic of violence permeated with religious motifs and triggers. 
Positioning dualism versus non-dualism, with the latter trumping the former, is 
hardly a workable solution. To blame a dualistic worldview for our troubles is, as
mentioned earlier, simply to fall back into the dualistic trap. Happily, certain
religious traditions offer frameworks of praxis that avoid deepening the perspectival
chasm between duality and non-duality. I argue that these frameworks present
themselves vividly and usefully in the form of the Sufi barzakh and the Tibetan
Buddhist bardo.
Liminality
Liminality is an experiential phenomenon. The transformation it invokes is an 
ontological rather than a conceptual or intellectual event. Accordingly, the subject 
undergoing the barzakh or the bardo experiences a shift in her mode of being—a 
shift over which she has little control. Because the liminal dynamics of both bardo 
and barzakh pervade everyday life, the uncomfortable experience of undergoing an 
uncontrollable existential adjustment will naturally keep asserting itself. 
As shown in Chapter Three, cycles of liminal disruption are unavoidable, natural, 
and necessary to human society.  Whether they come as explosions of repressed 
societal evolution (as in autonomic liminality) or simply as part of the cycle of 
human dynamics (as with reactive projection), such disruptions generate painful 
experiences of uncertainty, anxiety, and chaos. In liminal phases, the formerly 
reliable ground of identity has become shaky, while the previously stable hierarchy is 
reversed. At such moments it is all too easy for the liminar to project the blame for 
her discomfort on an external force, and the excluded Other is an obvious target. 
From the perspective of the threatened Us, further demonisation of Them may seem 
to offer a path back to the old, reassuring status quo. If the Other appears to be the 
source of the trouble, it might even make sense to eliminate it completely.  
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Reflective Interiority
Perpetrators of violence, religious or otherwise, necessarily lack a particular kind of 
awareness—what the venerable Christian theologian Paul Tillich calls an “immediate 
awareness which gives certainty and an element of uncertainty” (1957, 16). Courage 
is required, he argues, to face the “existential doubt” (22) invoked by that 
uncertainty. Yet, as Jones reminds us, those religious actors most likely to inspire or 
commit acts of violence are least likely to entertain such doubt. To do so would be to 
put their very identity in question. Jones points specifically to a sense of 
“omnipotence and perfection” as most vulnerable to the awareness Tillich proposes. 
One’s own human flaws must be strenuously denied, and the stronger the denial, the 
more powerful the projection on to the Other (2008, 134–5). 
I use the term “reflective interiority” to name the awareness required to engage the 
ambiguous nature of human morality, and particularly the ambiguity in our own 
experience. I understand the term “critical self-reflexivity”, as employed by scholar 
of religion and conflict Jason A. Springs, to describe the same phenomenon.241 Both 
terms refer to a practice of non-judgemental engagement with the disorder of one’s 
internal experience. Engagement of this sort entails profound risks to established 
identity, for it threatens the idealised self by revealing the inner demons that govern 
one’s least praiseworthy aspirations and impulses. Yet this is precisely the purpose of 
turning to face the realities of one’s own state of being: it has the potential to yield 
“diagnostic self-inventory and, ideally, self-correction” (2015, 148). To develop these 
skills is to loosen the grip of fear-driven reification and to reclaim responsibility for 
one’s own discomfort, including that which arises from liminal events.  
It is hardly a random coincidence that both the Sufi and Tibetan Buddhist approaches 
emphasise the importance of reflective interiority. “From the Sufi point of view”, 
according to Seyyed Hossain Nasr, “only the person who has reached the center of
241 I use the term “reflective”, rather than “reflexive”, in the interests of clarity. A reflex may be understood as an autonomic reaction to a 
  stimulus, as when one’s leg jerks in response to a tap on the knee. In Springs’s usage, however, “reflexivity” refers to a thoughtful   
  examination of one’s interior reality. I am grateful to George Lakoff (2009, 9) for his distinction between reflectivity and reflexivity in this 
  sense.
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his or her being and knows who he or she really is can be considered fully human 
and be really someone” (2007, 23). Or, in a Vajrayana register: “To be real, we need 
to discover ourselves in actual experience” (Chögyam and Déchen 2003, 83; 
emphasis original). Reflective interiority, in other words, is a spiritual imperative in 
both practice traditions.  
An Islamic hadith makes this imperative explicit in the proclamation that “[w]hoever 
knows himself, he knows his Lord” (Haddad 2009).242 Among those Muslim 
scholars who have taken this maxim to heart is al-Ḥārith ibn Asad al-Muḥāsibī, 
whose name—meaning “one who takes account of himself”—reflects his 
commitment to muḥāsaba, or self-scrutiny (Renard 2005, 162). This practice entails 
continual evaluation of “even the most secret motions of the soul” in the interests of 
overcoming one’s more base impulses (Schimmel 1975, 54). It has come to be 
associated specifically with the Sufi “science of hearts”: the spiritual disciplines 
enjoined on the practitioner intent on mystical accomplishment (Renard 2005, 214). 
One Qur’anic scholar calls muḥāsaba “a ‘practical’ approach … within an 
‘orthodox’ framework” (Picken 2005, 121), suggesting that a practice of reflective 
interiority is both active and theologically sanctioned. 
The notion of turning one’s attention to one’s own experience is also central to 
Vajrayana Buddhism. Scholar and translator B. Alan  Wallace emphasises the 
importance of exploring the arising and dissolution of mental events in order to 
“penetrate the nature of the observer” (2001, 131). A supplication to the Tibetan 
deity Mañjuśrī proclaims the excellence of “embodied deep awareness that is self-
produced” (Berzin 2009, 4). Tibetan Buddhist teacher Pema Chödrön maintains that 
self-reflection—“to really look at yourself honestly”—is essential to any progress on 
the spiritual path (Lion’s Roar Staff 2017). Reflection is also central to the rites of 
liminal passage (Turner 1967, 105).243 
243 Turner refers to the requirement that ritual initiands reflect on their society, not necessarily on themselves as individuals. Nonetheless, I 
argue that his reference to the practice of reflection, whatever its object, demonstrates a significant connection between liminality and 
the spiritual practices described here. 
242 According to Haddad (2009), this aphorism cannot be authoritatively attributed to the Prophet; nonetheless, he argues, it “conforms
  with the Qur’ān and Sunna”. 
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According to Francesca Fremantle, the essence of Vajrayana practice is “to tame 
our own mind” (2001, 294), an exercise that requires diligent and fearless self-
reflection. Accordingly, meditative techniques for taming the mind are central to 
Tibetan Buddhism (Hua 1974, 75). The same is true of Sufism (Nasr 2007, 115). In 
these practices, the gaze is turned inward rather than outward. The Other plays no 
role in this aspect of spiritual practice, except perhaps as a sort of mirror in which 
to glimpse one’s own distorted projections.244 
The mind having been tamed, Fremantle continues, “[t]hen we need to develop the 
energy, confidence, and courage of a warrior, to be willing to go beyond our limits 
and leap into the unknown” (2001, 294). In Sufism, the development of these 
qualities and the willingness to enter the unknown are reflected in the practice of 
chivalry, or futūwa. This is a form of internal warriorship, perhaps a species of the 
“greater jihād” the Prophet Muḥammad is said to have encouraged: namely, “that 
crucial spiritual battle against [one’s] negative tendencies”. Sufis call those who 
perform this battle rijāl, or people esteemed by God (Nasr 2007, 24). Ibn al-‘Arabī 
refers to such practitioners as mujahidūn, “those who undertake battle”, and defines 
them as “the people of effort, toil, and putting up with difficulties” (Chittick 1989, 
211).245
To dignify those who use religious exegeses to justify violent action with the title of 
mujahidūn is, from this perspective, to overlook important issues of context and 
principle. The Prophet is said to have distinguished between the greater and lesser 
jihād precisely in the setting of warfare, welcoming his warriors back from the 
“lesser jihād” of the front to the “greater jihād” of “man’s struggle in his soul” 
(Ahmed 2016, 318).246 Further, committed Sufis have participated in violent anti-
colonial movements (notably, in north Africa), demonstrating that the largely pacific 
theological basis of Sufi understanding does not necessarily preclude militancy in the 
245 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya II 145.29. Here, Chittick translates mujahidūn as “‘strugglers’ … that is, those who carry out the jihād, the 
struggle against their own limitations”. He attributes this translation to the Qur’ān; however, the closest reference I have been able to find—
and this according to only a single translator—occurs in Qur’ān 9:60 in the sense of “those fighting in the holy wars” (Khan). This is itself 
the translator’s interpretation of “Allāh’s Cause” (Khan), “Allāh’s Path” (Fakhry), or “an obligation [imposed] by Allāh” (Sahih 
International). 
246 Hadith scholars consider the authenticity of this anecdote questionable, though it is “famous on the tongues” (Ahmed 2016, 318). Such fame 
would suggest that the notion of the greater and lesser jihād strikes a powerful chord with Muslim practitioners, and is therefore worthy 
of consideration in the context presented here. 
244 Neither Sufism nor Vajrayana encourages self-absorbed exclusion of others’ concerns. As will shortly become clear, quite the opposite is true. 
    However, the basic practice of meditation is specifically orientated toward self-examination, in the interests developing a foundation of sanity
    from which to enter into relationship with external phenomena.  
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service of political emancipation (Muedini 2015, 134). The greater and lesser jihāds 
are not perforce mutually exclusive. 
Nonetheless, returning to Ibn al-‘Arabī’s mujahidūn, the brand of violence 
emerging from an Us-versus-Them mentality may be understood as precisely the 
avoidance of the effort and toil entailed in reflective interiority: a slashing of the 
Gordian knot, as contrasted with a commitment to explore its intricacies with a view 
to its gradual unravelling. The bold sword stroke that severed the knot may have 
served Alexander the Great, but the same tactic may prove counterproductive in the 
context of personal evolution. Were it possible to shift one’s mode of being with a 
single stroke, we would live in a world very different from the one in which we find 
ourselves. 
Accordingly, I argue that “man’s struggle in his soul” necessitates “effort, toil, and 
putting up with difficulties” in a register not compatible with attempts 
to eliminate the vexing Other in defence of one’s own truth-claims. 
Inclusivity as Spiritual Practice 
Both Sufism and Tibetan Buddhism regard meditation practice as foundation rather 
than fruition. Meditation practice cultivates intimacy with one’s internal experience; 
however, such spiritual attainment as may be achieved in this manner is ultimately 
dedicated to the ennoblement of external relationships.  
Sufi understanding, for example, specifically cautions against the exclusivity 
implicated in violence and embedded in religious or ideological fixation. This 
caution is evident in the description of the fata247—the practitioner who embodies 
futūwa—for this individual does not apprehend subject-object duality. From this 
perspective, “both ‘self’ and ‘others’ cease to exist” (Chodkiewicz 1983, 22). 
Duality then is overcome, resulting in the performance of “heroic generosity” (16). 
This stance relative to others clearly and unequivocally opposes the Us-versus-
Them construction. It further reflects the realities of the barzakh, in that the 
practitioner is bereft of the stable reference points of binary convention. As a  
247 Literally, “a handsome, brave youth”, but understood here as “the ideal, noble, or perfect man” whose generosity knows no limits: one who 
has realised futūwa (Al-Haveti 1983, 4). 
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liminal being, she is “neither here nor there … betwixt and between the positions 
assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremonial” (Turner 1969, 
95)—that is, the societal norms of good/bad, right/wrong and, by extension, self/
other. Significantly, although futūwa may manifest as “a code of honorable 
conduct” (Al-Haveti 1983, 6), ultimately it is “a state of mind” (13). The Sufi 
masters who taught it aspired “not to formulate a universal doctrine, but rather to 
inform the heart” (Chodkiewicz 1983, 16). 
This aspiration is in line with the three progressive levels of knowing pursued by 
Sufis from the formative period: knowledge acquired through information, 
knowledge acquired through experience, and finally, knowledge acquired through 
being—the latter esteemed as “true knowledge” (Al-Haveti 1983, 5).  Nasr offers a 
similar construction in describing the three levels of attaining certainty of spiritual 
truth. Using the Qur’ānic narrative of Moses’ encounter with the burning bush, he 
explains that Moses’ compatriots attained the lore of certainty by hearing of this 
encounter from a reliable source (Moses, himself). The eye of certainty manifests 
through directly seeing the fire, and finally the truth of certainty is attained in being 
consumed by the fire (Nasr 2007, 30–1). 
Buddhism’s three prajnas, or wisdoms, follow a remarkably similar evolution. Here, 
the three levels are known as hearing, contemplating, and meditating. “Knowing 
through information” is roughly analogous to “hearing”. Buddhist teacher Judith 
Lief conflates this prajna with “academic knowledge” of spiritual teachings (2002). 
In Chodkiewicz’s view, this involves the formulation of “a universal doctrine”—a 
necessary step in cultivating a spiritual tradition, but as Chodkiewicz implies, not 
the practitioner’s ultimate goal (1983, 16). 
The second prajna, “contemplating”, again resonates with Sufism’s “knowledge 
through experience”, in that it entails “really chewing … over” what one has 
acquired through information (Lief 2002). From contemplation of what has been 
heard, “the prajna of experience arises” (Ponlop 2008, 35; emphasis original). 
“Knowledge acquired through information” has progressed from the conceptual 
level to manifest as a felt sense of its meaning (38). As an experiential phenomenon, 
the liminal space of the barzakh or bardo might be said to support this level of 
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knowing or wisdom.  
Finally, the third prajna, “meditating”, refers to absorbing the teaching so that it 
becomes “part of who you are, down to your very bones and marrow” (Lief 2002). 
Here, the practitioner is able to “simply rest in the state of non-dual 
experience”  (Ponlop 2008, 44). Once more, the parallel with the third level of the 
Sufi’s “knowledge acquired through being”, where one is “consumed by the fire”, is 
inescapable. The transformational power of the liminal passage might further be 
understood as pointing to this third, and ultimate, transmutation of being itself. 
The Tibetan Buddhist analogue of fata might be pawo, a Tibetan word whose literal 
translation is “one who is brave”. Trungpa translates it as “warrior”, by which he 
means “the tradition of human bravery, or the tradition of fearlessness” (1984, 28). 
The word carries the implication of heroism (Chögyam and Déchen 2003, 288), but 
this heroism is not associated with triumph over external enemies. Aggression, 
according to this view, has no place in true warriorship for, perhaps counter-
intuitively, fearlessness arises out of tenderness. “It comes from letting the world 
tickle your … raw and beautiful heart. …    You are willing to share your heart with 
others” (Trungpa 1984, 46). The hero imagined in this sense is fearlessly vulnerable, 
and thus not compelled to seek the certainties associated with dogma or reified 
tradition. 
Such a mode of being might well entail the “toil, effort, and putting up with 
difficulties” ascribed to Ibn al-‘Arabī’s mujahidūn. A legend of the Muslim hero ‘Alī 
exemplifies the spiritual chivalry associated with such non-aggressive fearlessness. It 
seems that as ‘Alī sat astride a vanquished enemy, the soldier spat in his face. 
Instead of killing the man, and much to the latter’s surprise, ‘Alī immediately leapt 
away from his foe. He explained that the spitting had angered him, and that to 
retaliate from that state of mind would debase his own warriorship. In Rūmi’s 
retelling: 
Said he, “I wield the sword for the sake of the Truth,
I am the servant of the Truth not the functionary of the body.
I am the lion of the Truth, not the lion of passions,
My action does witness bear to my religion”. (Nasr 2007, 88)
Thus, even the purportedly “lesser” jihād of the battlefield enjoins on the practitioner 
a level of selflessness and detachment (Nasr 2007, 88). Such “heroic generosity” 
must almost certainly be the product of intensive and attentive reflection on one’s 
own experience. To have been aware of his anger and to have been able to choose 
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Truth over “passions”—in the heat of battle, no less—required a bravery born of 
fearless self-examination. The legend of ‘Alī’s heroic restraint vividly affirms 
futūwa as a mode of being, beyond merely a practice or acquired skill. To sheathe 
one’s sword in a moment of rage at one’s helpless foe calls on a level of humanity 
far deeper than that accessible through the dutiful exercise of restraint in the name of 
a belief system. It is, above all, fundamentally inclusive, in that it draws its force 
from a larger context than is accessible through an Us-versus-Them construction. 
‘Alī’s foe, though one of Them, is dignified as a person capable of triggering his 
enemy’s passions.  
At the heart of spiritual chivalry, in fact, is the clear understanding of one’s essential 
equality with all others. So central is this virtue that for the truly brave, “[t]he idea of 
having primacy should not even cross their minds, and when it accidentally does, 
they should turn to God in repentance as if they committed a great sin” (Gülen 
2012).248 Accordingly, ‘Alī permits the vanquished soldier’s action to “tickle [his] 
… raw and beautiful heart”—and, having done so, takes full responsibility for his 
own angry response. Extrapolating to the present day, ‘Alī’s example suggests that it 
might be possible that “we can be heroic and kind at the same time” (Trungpa 1984, 
28) in confronting our planetary problems.
‘Alī’s practice of spiritual chivalry here is a relational event, inclusive of all the 
parties involved. Not incidentally, the event is also classically liminal. The familiar 
hierarchy of victor and vanquished is undone; the certainty of ‘Alī’s triumph, in the 
form of his sword at his enemy’s throat, falls away. The established rules of warfare 
have been inverted. The enemy, astonished at this exceptional behaviour, demands 
to know why he has not been killed (Nasr 2007, 87). The reversal of the expected 
protocols has thrown his worldview into chaos.  
We are not told what happens next, but we might reasonably expect a transformation
—if not in the enemy soldier, “an idol worshipper” (Nasr 2007, 87), then in ‘Ali 
and/or his brothers-in-arms. Perhaps everyone present is jolted into a different mode 
of being. Certainly, the fact that Rūmi saw fit to immortalise this legend in verse
248 Citing a Turkish text, Fütüvvet Ruhunun Temsilcileri, or Representatives of the Spirit of Valor. According to Google Translate, fütüvvet is 
equivalent to futūwa. 
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suggests that a profound spiritual event has taken place. Its profundity would appear 
to rely on ‘Alī’s willingness to practise reflective interiority and then to fearlessly 
embrace liminality. I argue that these two activities are in fact interdependent. To 
examine one’s internal reality is to risk upsetting one’s own convictions of identity 
and to replace certainty with ambiguity. To embark on a liminal passage is to invite 
just such upset, and to put oneself to the test. This interactivity of reflective 
interiority and liminality underscores my argument for consideration of both in the 
analysis of religious violence. 
A Hermeneutic of Courage 
Like futūwa, the nowness of the bardo is a mode of being. “[B]ravery is the courage 
to be”, Trungpa argues. It is “a connection with the elemental quality of existence”. 
In this bravery the warrior, like the fata, overcomes the duality underlying the 
construction of Us-versus-Them. The phenomena available to the physical senses, 
rather than remaining external and separate from the perceiver, “in some sense … 
become one with you” (Trungpa 1984, 109). In this, the warrior overcomes habits of 
accepting and rejecting, such that “his very being transcends duality on the spot, and 
thus he is said to have complete authentic presence” (176).  
Zen Buddhist teacher Charlotte Joko Beck explains the correspondence between 
immediate presence and non-dual realisation: “When experiencing occurs, in that 
very moment, experiencing is not in space or time. It can’t be; for when it’s in space 
or time, we’ve made an object of it”. There is no subject in the moment of immediate 
presence—only “[e]xperiencing, experiencing, experiencing; change, change, 
change” (1993, 119). In the absence of both the experiencer and the experience, 
there is only nowness; and it is on this nowness that authenticity depends (Trungpa 
1984, 96). The warrior of the fourth moment is released from linearity and duality 
into the unconditioned, liminal inclusivity of the bardo. 
The central role of existential courage is of course not restricted to Buddhism and 
Sufism. Tillich invokes this quality in his analysis of Christian faith, concluding that 
courage is particularly essential in the context of uncertainty. For Tillich, faith entails 
both certainty and uncertainty; and “[t]o accept [uncertainty] is courage (1957, 16). 
Here, once more, the implication for liminality is evident, as uncertainty is a 
characteristic of liminal experience.  
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Perceiving the world from this mode of being, the warrior sees “how things display 
their harmony and their chaos at the same time” (Trungpa 1984, 104). Nowness 
embraces the paradox of non-binary experience. Its radical inclusivity transcends the 
impulse to either cling to harmony or reject (or, for that matter, cling to) chaos. This 
description brings to mind the barzakh, which, while not identical to the two 
phenomena flanking it—in this case, harmony and chaos—nonetheless “has in itself 
the power of each of them” (Morris 1995, 7).249 Like the barzakh, then, the bardo of 
the fourth moment entails “the principle of non-otherness” (Burckhardt 1979, 1), 
which in turn precludes an Us-and-Them worldview. 
The bardo, furthermore, is not other than everyday life. As Lopez observes, “the 
intermediate state encompasses all moments of existence, for we are always in 
between two states” (2011, 47; see also Mingyur 2019, 51). This is not a description 
of liminality as a permanent state, but rather as ubiquitous and recursive in the nature 
of ordinary reality. Embraced at this level, the bardo is experienced as 
unconditionally inclusive—and not only because, like the barzakh, it excludes no 
instance of experience. Both barzakh and bardo embody “the peculiar unity of the 
liminal: that which is neither this nor that, and yet is both” (Turner 1967, 99). The 
bardo’s essential inclusivity is further articulated in its manifestation as “wisdom 
beyond aggression” (Trungpa 1984, 103–4), for, as I have argued, aggression is 
dependent on exclusivity. Following this logic, the “wisdom beyond aggression” is 
necessarily inclusive in nature.  
Trungpa goes on to define bravery as “not being afraid of yourself” (1984, 28). Here, 
again, reflective interiority appears central to spiritual evolution. In order to progress, 
whether in pursuit of fanā or Buddhist enlightenment, the practitioner cannot avoid 
attending to her internal experience. In so doing, she must confront the existential 
risk entailed in the death of her “ego-dreams”, or ideal self-image (Smith 1993, vii). 
This task is a daunting one, for it entails personal encounters with the very demons 
one’s habitual reactivities are designed to override. As Sachiko Murata observes in 
the context of Islamic theology, turning inward “involves an increasing intensity of   
249 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya I 304.16. 
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ontological qualities”. The reward for braving such intensity—“infinite and absolute 
Being” (1992, 237)—is unquestionably desirable, yet the cost is nothing less than 
fanā: “annihilation … of the human attributes”. Fanā is accomplished through God’s 
“majesty and severity” (304), rather than through His mercy (11), underlining the 
difficulty of the journey.
In the example of ‘Alī, above, recourse to violence will have been an expression of 
existential cowardice. This variety of cowardice is not the same as that proclaimed 
by political leaders who condemn violent acts as “cowardly”. I understand those 
assertions to reflect frustration at the perpetrators’ flight from retribution into hiding 
or death. The existential cowardice I assert constitutes a rejection of religious 
aspiration itself: a denial of the yearning to fully realise one’s spiritual potential. 
When ‘Alī stayed his sword “for the sake of Truth”, he might conventionally have 
been accused of lacking the courage to dispatch his foe.250 Yet I argue that his 
decision to bear witness to his religion by refraining from violence required an even 
greater and more meaningful brand of courage: precisely the heroism or bravery 
described by such masters as al-Sulamī and Trungpa.  
Context in Violence 
Philosopher James Mensch makes a compelling point that bears directly on ‘Alī’s 
decision: any meaning that may inhere in violence depends on context. Wielded 
reactively—as, perhaps, might have been the case had ‘Alī killed the enemy who 
spat at him—violence is meaningless. “As an instrument, we take [violence] as 
drawing its sense from the tasks on which we employ it”, Mensch argues. “Outside 
of the context set by such tasks, it has no sense” (2013, 25). This argument 
transcends the binaries of violence and non-violence to make a more profound and 
nuanced point. To reify violence as unequivocally unacceptable is to replicate the 
very exclusion that drives the mindless, reactive violence born of an Us-versus-Them 
mindset. This mindset projects the evils of violence on Them, reserving for Us the 
righteousness of the non-violent. 
250 The question of competing “Truths”, though certainly relevant in the context of religious violence, does not figure into the current 
discussion. 
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It is not necessarily my argument that violence is sometimes justified, although this 
is almost certainly the case. The mother who kills the would-be murderer of her 
children is an example so obvious as to almost overstate the point. Historian Gerald 
Runkle suggests that we may avoid the trap of demonising violence by shifting the 
discussion to issues of justice and rights. Clarity on these values, he argues, will 
naturally generate non-violent defences in their service (1976, 368). Ultimately, 
however, Runkle resorts to calculations of relative harm to justify violence in certain 
defined circumstances (377). Although strategies of this kind may prove of practical 
use under particular conditions, my argument takes a different tack. I suggest that it 
may be possible to practise violence without concomitantly practising exclusion. 
‘Alī’s example, at any rate, implies that this might be achievable.  
To separate violence from exclusion would require viewing violent activity through a 
lens free of binary attributes. I submit that narrowing one’s understanding to a binary 
worldview virtually necessitates judgements of good/bad or right/wrong. This is 
precisely due to a lack of contextual consideration. If Phenomenon X is good, its 
potentially negative impacts on the surrounding conditions are disregarded or 
discounted; its good reputation will not be tarnished by inconvenient facts. If, on the 
other hand, Phenomenon X is bad, it may be blamed for any negative outcomes, 
regardless of its actual responsibility. As the identified problem, it must then 
logically be removed in order to improve the conditions in which it is embedded.  
Examples of this dynamic abound in the current cultural environment. For 
“Phenomenon X”, we may substitute recreational drug use, unionisation, celibacy 
for Roman Catholic priests, or mothers entering the workforce. Arguments for both 
sides of any of these issues, at least as manifest in popular media, often tend to 
narrow their focus to exclude contextual considerations.251
251 See, for example, Pam Vogel, “5 of the Worst examples of Biased and Distorted Media Coverage of Education in 2015” (Naked Capitalism, 
     December 31, 2015, https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2015/12/5-of-the-worst-examples-of-biased-and-distorted-media-coverage-of-
     education-in-2015.html); Stanford University Medical Center, “Studies of Scientific Bias Targeting the Right Problems, Study
  Finds” (Phys.org, March 20, 2017, https://phys.org/news/2017-03-scientific-bias-problems.html, 2017); and Lesley Evans Ogden, “Working
  Mothers Face a 'Wall' of Bias—But There Are Ways to Push Back” (Science, April 10, 2019, https://www.sciencemag.org/careers/2019/04/
     working-mothers-face-wall-bias-there-are- ways-push-back).
Whether Phenomenon X is good or bad, the assumption of mutually exclusive 
binaries brackets existing conditions from analysis. In neither case is the contextual 
environment considered germane, which renders accurate and effective judgement 
impossible.252 To exclude either side of the binary—good/right or bad/wrong—is to 
separate the phenomenon from the dialectic that shapes and is shaped by its 
presence. The practice of exclusion, whether of a binary value from its opposite or a 
phenomenon from its context, refers back to the dualistic worldview that first 
attributes binary values to phenomena such as violence and non-violence, and that 
posits value-based separations between phenomena. 
As a liminal event, violence can further not be productively extracted from the larger 
context of its manifestation.253 Violence reflects the fundamental nature of liminality, 
in that it is irrational, it upsets established structures, it threatens longstanding 
traditions, and it introduces deep uncertainties regarding the future (Horvath, 
Thomassen, and Wydra 2015, 2). As such, violence is dependent on the rationality, 
structures, traditions, and certainties it disrupts. Here again, the value of a relational 
and inclusive analysis makes itself apparent.   
One might imagine an ideal world where violence would be unnecessary. But our 
world is far from ideal. As in the case of the mother protecting her children’s lives, 
or perhaps of a population rejecting the structural violence of colonialism, 
imperialism, or apartheid, violence may prove to be the lesser of evils. Nonetheless, I 
argue that for a violent act to hold the potential for positive outcome, inclusive 
considerations of context must trump those of momentary passions or conceptual 
justifications. As Nasr has observed, even the “lesser jihād” of the battlefield “must 
be selfless, detached, and not caused by anger and hatred” (2007, 88). Both Sufism 
and Vajrayana Buddhism promote such action as heroic, precisely because it is free 
from attachment to personal valorisation. Trungpa gives a compelling example of 
this approach to violence: 
253 The relationship between liminality and violence is underscored by the common practice of invoking deliberately violent means to effect the
  transformation of initiates during the liminal phase of rites of passage (Alcorta and Sosis 2013, 579). 
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252 A contemporary example of this logic may be inferred from Juan Gonzalez, The Harvest of Empire: A History of Latinos in America, rev. 
  ed., (New York: Penguin Books, 2011). Gonzalez documents the ways in which the  United States’s political and economic interference in
  Latin American and Caribbean countries is implicated in the current flood of immigrants across the U.S.’s southern border.  Those who judge
  the would-be immigrants as bad and wrong (see, for instance, https://www.drjamesdobson.org/about/july-newsletter-2019) fail to recognise the
  contextual situation in which their own country has played a central role.
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This, from an acknowledged master of Buddhism, a tradition whose foundational 
precept is to refrain from taking life (Humphreys 1997, 174). The point of this 
example seems to be that in certain specific contexts, violence may be the best 
course of action—and, significantly, that it is possible to enact violence without 
anger or hatred. By contrast, the perpetration of mindless, reactive violence—the 
kind ‘Alī rejected—is neither heroic nor brave. It reflects a preference for relative, 
binary values over the unconditional inclusivity of ultimate concerns. By “ultimate 
concerns”, I mean a compelling interest in the nature of ultimate reality. Tillich’s 
definition offers a slightly different nuance: “concern about what is experienced as 
ultimate” (1957, 9). In his view, any discussion of divinity is meaningless except 
when conducted “in the state of ultimate concern” (10). I read this as an assertion 
that a concern with ultimacy is essential to an authentic religious outlook.  
In this light Tillich’s further argument, that ultimate concerns transcend the bounds 
of duality, becomes particularly compelling. He points to “the disappearance of the 
ordinary subject-object scheme in the experience of the ultimate, the unconditional”, 
further invoking the liminal nature of the ultimate in that it “is present beyond the 
cleavage of subject and object”. Much like the barzakh, “[i]t is present as both and 
beyond both” (1957, 11). The holy, therefore, is essentially ambiguous, containing 
the potentials for both creation and destruction (15–16). 
Significantly, in the context of the present study, Tillich argues that the inability to 
transcend dualistic understanding is characteristic of “idolatrous faith”, in which 
finite and conditioned phenomena are elevated to the level of ultimacy. This version 
of faith has rejected the ambiguity of the holy, fixating instead on its rationality, 
truth, and goodness. Ironically, this fixation leaves the practitioner of “idolatrous 
faith” with only the “demonic” aspect of holiness (1957, 15–16). This dynamic may 
help explain the form of projection described earlier: the religious fundamentalist, 
faced with the negative aspect of the holy, projects it on to “a demonic enemy 
[I]f I happened to find myself in the central headquarters
where they push the button that could blow up the planet, I
would kill the person who was going to push the button for
the bomb right away and without any hesitation. I would take
delight in it! (Trungpa 1993, 88)
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… whose elimination is an ultimate goal” (Gopin 2000, 205). This process might be 
cited as an instance of reactive projection: the fixated religionist, having rejected the 
liminality entailed in authentic faith, blames the ensuing degeneration of spiritual 
experience on the demonic enemy and vows violent retribution. 
The consequence of “idolatrous faith” is “existential disappointment” (Tillich 1957, 
12), for “there is no finite way of reaching the infinite” (14). This argument accords 
closely with my own understanding of spiritual authenticity as entailing a mode of 
being that draws on a non-dual worldview, and that transcends fixation on a 
constructed identity. The term “existential disappointment” nicely encapsulates the 
distress that I have argued triggers violent reactivity on the part of those religious 
extremists whose commitment to static views precludes the ontological 
transformation enabled by liminal experience. 
I argue, therefore, that what renders religious violence problematic is not so much its 
violence as its perpetrators’ distorted understanding of religion. This is not a novel 
argument. Many scholars have pointed out the discrepancies between religious texts 
and those interpretations employed to justify violent acts.254 However, it is not in 
textual hermeneutics that I locate the difficulty, for the dualistic nature of language 
makes scriptural interpretations inescapably susceptible to binary understandings.255 
Rather, I propose that the problem at the heart of religious violence consists in an 
abandonment of context and an insufficiency of existential courage. I argue, further, 
that a liminal analysis might serve to clarify and contextualise both of these 
predicaments. Recognising that liminal events are (a) deeply uncomfortable and (b) 
inevitable may help reframe the challenge they represent and, by extension, the 
options available in response. 
254 See, for example, Gopin (2000) and Gerard F. Powers, “Religion and Peacebuilding” in Strategies of Peace: Transforming Conflict in
  a Violent World, ed. Daniel Philpott and Gerard F. Powers, 317–52 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
255 This point will be developed further in the following chapter. 
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Not incidentally, I submit that the same abandonment of context and insufficient 
courage are detectable in certain strains of the research on religious violence. It is 
hardly surprising that much scholarship is governed by conventional, dualistic 
understandings of violence, nor that a natural aversion to violent activity should 
inform research. These approaches reflect the cultural values and assumptions in 
which we think, move, and work. Yet a remark popularly attributed to Albert 
Einstein expresses the futility of attempting to find a solution from the standpoint of 
the same consciousness  that created the problem.256  It is apparent, in a word, that an 
either/or mindset that opposes violence to non-violence has thus far proven 
inadequate to the task of unraveling Us-versus-Them thinking. Approaching the 
issue of religious violence from the motivation to eliminate it must, I argue, limit the 
researcher’s capacity to perceive the larger context in which it thrives. Again, I 
invoke the problem of Phenomenon X, fixation on which tends to draw attention to 
the trees at the expense of the forest. 
As has been demonstrated in fields as diverse as quantum mechanics, anthropology, 
and sociology, the mere presence of an observer influences the behaviours of the 
elements intrinsic to the phenomenal world. It might then be reasonable to infer that 
the particular mindset or mood of the observer should further influence the nature of 
an observed event. To follow this argument is to permit at least some consideration 
of the potential for shifting our understanding of religious violence. Further, I argue 
that the application of a liminal analysis to religious violence may both support the 
loosening of dualistic conceptual constraints and open novel methodological 
possibilities in the examination and understanding of this vexing and thus far 
intractable phenomenon.  
Conclusion
The profound uncertainty characteristic of liminal phases is unavoidable in the 
course of human experience. The temptation to seek solid ground in the face of these 
chaotic and ambiguous passages is intense. Ideological fixation, whether religious,  
256 “You cannot solve a problem from the same consciousness that created it. You must learn to see the world anew.” I have been unable to  
      confirm the actual source of this statement. Whether or not Einstein actually originated it, however, its logic remains compelling and
      relevant. 
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political, philosophical, or academic, offers a seductive refuge from liminal vertigo. 
Yet the inescapability of change resists such denial. To cling to perceived certainties 
in the face of liminality is to flout the structure of reality, itself. And, as Charles 
Darwin has been credited with observing, those creatures that survive a changing 
environment are not necessarily the strongest or smartest, but the most adaptable.257  
The bardo and the barzakh, even as they typify the anti-structure of their own 
liminal nature, paradoxically present themselves as structured forms. Both are well 
established and thoroughly consistent with the views of their respective religious 
systems. Although neither promises to quell anxiety through the stabilisation of 
chaos—indeed, ambiguity is their very essence—both the barzakh and the bardo 
bear the reassuring stamp of religious authority. The practitioner understands that 
entering into such a phase, although it will be difficult and possibly even frightening, 
is to embark on a recognised and traditionally endorsed crossing integral to her 
spiritual path. Furthermore, this liminal passage holds the promise of the 
transformation to which every spiritual seeker aspires.  
The prerequisites for such a journey include a certain level of self-awareness. It is 
for this reason that Fremantle refers to the Bardo Thötröl as “a book of the living as 
well as a book of the dead”. To prepare oneself for the bardos of dying and death, it 
is necessary to recognise the continual processes of living, dying, and being reborn 
that attend every moment of existence (2001, 7). Such recognition requires profound 
existential courage, for no sense of permanent identity can survive it. 
Similarly, it is primarily in the barāzikh of everyday life that the Sufi can find God. 
As Ibn al-‘Arabī proclaims, “His self-disclosure must take place within formal 
existence, which is that which accepts self-transmutation and continual change” 
(cited by Chittick 1998, 337).258  Thus, the Divine is accessible in the very movement 
of a shifting reality, and nowhere else.   To deny or resist change, from this 
perspective, is to deny or resist the presence of the sacred. The practitioner must be 
willing to abandon the perceived safety of an identity rooted in notions of changeless 
258 Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya III 516.14. 
257 It seems that this observation was actually articulated by Leon C. Megginson in a presidential address delivered at the Southwestern
     Social Science Association convention in San Antonio, Texas on April 12, 1963. Megginson was, however, summarising Darwin’s
  conclusions in the latter’s masterwork, The Origin of the Species (accessed 12 June, 2019, https://quoteinvestigator.com /2014/05/04/
  adapt).  
171 
religious doctrine, history, or tradition. Spiritual practice at this level demands a 
willingness to examine one’s own inner experience. When identification with 
external entities or values falls away, so do impediments to the practice of reflective 
interiority. 
Perpetrators of violence do, of course, have inner lives. I argue, however, that their 
actions lack a certain kind of awareness with respect to the interiority described 
above. I base this argument on the fixation, common among violent actors, on truth-
claims that deny the realities of change. Such fixation relieves its subject of the 
necessity for searching self-examination, for the denial of change extends to his 
personal and group identity. Since these identities typically manifest as ideals rather 
than as reflections of actual modes of being, it follows that unapproved and 
unwanted experiences must be repressed. Absent awareness of such painful 
challenges to an assumed ideal self, life becomes an endless struggle against the 
inevitable manifestations of repressed thoughts and impulses.
Whatever the dynamics that lead to liminal disruption, people who are blind to their 
own role in shaping the variety and intensity of its discomfort are likely to 
externalise responsibility. This projection is intimately connected to the 
maintenance of identity:
This observation concisely describes the process whereby the Us-and-Them
construction of the adversarial collective identity promotes projection of repressed
experiences on to the Other. The anticipated elimination of the Other is then 
conflated with the elimination of the struggle. If Phenomenon X is the problem, its
removal presents itself as a compelling solution; yet this strategy routinely proves 
259 Moyaert is quoting moral theologian Didier Pollefeyt, “Kwaad en verzoening: Een christelijk ethische analyse in het licht van Auschwitz”, 
in De mens en zijn wereld morgen: Lessen voor de eenentwintigste eeuw, ed. B. Raymaekers and A. Van De Putte (Louvain: Universitaire 
Pers Louvain 1999), 109–33. This excerpt appears on pages 112–13. Moyaert’s translator is Henry Jansen. 
[A]n unambiguous and undoubted identity is acquired by
characterizing oneself over against an ... antagonist, a scapegoat,
an enemy who is the mirror image of oneself, bearing all the
characteristics that one fears the most in oneself and therefore
attempts with all violence to suppress, preferably in the other.
(Moyaert 2011, 56)259
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ineffective. Thus, perpetrators of exclusionary violence face the very real potential 
of dangerous and escalating conditions of permanent liminality.
The kind of awareness required to engage with one’s inner reality must encompass 
all that we consider shameful and unacceptable along with all we celebrate and 
embrace. Such intimacy with the full range of one’s own humanity necessarily 
enables identification with others, for we recognise in ourselves the same impulses 
and motivations that drive even those actions we most abhor. Repression of the 
undesirable aspects of our internal experience is not merely psychologically contra-
indicated or ultimately ineffective: it can generate deadly consequences. When it 
erupts in the form of projection on to a select Other, such repression contributes to a 
toxic blend of fixated identity, religious fervour, and resource scarcity (both actual 
and perceived). This dissertation argues that what we call “religious violence” is, 
precisely, the product of these dynamics. 
A strong corrective to this conundrum, as I have argued, is the spacious and non-
judgemental awareness produced by the practice of reflective interiority. Futūwa and 
warriorship are exemplary among the spiritual praxes designed to cultivate such 
existential states. As has been demonstrated, these modes of being are intimately 
associated with the liminal spaces of the barzakh and bardo, respectively. Both 
approaches further recognise aggressive hatred as counterproductive, and both 
elevate concern for others above self-interest. Accordingly, an embrace of the 
liminal barzakh or bardo is incompatible with the Us-and-Them worldview. It 
follows that the decline of that worldview necessarily erodes the dualism that lies at 
the heart of violence. 
Turning to face liminality may well promise benefits beyond even the mitigation of 
religious and other forms of violence. Uncertainty—such as the ambivalence and 
lack of firm ground experienced during liminal events—is associated with anxiety, 
fear of judgement, and the risk of loss (Fields 2011, 412). As religious teachers have 
observed, to resist such occurrences is to reject the possibilities of spiritual 
maturation (Chödrön 1991, 40; Nasr 2007, 120). A   passage through uncertainty 
must, in fact, precede any meaningful human creation (Fields 2011, 430). Simply 
understanding the natural dynamics of liminality may support a first step away from 
reactive aversion in contexts other than that of religious violence.  
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As noted in Chapter Three, much scholarship has already been generated with 
respect to liminal analyses of international affairs, politics, history, education, 
race, and other fields of research. I suspect that the lens of liminality will shortly 
be applied in a great many other contexts. It is frankly difficult to name an 
academic discipline in which a liminal analysis could not offer the potential to 
extend current understandings. 
Yet what I propose is not only the academic employment of liminality as an 
intellectual tool. I suggest, rather, that an actual embrace of liminal experience in 
the pursuit of academic understanding may punctuate the dread of uncertainty 
with curiosity about the loss of familiar reference points. My own experience of 
the liminal passage of writing a doctoral dissertation260 has demonstrated that 
turning toward liminality in this way can generate alternatives to fearful 
repression, projection, and other comfort-orientated but ultimately destructive 
strategies.  
260 See Mary Jo Deegan and Michael R. Hill, “Doctoral Dissertations as Liminal Journeys of the Self: Betwixt and Between in Graduate 
Sociology Programs”, Teaching Sociology 19, no.3 (1991): 322–32. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion
The evils we suffer cannot be eliminated by a violent attack in which one 
sector of humanity flies at another in destructive fury. Our evils are 
common and the solution can only be common. But we are not ready to 
undertake this common task because we are not ourselves. Consequently 
the first duty of every man is to return to his own “right mind” in order 
that society itself may be sane. 
—Thomas Merton, Gandhi on Non-Violence 
This dissertation begins with a question: does “religious violence” exist? The term 
implies a particular brand of violence that is primarily motivated by allegiance to 
religious ideology. I have argued, in line with a number of prominent scholars in the 
field, that the term is a misnomer. Although religious concerns can certainly intensify 
the emotions and support the justifications associated with violence, I agree with 
William T. Cavanaugh, Jyrki Käkönen, Karen Armstrong, and others that religion is 
most often what R. Scott Appleby calls “a dependent variable”: that is, where 
religion is implicated in violence, it is typically not causal.  
Other scholars argue eloquently that religion is, in fact, a proximate cause of 
violence. These include Mark Juergensmeyer, Charles Selengut, and Jan Assmann. In 
Chapter Two, I make the case for my own view: that were it possible to extract the 
religion from religious violence, the violence in question would proceed on the basis 
of myriad other factors, including competition for resources, nationalism, and 
political ideology. 
My argument proposes the defence of group identity as among the proximate causes 
of so-called religious violence. Martin E. Marty, having devoted substantial time and 
research to the issue of religious fundamentalism, concludes that the quest to secure 
individual and collective identity is central to that phenomenon. People’s “search for 
self-identity”, he writes, 
when it is challenged by change, may very well include recourse to 
religion, perhaps even as a starting and end point. In fact, religion 
may be the prime motivator, inspirer, and legitimator of their seeking 
and their acting. (Marty 1989, 7) 
Although fundamentalist views need not necessarily lead to conflict, they are 
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frequently implicated in the forms of religious extremism that lead to violence, 
especially in clashes between two varieties of fundamentalism (Appleby and Marty 
2002, 20). The search for identity, in other words, may be pervasive in religious 
violence.  
Henry Munson, an anthropologist specialising in the study of religious extremism, 
lists Sikh and Hindu militancy in India and Protestant Unionism in Northern Ireland 
among examples of presumed religious violence that he attributes to issues of 
identity. In such cases, Munson argues that violence is explicitly not triggered by 
moral outrage at perceived violations of religious tenets. Rather, he writes, 
“[r]eligion serves as a distinctive marker of identity, and notably of national identity, 
even in the absence of belief” (2005, 340–1). In such cases, religious identity has 
been co-opted in the service of national interests, leaving the designation of 
“religious violence” in question. That said, nationalism shares much in common with 
religion, as described in Chapter Two. 
Identity and Religious Violence 
The human tendency to identify as or with a given ideology, religion, or collective is 
not in itself malign. Its dominant articulation in societal contexts, however, can lend 
the dynamics of identity a dangerous edge. Fixation on a given identity holds the 
potential for social disruption precisely due to the duality at its heart, for to identify 
with a group means to distinguish that group from others. Some scholars argue that 
violence is already implicit in this fundamental distinction.261 The distinction is 
typically expressed in the form of certain ideological, ritual, historical, ethnic, and/or 
doctrinal reference points, which themselves become conflated with the group 
identity. Identification with these reference points divides the world between those 
who express the forms associated with one’s own group and those who do not: in a 
word, Us and Them. As demonstrated in Chapter Two, this worldview plays a 
particularly powerful role in religious allegiance. 
When the reference points in question are held to be universal truths, the group may 
261 See, for example, Regina M. Schwartz and Val Plumwood, both cited earlier. 
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perceive itself as defending much more than just its own identity. The more tenacious 
its claim to an ultimate truth, the more such a group is likely to see its mission as 
crucial to the well-being of all humanity. According to environmental scholar Chris 
Park, the world’s three most widely distributed religions—Christianity, Islam, and 
Buddhism—share an “ultimate goal … to convert all people on earth”. Park’s 
intention, here, is to underscore the very wide global distribution of these three 
“universal religions”, perhaps softening this otherwise somewhat reductionist claim 
(2005, 440).262 To the extent that even a minority of adherents of these religions take 
such an aspiration to heart, conflict would seem to be inevitable. 
Truth and Its Opposite 
Of all the registers of human activity, that of religion is among those most closely 
associated with universal truth-claims. Such claims add the conviction of a divine 
mandate to the already powerful compulsion to defend the group’s identity. This 
combination of identity under threat and belief in a sanctified vocation may render 
religious groups prone to especially vigorous defence of their ideological positions. 
The problematic dualism implicit in identity formation and maintenance extends to 
ideology, ritual, history, etc.—the reference points mentioned above. Each group 
holds its own version supreme and, by extension, others’ versions inferior. In the case 
of the binaries of good and evil, purity and impurity, truth and falsehood, all but the 
most deliberately antinomian groups will naturally identify with the good, the pure, 
and the true.  
Again, claims to a universal truth complicate the matter, particularly in cases where 
one’s own group’s characterisations of goodness, purity, and truth are considered 
superior in all cases, for all people. This logic describes the phenomenon of 
reification, by which one’s own view is held to be uniquely exempt from change and 
relational dynamics, and therefore singularly appropriate for adoption by all (Wallace 
2001, 138). The spectre of the liminal holds particular menace here, for the 
262 As a teacher trained in a prominent Western Buddhist tradition, I can attest that no such “ultimate goal” was ever communicated to me. In 
fact, I was explicitly coached to avoid evangelism in conveying the Buddhist teachings. 
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associated dissolution of reference points makes nonsense of any claim to an 
enduring truth (Szakolczai 2000, 187). 
Those identified with opposing sides of mutually exclusive binaries will likely find 
coexistence difficult, if not impossible. When any group claims exclusive access to 
the good, the pure, and the true, all other groups—the Other—are more easily 
identified with evil, impurity, and falsehood. From there it is but a short step to the 
exercise of active exclusion, which acquires a particular urgency when competing 
truth-claims are perceived to threaten the basis of a group’s very identity. When open 
conflict erupts, religious ideology and tradition are easily co-opted to justify violent 
action. 
Accordingly, I argue that dualistic thinking is central to violence. Dualism is a 
necessary precondition for exclusion, which has itself been implicated in—if not 
outright conflated with—violence. Hence, I submit that religious violence arises out 
of a more complex and dynamic mix of factors than solely a clash of religious 
allegiances, and that the construction and maintenance of group identity may be 
central to this mix. Since the desire to identify with and belong to a collective is 
fundamentally human, the stakes are high. I argue that, in the aetiology of violence, 
perceived threats to such identification are antecedent to doctrinal or other religious 
quarrels. 
Liminality 
Liminality came to academic attention through the work of British anthropologist 
Victor Turner, whose inspiration was Arnold van Gennep’s early-twentieth-century 
recognition of the tripartite structure of rites of passage. Although van Gennep 
developed this analysis in the context of east African tribal rites, he believed that 
such rites of passage are natural societal processes, and that the stages of separation, 
transition, and incorporation could apply to the spatial, temporal, and status shifts 
common to all human societies. 
Turner was especially interested in the second of the three rites: the transitional, or 
“threshold” phase between two relatively stable states. He published a number of 
works during the mid-twentieth century that explored and expanded van Gennep’s 
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original insight with respect to this liminal phase. Recent scholarship in a wide 
spectrum of academic disciplines has built on Turner’s thinking to employ his 
understanding of the liminal passage. This dissertation seeks to contribute to this 
trend by proposing liminality as a useful analytical tool in the investigation of 
religious violence. 
The liminal phase of transition is characterised by uncertainty, ambiguity, and a 
typically chaotic inversion of previously established norms and hierarchies. Hence, it 
invokes significant discomfort and is typically met with apprehension. The liminar’s 
familiar reference points are no longer available, and there is no guarantee that others 
will arise to take their place. Should any such come into view, the subject has little, if 
any, control over what shape the new realities will take.  
Liminality is inherent in the dynamics of identity construction over time. The 
recurrent flux characteristic of identity is attributable to the repeated liminal events 
that occur in the course of our life experiences (Szakolczai 2000, 188; Katz 2015, 
123). For a group or individual committed to avoiding such ongoing disruption, 
ideological fixation can promise a seductive refuge. Fixation, however, directly 
opposes the natural processes of identity construction, leading to an endless struggle 
against inevitable change. The Us-and-Them configuration already implicated in 
group-identity formation provides a channel through which the struggle may be 
projected on to the Other, exacerbating antagonisms related to opposing theologies, 
practices, historical claims, and so forth.  
The certainties sought in religious dogma may be derived from doctrine or tradition. 
Significantly, however, they often invoke the past, the only available dimension that 
appears stable. Relative to the shifting ground of the present and the unknowability 
of the future, the past represents solidity and reassurance, particularly when viewed 
through the lens of a desperate nostalgia. Nostalgia functions precisely to render the 
past static and ideal, in contrast to the untidy dynamism of actual, present 
experience. Ironically, nostalgia “evokes the past only to bury it alive” (Lasch 1991, 
117). The past recalled as a changeless template for fashioning the future necessarily 
violates historical fact, abandoning the important lessons to be discovered in 
reflection on a dynamic, living past. 
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It is further in the nature of nostalgia to deny the influence of the past on subsequent 
developments. Nostalgics tend to enshrine narratives of the past in hermetic 
repositories, separated from their connection (and hence, also their accountability) to 
the present and future (Lasch 1991, 117). Yet because communities tend to create 
imaginaries based on known structures, such frozen narratives of the past often serve 
to shape expectations of future events (Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995, 75–6n12). 
Rather than engage an open-ended analysis of a perpetually unfolding historical 
dialectic, fixated religionists may project a whole-cloth, static, and idealised past on 
to the screen of the future. The more idealised a group’s purported history, the more 
reassuring its projections of a likely future. This may apply even to the apocalyptic 
projections that characterise many religious fundamentalisms, as the anticipated 
catastrophe is expected to annihilate the derided Other on a global scale, sparing the 
righteous to establish a new order unchallenged (Juergensmeyer 2006, 364). The 
biblical tale of Noah’s survival through the great flood may be considered an 
example of an idealised past projected on to a future apocalypse that leads, through 
terror, to a new, pure beginning. 
Those who wish to impose a romanticised past on the future may perceive their 
project as socially, culturally, politically, and/or religiously transformative. It has 
been argued, however, that passage through the disconcerting liminal phase is a 
necessary condition for the accomplishment of any real transformation, 
particularly—perhaps ironically— the kind of transformation often invoked as 
central to religious aspiration (Nasr 2005, 64; Sheikh 2012, 371). In addition, human 
beings need liminal passages in order to make meaning (Horvath, Wydra, and 
Thomassen 2015, 2), which is itself a central concern of religion (Johnson 2016, 3). 
Accordingly, I argue that the weight of evidence—in terms of both practical benefit 
and the inevitability of liminal events—endorses the wisdom of familiarising oneself 
with, and ultimately embracing, liminality. 
Two Hypotheses 
I have argued that the approach of a liminal phase will hold particular foreboding for 
a group invested in the reification of its reference points. To some extent, collective 
religious identity construction is dependent on a familiar binary worldview that 
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becomes less dependable on the unsteady ground of liminality. “Things fall apart”, as 
William Butler Yeats proclaims; “the centre cannot hold.” Perhaps prophetically, the 
poet goes on to lament that under these conditions, “the best lack all conviction, 
while the worst / are full of passionate intensity”.263 I argue that such passionate 
intensity in the face of things falling apart is precisely what drives religious violence.  
I offer two possible scenarios in which the lens of liminality may clarify the 
dynamics of religious violence. The first of these, reactive projection, describes a 
situation in which violence is a direct reaction to the discomfort of a liminal passage. 
Sensing with dread the approach of uncontrollable liminal chaos, fixated religionists 
blame their distress on the Other: the purportedly evil, impure, inauthentic Them, 
contrasted with the ostensibly good, pure, authentic Us. To eliminate Them, from this 
perspective, should bring an end to the discomfort attributed to their activities—or, 
more precisely, to their very existence.  
The second hypothetical scenario, autonomic liminality, suggests that when religious 
actors oppose the natural manifestation of a liminal phase by fixating on perceived 
certainties, liminal events may erupt uncontainably in the form of violence. The more 
strenuous their attempts to repress the apprehension and vulnerability attendant on 
approaching upheaval, the more intense these difficulties may in fact become. As 
psychologists are well aware, repression “almost always breeds anxiety, fear, and 
even aggression” (Jones 2008, 169). Anxiety and fear are, as has been noted, 
common reactions to the groundlessness of liminality. Hence, autonomic liminality 
describes a situation in which the painful emotions attendant on liminal disruption 
have been repressed or projected in order to avoid or displace that disruption, and 
where this strategy has served instead to aggravate and compound both the 
disruption and the pain.  
263 From “The Second Coming”, by William Butler Yeats (http://www.potw.org/archive/potw351.html, accessed July 31, 2019). “The Second 
Coming” might be understood as describing precisely the chaotic disruption of the liminal in the form of war. Yeats wrote the poem in the 
aftermath of World War I. Shortly before the Second World War broke out, he told a friend that the poem anticipated what was still to come. 
“His poem seems to suggest that world affairs and spirituality undergo transformation from time to time”, explains a literary analyst. 
“Humankind has to experience darkness before the light can stream in again through the cracks” (Andrew Spacey, “Summary and Analysis of 
the Poem ‘The Second Coming’ by William Butler Yeats”, March 5, 2019. https://owlcation.com/humanities/Summary-and-Analysis-of-Poem-
The-Second-Coming-by-William-Butler-Yeats, accessed August  21, 2019.)  
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Reactive projection, then, employs a strategy of blame to resolve the painful 
emotions generated by liminal disruption. Autonomic liminality refers to an eruption 
of liminality despite, and in fact intensified by, this or other repressive strategies. 
Both these hypothetical analyses are grounded in the understanding of liminal events 
as not only inevitable but actually natural to human dynamics. This analysis does not 
propose that autonomic liminality and reactive projection are necessarily mutually 
exclusive. Reactive projection might in fact be considered an almost routine by-
product of autonomic liminality; although theoretically, at least, the reverse might 
not obtain. 
If liminality is indeed necessary to genuine transformation, it is particularly ironic 
that those who fixate on an unchanging view of their religious traditions, in denial of 
the reality of recursive liminal passages, reject and perhaps even disfigure the very 
transformation they seek. In this way, resistance to natural liminal cycles sets up 
conditions conducive to what has been called “permanent liminality”, a situation in 
which liminal disruption fails to resolve into the third phase of van Gennep’s 
tripartite rites: the relatively stable incorporative or aggregative phase.  
The chances of liminal conditions becoming normalised in this way are multiplied 
when people attempt to impose artificial order on naturally occurring disorder, such 
as that associated with liminal events (Thomassen 2014, 229). Another irony, then: 
fixated religionists (or ideologues of any stripe), in their very attempts to deny or 
avoid liminality, run the risk of establishing it as an ongoing state. It could be argued 
that the continued and increasing global incidence of religious violence in itself 
reflects conditions of permanent liminality. 
The hypotheses presented above—those of reactive projection and autonomic 
liminality—do not exhaust the possible applications of liminality as a lens through 
which to view the phenomenon of religious violence. I offer them as preliminary 
examples of the potential for analytical evolution in the academic study of this 
phenomenon. 
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Experience and Emotion 
As a conscious realist, I am postulating conscious experiences as 
ontological primitives, the most basic ingredients of the world. I’m 
claiming that experiences are the real coin of the realm. The experiences 
of everyday life—my real feeling of a headache, my real taste of 
chocolate—that really is the ultimate nature of reality. 
—Donald Hoffman, cognitive scientist, Quanta Magazine  
Liminal passages are, by definition, experiential in nature. The relationship between 
liminality and experience is unequivocally asserted in the following: 
[A]n “experience” means that once previous certainties are removed
and one enters a delicate, uncertain, malleable state, something might
happen to one that alters the very core of one’s being. (Szakolczai
2015, 18)
Direct experience is both stressful and transformative. Transformation is virtually 
guaranteed to invoke stress, precisely because “previous certainties are removed”. To 
avoid this challenging passage is to drift into “indirect experience”, which, for 
psychologist and Buddhist teacher Ngakpa Chögyam, is synonymous with duality 
(2003, 75).264 Duality having been established as fundamental to violence, this 
abandonment of direct experience would, from this perspective, seem to be 
implicated in the dynamics of violent activity. 
Experience itself defies fixation. From one moment to the next, we shift from 
pleasure to pain, joy to sorrow, loss to gain. The routine frustration of our attempts to 
cling to desirable experiences may be why both the Sufi and Vajrayana Buddhist 
traditions view liminality as intrinsic to human experience. Continual change sweeps 
us along from barzakh to barzakh, from bardo to bardo. This should help us 
recognise the futility of attempts to impose ideological fixities on the nature of 
reality. “You come to nature with your theories”, notes nineteenth-century French 
264 It may be that the barzakh separating and uniting direct and indirect experience—and hence also non-dual and dualistic modes of being—
consists in the presence of thoughts. As Schleiermacher (1893, 37) observes, “[y]our thought can only embrace what is sundered”. This insight 
underscores the cautions reported in previous chapters with respect to an unreflective, exclusive dependence on intellectual understanding in 
the embrace of spiritual realities. 
183 
artist Auguste Renoir, “and she knocks them all flat”.265 Such recognition further 
clarifies why neither the barzakh nor the bardo is accessible via intellectual striving. 
The conceptual reification of liminal passages opposes their very nature and 
function.  
Early champions of academic religious studies such as Friedrich Schleiermacher and 
Rudolf Otto argue passionately for the primacy of experience in religion 
(Schleiermacher 1893, 40–1; Otto [1923] 1929, 61). More recently, Robert Bellah 
proposes that “traditional forms arise not from reason but from the immediacy of 
experience” (Cooper 2004).266 The similarity between Bellah’s “immediacy of 
experience” and Trungpa’s “experience of nowness” is instantly apparent. These 
scholars suggest that the heart of religious understanding leans more heavily on 
experiential than on intellectual insight.  
This is not to say that the intellectual foundations of religious doctrine have no value, 
nor to oppose doctrine to experience. Rather, authentic religious doctrine must stand 
on the ground of human experience. Liminality being native to the structure of 
human experience, it follows that authentic spirituality, infused as it is with 
experiential value, must likewise reflect the inevitability and influence of liminal 
events.  
Although doctrine will likely include theoretical and mythic narrative, I argue that its 
moral impetus can be effective only to the extent that it engages the heart. At this 
level, the notion of certainty arises in a different register, as reflected in Nasr’s 
description of the lore, eye, and truth of certainty, expounded in Chapter Six. As with 
the Buddhist equivalent of hearing, contemplating, and meditating, spiritual 
understanding progresses from the intellectual to the experiential, and it is in 
experience that certainty ripens. Thus the practitioner’s internal experience is at least 
as central to authentic spiritual insight, if not more so, than is any external 
theological or historical text.  
265 As quoted in Masterpieces of Painting from the National Gallery of Art, ed. H. Cairns (Washington DC: National Gallery of Art, 1944),  
       168. 
266 Bellah credits this insight to Paul Ricoeur’s “second naivete”, an analytical approach that reinstates traditional exegesis as understood in the
  light of critical enquiry. 
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From this perspective, spiritual transformation occurs more at an ontological than at 
an intellectual level. It generates changes to the practitioner’s mode of being. The 
shiftiness of experiential ground may in fact explain why religious tenets have 
historically undergone frequent re-interpretation. Even the Hebrew Bible’s Ten 
Commandments, although literally carved in stone, specifically address the situation 
in which the Israelites found themselves at a particular juncture on their journey 
(Schwartz 1997, 36). For another example, many modern Jews consider the biblical 
dietary prohibitions of kashrut largely irrelevant now that the risk of food 
contamination that presumably informed these laws is no longer of pressing concern 
(Jewish Virtual Library 2019). 
Whatever the historical and cultural conditions driving the content of religious 
doctrine, Boyer argues that many scriptural texts originated to protect the livelihoods 
of religious specialists. Beginning in the Middle East and eventually spreading 
across all of Eurasia, ancient guilds of these specialists apparently developed 
theologies to “brand” their respective versions of supernatural access. If so, then 
early religious doctrine in this part of the world might have arisen from market 
forces rather than, or along with, divine inspiration. Accordingly, Boyer asserts that 
doctrine is not the foundation of religious institutions but arises from each institution 
as an assertion of privileged identity (2001, 275). The Us-versus-Them construction 
is obviously native to this strategy, for a given religious specialist must distinguish 
himself from the pack of others also claiming unique access to spiritual truths.  
Further, doctrine is shaped by cultural, political, and societal conditions at the time of 
its formulation. “[W]hat is at stake in the diffusion of religious concepts”, Boyer 
submits, “is very much a matter of social interaction, of coalitions and politics, 
filtered through people’s social mind concepts” (2001, 269). The importance of 
flexible interpretation is again apparent here, as all of these dynamics are themselves 
constantly in flux.  
Boyer’s argument does not challenge the potential malleability of religious doctrine; 
like any product, it can offer new and improved versions of itself. The continual 
revision of established spiritual traditions—as manifested in Christian Science, 
Jewish Renewal, the Muslim Reform Movement, and Engaged Buddhism, among 
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others—speaks to the compelling response of religious actors to changing historical, 
cultural, and societal conditions. Nor does Boyer’s somewhat cynical account of 
doctrinal origins necessarily rule out the possibility that any given doctrine may 
contain genuinely useful and uplifting spiritual content. Despite Evans-Wentz’s 
questionable claim to authentic Tibetan Buddhist transmission (Lopez 2011, 150), for 
example, his translation of the Bardo Thötröl has after all proven widely helpful to 
many sincere practitioners. As Buddhist lore reminds us, the impeccable white lotus 
draws its life from roots buried in dark sludge (Chögyam and Déchen 2003, 159). As 
this dissertation argues, rigid binary distinctions are of limited utility in exploring the 
dynamic nature of the phenomenal world. To designate any phenomenon as 
exclusively good or bad is to impose a two-dimensional view on a reality comprising 
at least four dimensions—and perhaps many more (Boyle 2006).  
Thus, its origins notwithstanding, religious doctrine may contain profound spiritual 
guidance and support. Certainly, students of virtually every religious tradition count 
the study of its sacred texts as indispensable to their pursuit of genuine spiritual 
understanding. The crucial point, from a non-dual perspective, is to recognise the 
inseparability of doctrine and experience. As Buddhist teacher Traleg Kyabgon 
reminds us, “cognitive ability should be supported by the richness of our emotional 
repertoire” (2015, 77). From a different angle, we may draw on our intellectual 
capacities to integrate the understandings encoded in our experience. Either way, 
“there is no cognition without feeling and no meaning without emotion” (Melucci 
1995, 45). As human beings, we are gifted with intellectual, emotional, and intuitive 
capacities. It behooves us to cultivate and engage all of these faculties, particularly in 
the context of religion, where realities beyond the limits of ordinary consciousness 
are invoked. Maintaining the optimal balance must surely be part of the task entailed 
in the spiritual challenge at any given juncture. 
The Manipulation of Experience 
Although experience defies reification, it is not impervious to manipulation. This is 
particularly true in the case of emotional experience—and emotion, as argued in 
Chapter Two, is intrinsically implicated in religious violence. Anger and disgust 
promote efforts to eliminate the evil, impure Other, while violent action itself may 
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generate feelings of ecstatic “deified self-intensification” (Giesen 2015a, 86). Both 
negative and positive emotions such as these can be powerfully motivating, a point 
surely not missed by ideologues seeking to recruit soldiers. 
Here again, the centrality of identity to violence is evident. Indeed, aggressive anger 
“is a style of communication that sets out to establish unchanging personal identity 
as real” (Chögyam and Déchen 2003, 138). Negative emotions directed at the Other 
intensify the Us-versus-Them construction underlying group identification, while the 
exhilaration derived from violent activity appears to directly reinforce a sense of 
superior selfhood. Either way, the emotion—whether disgust, anger, or ecstasy—
drives an internal narrative that intensifies the experience. Anyone who has 
experienced the intensification of such emotions understands how, barring other 
interventions, a compelling need arises to resolve the intensity by taking action.  
This entire process is typically opaque to the perpetrator of violence. Jones remarks 
that “amnesia about what is really going on … blindness about the actual cause of 
violence” is essential to the dynamics of projection and aggression (2008, 151). 
Jones is referring specifically to the phenomenon of scapegoating, but I argue that his 
analysis extends to include most, if not all, forms of reactive projection. Further, 
Jones suggests that a proclamation of perceived certainties necessarily denies one’s 
human limitations (169). The violent perpetrator is obliged to practise active 
ignorance of his own unending “living-dying”. Thus, acts of violence depend on the 
suppression of self-awareness, and specifically on disassociation from one’s own 
experience.  
Presence, by contrast, requires acute self-awareness. As promoted by both Sufis and 
Vajrayana Buddhists, it entails a profound commitment to what I have called 
“reflective interiority”. For the Sufi, this interiority consists in an encounter with “the 
truth of the oneness of Being”, which “can be fully known only by being experienced 
spiritually” (Nasr 2007, 38). For the Buddhist, it is “to discover ourselves in actual 
experience” (Chögyam and Déchen 2003, 83; emphasis original). Such presence, as 
discussed earlier, is not a mere feat of mindfulness divorced from past and future 




The inseparability of conceptual and experiential content notwithstanding, the two 
are distinct. The paradox implicit in their relationship is evident in the non-duality of 
experience, on the one hand, and the unavoidable dualism of language, on the other. 
As Tillich notes, the non-dual ultimate can only be spoken of “in a language which at 
the same time denies the possibility of speaking about it” (1957, 61). Language, in 
other words, lacks the dimensionality necessary to do justice to experience (cf. 
Prickett 2006, 87). And yet the two—language and experience—can hardly be 
separated. As the writer James Baldwin remarks, “it is experience which shapes a 
language; and it is language which controls an experience” (2010, 134). The 
relationship between the two invites consideration of a barzakh. Such a barzakh 
might perhaps consist in spiritual practice itself, in that the latter promotes a 
distinction between dualistic doctrine and non-dual experience while simultaneously 
expanding one’s consciousness to accommodate both. 
The fact remains that experience cannot be captured, immobilised, and transmitted. 
Conceptual mind must step in, which it does in the form of language. The power of 
language in the context of religion is evident in the very endurance of myriad 
scriptures, teachings, and commentaries. Recorded doctrine parts ways with the 
direct “experience of nowness”, yet those who attain direct spiritual experience 
mostly do so with the help of the recorded accounts of those who have gone before 
them.  
Seyyed Hossain Nasr eloquently explains the relationship between the articulable 
and the ineffable in human affairs: 
What good does it do to write about love? One has to experience love 
in order to understand what it is. … Nevertheless, although dealing 
with words and concepts, writing about love can awaken a certain 
awareness in the mind and soul of the reader, which in turn can cause 
him or her to become prepared to experience love on some level. But 
love itself cannot be reduced to its description no matter how lucid 
and poetic, while at the same time words that have come from those 
who have really loved can bring about recollection and awaken within 
some people the love that resides within the soul of all men and 
women. (Nasr 2007, 61) 
Applying Nasr’s argument to religious doctrine, on the one hand, and to the waqt or 
fourth moment, on the other, it would seem that a productive relationship may obtain 
between doctrine and liminality. Positive outcomes, however, depend on an attentive 
and respectful interaction. Elevating either at the expense of the other seems unlikely 
to lead to authentic spiritual insight.  
Jones likens discursive analysis of the Divine to a Zen koan in that its purpose is “to 
drive the mind beyond itself and into the transcendental darkness that lights up the 
world” (2008, 189). At its best, such analysis consciously employs ratiocination in 
order to transcend ratiocination. Thus there is, as Nasr argues, a role for language—
and for doctrine, in the religious context—in the pursuit of authentic spiritual 
attainment.  
This raises the challenge of finding language that is suitably subtle and skillful. Ibn 
al-‘Arabī is among those who endeavour to achieve a meaningful balance between 
language and experience. His struggle centres on the “meaning event”—the instant 
when non-reflective consciousness is transformed into reflective awareness, an event 
that erases dualistic distinctions (Sells 1994, 63). The dualism embedded in language 
makes it impossible to communicate the experience of the meaning event; yet to 
refrain from attempting to do so is to abandon other practitioners who aspire to attain 
it. 
Ibn al-‘Arabī employs the metaphor of a polished mirror, which is itself invisible 
except by means of whatever it is reflecting. The meaning event entails a shift in the 
practitioner’s identity, as, in “a moment of immediacy”, she relinquishes her sense of 
a separate self and enters into union with the Divine. The polished mirror of her 
awareness erases the separation between subject and object. Thus the meaning event 
may even transcend union, in that the distinction between self and other falls away as 
the practitioner experiences “oneness with the real”. Now it is no longer possible to 
tell whose image appears in the mirror: God’s, or the Sufi’s (Sells 1994, 8–10). This 
“moment of immediacy” recalls the waqt or fourth moment, experiences that also 
explicitly eclipse the separations of dualism.  
The same metaphor occurs in Tibetan Buddhism, where primordial awareness is 
described as a mirror. The mirror’s capacity to reflect without bias whatever is 
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placed before it is referred to as “immediate presence” (Reynolds 2000, 5)—an 
echo of Trungpa’s fourth moment as an “experience of nowness”. Trungpa, in fact, 
locates that experience in a non-dual, unconditioned mode of being he calls “the 
cosmic mirror” (2004, 80). In both the Vajrayana and Ibn al-‘Arabī’s Sufism, the 
mirror denotes pure awareness, specifically as it manifests in immediate experience. 
Metaphor is frequently and richly engaged in both Sufism and Vajrayana. As 
mentioned in Chapter Four, Ibn al-‘Arabī counts metaphor as one of the three 
Presences that describe reality. So crucial is this Presence to spiritual understanding 
that without it, the meanings emanating from the Divine are not available to 
humanity. Thus, as a barzakh bridging meaning and form, it is “the most perfect 
world” (Chittick 1998, 259). 
Shaykh al-Akbar’s mirror is just one of the metaphors Sufism shares with 
Vajrayana Buddhism. Another is the invocation of light, which Sufis use to describe 
the self-manifestation of the Divine (Renard 2005, 143).267 In similar vein, the 
Vajrayana notion of buddha-nature has been called “the sun of human dignity”, 
whose light pervades the entirety of our experience (Trungpa 2004, 44). Seeds, 
plants, clouds, and water are just some of the myriad metaphors found, not only in 
Sufism and Buddhism, but across the spectrum of religious literature.268 The 
ubiquity of metaphor in this context reflects its unique utility in conveying the 
nature of experience.  
The characteristically literal interpretations of doctrine by some religious extremists 
offer a stark contrast to this poetic language (Strozier 2007, 85). Nasr’s elegant 
argument, above, suggests that such literalism—in addition to generating “bad 
science [and] bad theology” (Teehan 2010, 189)—does not serve the delicate 
relationship between language and experience. Failing to invoke the intimate, 
intricate, continually shifting essence of experience, the language of literalism tends 
to impose a one-size-fits-all worldview that excludes other possibilities. In the face 
267 See also Chapter Four of this study, footnote 72. 
268 See, for example, Qur’ān 37:64; Matthew 13:1–23; Label Lam, “Torah-Like Water: Parshas Bamidbar”, Torah.org, Dvar Torah, May
  13, 2010, https://torah.org/torah-portion/dvartorah-5770-bamidbar/, accessed July 12, 2019; and Jayaram V, “Symbolism of the Cloud,
  Lightning, and Thunder”, Hinduwebsite.com, n.d., https://www.hinduwebsite.com/symbolism/symbols /cloud.asp, accessed July 12, 2019. 
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of such assumed certainty, the practitioner is invited to deny the wisdom of her own 
experience. Absent that wisdom, the heartless constructions of exclusionary logic 
work to obscure her commonality with all other experiencers—namely, the rest of 
humanity. From this angle of vision, the violence implicit in the Us-versus-Them 
worldview easily heaves into view. 
Whether read as literal or appreciated as metaphorical, doctrine appears to receive 
significantly more attention in the study of religions than does experience. This is 
hardly surprising, given the centrality of language to academic activity. Experience is 
singular, fleeting, and unrepeatable, making it less accessible to analytical tools. As 
liminal phases, the barzakh and the bardo are categorically experiential in nature; 
thus, intellectual striving offers only limited access to both. Indeed, caution is needed 
to guard against attempts to reify these liminal passages. 
Barzakh and Bardo 
Religion is largely an experiential form of human engagement. As such, it is subject 
to the structural dynamics common to all experience, including inevitable liminal 
events. It seems thus quite natural that religious traditions across the planet have 
developed ways of thinking about and engaging with liminality. The Sufi barzakh 
and the Tibetan Buddhist bardo, in my view, represent two of the most well 
developed and sophisticated articulations of this engagement.  
As exemplars of liminal passages, both the barzakh and the bardo demonstrate a 
robust capacity for religious lore to embrace the realities of disruption—and to seize 
on them as opportunities for transformation. The presentation of these two passages 
in this study suggests that practitioners of their respective religious systems consider 
them helpful to their spiritual development. In this, the barzakh and the bardo lend 
religious authority to the experience of liminality, providing a spiritually legitimate 
container for individual and collective life passages that may otherwise be regarded 
as essentially negative. 
My comparison of the barzakh and the bardo has not yielded any meaningful 
distinctions between them in the context of this study. Obvious differences derive 
from their respective theistic and non-theistic roots: where the barzakh is intimately 
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implicated in the Sufi’s relationship with the Divine, the bardo represents an 
opportunity for the Vajrayana practitioner to engage her relationship with her own 
mind. There are also stylistic divergences between the two. Ibn al-‘Arabī’s barzakh, 
for example, reflects a more minimalist Sufi aesthetic, while the bardo is replete with 
the ornate and elaborate symbolism typical of Tibetan Buddhism. 
Beyond these relatively superficial differences, however, lie more significant 
similarities. Chapters Four and Five have documented many of these, among them 
the recognition of pervasive liminal activity in everyday life; the manifestation of 
such activity in immediate experience; and the non-duality implicit in both passages. 
Further, the bardo and the barzakh both reveal themselves as modes of being, as 
opposed to conceptual ideals. In this sense, they offer remarkably similar guidance to 
adherents of spiritual practices that are, as noted above, in some respects quite 
dissimilar. This suggests that liminality and the imperative to engage it may not be 
peculiar to any particular religious mindset but may rather represent recognitions of a 
more fundamental spiritual reality.  
The Immediate Threshold 
As noted in Chapter Four, a barzakh lies between any two adjacent entities—
including, it must then be imagined, between the bardo and the barzakh as 
comparands. Since this study has repeatedly argued for the importance of 
recognising liminality in academic research, it would be disingenuous at best to 
overlook the threshold between its two central comparands. In order to compare the 
barzakh and the bardo, an examination of the liminal gap between them seems 
essential. I argue that this gap consists in liminality, itself. In the context of this 
dissertation, in other words, a bardo or barzakh lies between the bardo and the 
barzakh.  
This being the case, it further becomes necessary to examine the ways in which 
liminality—the threshold or isthmus between comparands—accomplishes its dual 
functions of unification and differentiation. Its unifying activity is obvious: in their 
anxiety-provoking disruption of known order, both passages share the unsettling 
attributes of the liminal. The transformational potential of liminal events is likewise 
common to both, as are the other similarities listed above. It is thus easy to see how 
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an isthmus lying between the two seas of the barzakh and the bardo unites the two 
experiences.  
Liminality as separating the bardo and the barzakh requires a more subtle analysis. It 
is not enough simply to enumerate the differences between the two. The question, 
rather, is how the isthmus of liminality may be understood to embody these 
differences. Here, I propose employing the two terms as synecdoches for their 
respective spiritual homes: Vajrayana Buddhism and Sufism, respectively. These 
represent two quite different and distinct religious cultures: on the one hand, a 
theistic spiritual system rooted in Abrahamic values historically emerging on the 
Arabian Peninsula, and on the other, a non-theistic Indian tradition imbued with 
Tibetan shamanism. For each community, the other is indeed Other—that is to say, 
thoroughly not-Us in language, geography, history, doctrine, practices, nationality, 
and cultural commitments. While it is certainly the case that Muslims and Buddhists 
have entered into conflicts, notably in south and southeast Asia,269 reports of violent 
engagements specifically between Sufis and Tibetan Buddhists have proven difficult 
to find. Using a strangely applicable metaphor to describe the relations between 
Sufism and Buddhism, in fact, one scholar describes a meeting between His Holiness 
the Dalai Lama, the acknowledged leader of all Tibetan Buddhists, and several 
prominent scholars of Sufism as “a gentle meeting of two oceans”.270  
The peaceful implication of this description is of course no miracle. Few occasions 
have arisen for Sufis and Vajrayanists to compete over material resources or 
ideological positionalities. Accordingly, it is not my intention to suggest that the two 
communities represent some ideal of religious harmony. I propose, rather, to explore 
the possibilities inhering in the location of a liminal gap, with its typical lack of 
defined boundaries, squarely in between two long-established identities. Liminality 
269 For an overview of current conflicts, see Bruno Marshall Shirley, “Buddhist-Muslim Violence in South and South-East Asia: The Local 
Becomes Regional, or a Clash of Civilizations?” (International Policy Digest, 29 Jun 2016, accessed August 27, 2019, 
https://intpolicydigest.org/2016/06/29/buddhist-muslim-violence-in-south-and-south-east-asia-the-local-becomes-regional-or-a-clash-
     of-civilizations/). 
270 The scholar is Wallace Loh, president of the University of Maryland; the occasion, “A Meeting of Two Oceans, Dialogue on Sufism and 
Buddhism”, held at the Roshan Center for Persian Studies at the University of Maryland on May 7, 2013, accessed August 3, 2019, 
https://studybuddhism.com/en/advanced-studies/history-culture/buddhism-islam/the-dalai-lama-in-dialogue-with-sufi-scholars. 
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as a separative agent, here, obliges each side to embody its own essential nature, for 
it cannot in itself provide those limits. The liminal isthmus, holding “in itself the 
power of each” of the conditions on either side of it (Morris 1995, 7), necessarily 
substantiates that power—which itself lies precisely in their respective identities. 
Further, “[u]nderstanding the definition of the barzakh is identical to understanding 
the essence of the activity of defining, which consists of differentiating between 
things” (Bashir 2004, 87). Its differentiating function, in other words, makes of the 
liminal an essential factor in the establishment of defining identities on either side of 
it. Or, to put it yet another way, it is precisely the presence of the liminal that makes 
any identity possible. 
Attributes of Liminality 
The foregoing analysis entails a recognition of the unifying action of differentiation. 
Here, several of liminality’s core attributes come into view. For the purposes of this 
study, I wish to draw attention to three of these attributes: the embrace of extremes; 
enantiodromia; and paradox. While these characteristics by no means exhaust the 
nature of the liminal, I submit that they are particularly relevant in the context of 
religious violence. 
First, it might be argued that liminality not only embraces but actually relies on 
extremes. This argument goes back to the very emphatic polarities of life and death 
addressed by the conventional understandings of the bardo and the barzakh. Beyond 
that, for Ibn al-‘Arabī, a barzakh is necessary to rationalise the existence of profound 
opposites within the relationship between divine and human existence. Similarly, in 
the Vajrayana tradition, the bardo navigates the territory between the radical 
extremes of suffering and freedom, or saṃsāra and nirvāna. In either case, liminality 
has the capacity to bring together acute polarities—unification and differentiation 
among them.  
In its embrace of extremes, liminality further entails a second attribute: what 
Heraclitus calls “enantiodromia”, or the view that “everything that exists turns into 
194 
its opposite” (Jung 1970, 5,496).271 Enantiodromia is especially apparent where 
extreme polarities are present. Jung observes that the more extreme a positionality, 
the more inevitable is this transformative inversion (4,063), which is surely worth 
considering in the context of religious extremism. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most explicitly, liminality is a site of paradox: a coming 
together of conventionally contradictory phenomena (Thomassen 2014, 92). In the 
“hyper-reality” of the liminal, structure and meaning fall apart in the very process of 
informing new structures and meanings (1). Under these conditions, paradox is 
unavoidable. Conventional logic cannot accommodate or express such simultaneous 
destruction and creation. The simultaneity of differentiation and unification is but 
one more paradoxical capacity of the liminal. 
Ibn al-‘Arabī views differentiation as itself a relationship. As mentioned in Chapter 
Four, he sees “the relation of difference from Other” as no less binding than is the 
relation of sameness (Bashier 2004, 88; emphasis original). Each side is dependent 
on the other to assert its identity in contrast. In the decidedly unparadoxical Us-
versus-Them situation, however, relationship and differentiation appear mutually 
exclusive. Thus, those identifying as Us seek to eliminate all relations with Them, 
including the relation of difference. The only way to eliminate the relation of 
difference is to unite. Bashir notes that this argument “yields the paradoxical 
conclusion that by identifying themselves things lose their very identity, since they 
become other than themselves” (2004, 88).  
Here we see enantiodromia in action: at either end of the alternation between unity 
and separation, its opposite is poised for the extreme to reach its apogee. The three 
attributes of liminality expounded above are evident in this situation, for the extreme 
poles of Us and Them are ineluctably drawn into enantiodromiac transformation. The 
participants’ intentions are, paradoxically, thwarted by their very attempts to 
accomplish them. This self-defeating trajectory recalls the hypothesis of autonomic 
liminality, posited earlier. 
271 Enantiodromia is implied in the writings of Heraclitus, and was taken up by psychoanalyst C.G. Jung (Sharp 2001, 45 n27). I am grateful to 
Dr. Laura Marshall for bringing the concept to my attention. 
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Further exploration of this paradox turns to the characteristics of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s 
barzakh. It is to be remembered that this isthmus maintains a consistent integrity 
within itself even while embodying the characteristics of the seas at either shore. 
Thus, despite the differences between the respective seas, it does not itself exhibit 
any dividing line (Chittick 1998, 335). 272 But not only is the barzakh indivisible; it 
renders indivisible the adjoining phenomena. In Ibn al-‘Arabī’s view, “the separation 
between the things (defining) and the separating factor (that which defines) become 
manifest as one in entity” (Bashir 2004, 87). In similar vein, cultural scholar Irén 
Annus observes that “the construction of difference is simultaneous with the 
construction of sameness; that is, these two processes are inseparable and are in fact 
parts of the same whole” (2011, 3). Here we find a resonance with the view of non-
duality, in which the distinction between subject and object falls away. In this sense, 
the liminal might be considered a downright challenge to differentiation. And yet, as 
demonstrated, even in its indivisibility it functions to divide.  
Chittick, examining the inseparability of unity and differentiation from a different 
angle, considers the nature of tawhīd, or the indivisible unity of the Divine. 
Although tawhīd might be considered the ultimate and essential embodiment of 
unity, Chittick explains that it is necessarily founded on diversity, for unity 
presupposes an originating multiplicity (1999, 203). In order for phenomena to 
unite, in other words, they must originally be separate. The barzakh, then, 
differentiates in order to make unity possible (Bashir 2004, 7). This is why the 
conditions or phenomena flanking the barzakh must declare their respective 
identities in order for the transformational power of liminality to take effect. In the 
case of the collective identities implicated in religious violence, it may thus be 
paradoxically more beneficial for conflicted parties to maintain clear boundaries 
than to compromise those attributes that distinguish them from the Other.273  
In these expositions, both Bashir and Chittick assert the indivisibility of difference 
and unity. I understand this to indicate that the barzakh embodies this indivisibility. 
272 Citing Al-Futûhât al-Makkîya III 518.1. 
273 See Eisenstadt and Giesen’s liminal trichotomy, cited in Chapter Three. 
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Indivisibility is, therefore, the condition of transformation from difference to unity, 
and simultaneously, the condition of inherent difference necessary to that 
transformation. At this point, it might be helpful to recall Ibn al-‘Arabī’s explanation 
of the barzakh between red and green: while the two are clearly differentiated, as 
colours they are “one in their luminous substance” (Chittick 1994, 16). In their 
vividness and radiance as colours—their essential colourness, so to speak—red and 
green are united. Yet their unity at this higher level is enabled by their respective 
identities as different colours. It is the distinct identity of red that establishes it as a 
colour; likewise, green. Were everything in the phenomenal world the same colour, 
that particular attribute would not be recognised as colour. It is because colours are 
distinct from one another that we are aware of their existence. Just as red and green 
must differ in order to make the apprehension of colour possible, the liminal gap 
between the barzakh and the bardo is separative precisely because it is unitive.  
Bashir approaches the question of unity versus separateness from the viewpoint of 
ultimate and relative realities, a matter of particular importance in the context of 
religion. “The consideration of the paradoxical representation of liminal cases”, he 
asserts, 
represents a threshold over which the reality of the divine and the 
reality of the world, or the Truth and its appearances interact and, 
through that very interaction, restore the unity of the human 
knowledge, not for the sake of perpetuating the split in the human 
consciousness. (Bashir 2004, 18) 
A significant qualifier in this account is the centrality of “interaction” as an active, 
dynamic movement requiring the participation of both elements. The “unity of 
human knowledge” and “the human consciousness” Bashir references bring the lofty 
relationship between ultimate and relative reality squarely into the everyday world of 
people, where that relationship acquires meaning. Accordingly, I argue that the 
dynamism of the interactivity Bashir describes extends to the human realm, where 
the “principle of non-otherness” inherent in the barzakh comes into play (Burckhardt 
1979, 1). Although this principle might, in some other context, imply the 
fundamental commonality of all peoples, I suggest that here it could be read as “non-
othering”.  
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This transformation from principle to activity accords with the experiential, and 
hence dynamic, nature of both the bardo and the barzakh. They are processes, rather 
than destinations. Non-othering, in this register, implies an active choosing with 
respect to human interaction, as opposed to an ideological or doctrinal orientation. 
This, again, recalls the energetic nature of liminality itself. I argue that recognising 
the liminal necessarily implies the choice entailed in non-othering, and in this way 
holds the potential to defuse the conflicts arising out of attempts by Us to either 
engulf or eliminate Them.  
Paradox and Identity 
Throughout this dissertation, I have argued against fixating on perceived certainties. 
I have demonstrated how an understanding of liminality opposes the possibility of 
static conditions. And yet I submit that clear declarations of religious identity might 
in fact contribute to a softening of violent positionalities. This is precisely because of 
what liminality has to teach us about extremes, enantiodromia, and paradox. 
In order to accomplish its transformational function, the isthmus of liminality 
separating the seas of the bardo and the barzakh requires stability on either side of it: 
van Gennep’s preliminal separation and post-liminal incorporation phases. Only 
when there is clarity regarding what, exactly, is being simultaneously united and 
separated can the liminal event proceed from the extremes of differentiation to 
enantiodromia and subsequent unity. By the same token, the differentiated elements 
must pass through liminality in order to attain unity. I propose, therefore, that when 
religious identity is available to liminal transformation it might in fact function to 
calm rather than escalate conflict. To acknowledge and support claims of unique and 
disparate identities on the part of adversaries is to endorse the extreme positionalities 
necessary for the process of enantiodromia to proceed.  
If religious violence is a liminal outburst or a reaction to liminal events, as I have 
argued, it follows that solutions are not to be found in attempts to reconcile doctrinal, 
traditional, or ritual differences. To apply the analytical lens of liminality, by 
contrast, necessitates a close examination of the corresponding dynamics, including, 
as mentioned, the presence of extremes, enantiodromia, and paradox. This is perhaps 
one way to describe the essential role of context in any investigation of religious 
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violence. 
Perhaps more to the point, though, I suggest that the application of such an analytical 
lens is incommensurate with attempts to bring order to the associated disruption. 
Viewed as a natural and inevitable eruption of liminality, the disruption characteristic 
of religious violence might reveal a certain wisdom, however distorted in its 
expression. Whether or not this proves to be the case, I submit that an inflexibly 
oppositional stance toward violence is likely to obscure any valuable clues that are 
otherwise overlooked in the liminal chaos. 
A poster advertising a meditation programme features a stereotypical guru type—a 
bearded old man in a dhoti—on a surfboard. The caption reads, “You can’t stop the 
waves, but you can learn to surf”. Since the best efforts of scholars, diplomats, and 
others to end religious violence have yet to prove their long-term effectiveness, it 
might perhaps make sense to embrace it on its own, chaotic terms; to learn, in other 
words, to surf the choppy seas of religious violence. To continue searching for 
resolution by stopping the waves may ultimately result in analyses “that have been 
distorted into clarity” (Law 2004, 2). Liminality, in its lack of clarity, challenges the 
observer to embrace the very uncertainty so emphatically dismissed by fixated 
religionists.  
Accordingly, my textual comparison itself consists in a barzakh or bardo. It resists 
arrival at a concluding point, for as Ibn al-‘Arabī cautions, to do so “is to kill” the 
investigation. For him, “there is no closure, only disclosure” (Chittick 1998, xi; 
emphasis original). I have endeavoured, therefore, to avoid Law’s “[distortion] into 
clarity” in favour of broadening the field of investigation into religious violence. I 
argue that the indeterminacy of this approach reflects the indeterminacy—the 
messiness—of reality. Once again, I invoke the wisdom of poetry: 
Yet all experience is an arch wherethro’  
Gleams that untravell’d world whose margin fades 
For ever and forever when I move.  
How dull it is to pause, to make an end, 
To rust unburnish’d, not to shine in use!274  
274 Alfred Tennyson, “Ulysses”, accessed August 8, 2019, https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/45392/ulysses. 
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The speaker, Ulysses, is an inveterate traveller. Despite his old age and his 
responsibilities as ruler of a kingdom, he elects to continue exploring unknown 
territories whose “margin” (one of Turner’s terms for the liminal [Turner 1969, 94])
—refuses to be fixed. He fantasises about reaching “the Happy Isles” where warriors 
go to their reward, but his central inspiration is the voyage of discovery itself. 
As scholars, we may perhaps likewise derive more satisfaction, and produce ever 
more surprising results by “[shining] in use”. Continual discovery, by definition, 
opposes tidy conclusions. The indeterminate nature of liminality offers just such an 
adventure, replete with the dangers attendant on entering unknown worlds. 
Nonetheless, I propose that recognising and exploring the liminal events in our own 
work may support unforeseen innovation in the academic treatment of religious 
violence.  
Liminality as Hermeneutic 
Once again, as in previous chapters, I argue for the application of a liminal lens to 
the academic research on religious violence. This is not based on technical 
considerations, but on the possibly apocryphal but nonetheless persuasive Einstein 
quote cited in the previous chapter. The consciousness that creates a problem is 
unlikely to generate its solution. Accordingly, it is my observation that the Us-and-
Them construction driving much contemporary religious violence is pervasive 
throughout modern Western culture, including, inevitably, the academy. I suggest 
that those of us dedicated to understanding and analysing conflict of any kind 
might find that applying to our own work the arguments against dualistic, 
hierarchical judgements leads to a more fluid engagement of academic 
investigation. Perhaps we may enter the “realm of social possibility” invoked by 
Rumelili, above. 
Academic researchers are no more or less susceptible to divisive, judgemental 
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thinking than is anyone else. Every one of us is captive to the forces driving both our 
attraction to and our involvement in the dynamics that shape group identity. We all 
entertain assumptions and logics, often unwittingly, that colour our research. Saler 
offers a pithy encapsulation of the problem as it manifests in his own discipline: 
In short, the practitioners of a mostly Western profession 
(anthropology) employ a Western category (religion), conceptualized 
as a component of a larger Western category (culture), to achieve 
their professional goal of coming to understand what is meaningful 
and important for non-Western peoples. (Saler 2000, 8) 
Saler’s reference to Western academia versus “non-Western peoples” applies only 
partially to the scholarship on religious violence, but his point holds good in that all 
scholarship is influenced by unwitting, and therefore unquestioned, assumptions that 
are deeply rooted in cultural norms—as well as by tested views and positions that are 
foundational to our respective disciplines and communities of practice. We are born 
on a gameboard whose existence is opaque to us until we learn that other games 
exist. It is as though, raised on a Monopoly board, we eagerly transfer to a newly 
discovered Scrabble board and try to learn who holds the bank while searching in 
vain for the dice. Again, our scholarly understandings of religion, however sincerely 
and diligently interrogated, are “filtered through [our] social mind concepts” (Boyer 
2001, 269). For this reason, the reflective interiority I argued for in Chapter Six is 
central to any real shift in the animating logic of violence. 
Runkle proposes that violence is not bad if it is employed in order to “maximize the 
good, minimize the bad, and distribute them justly”. The obvious flaw in this 
argument is that opposing sides define good, bad, and justice quite differently. In the 
case of religious violence, appeals to a higher authority routinely reinforce 
competing God’s-eye definitions of such values. Runkle does conclude that strong 
feelings against violence tend to compromise the best-intentioned efforts to mitigate 
it (1976, 389). Here, his argument and mine concur.  
Anthony Judge is a prolific researcher and encyclopaedist who specialises in 
international organisational strategy and policy. Judge impatiently dismisses “the 
bloody stupidity which continues to characterize the ongoing dynamics between ‘us’ 
and ‘them’”. In his view, “we all play our roles and occupy conditions” in these 
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ubiquitous and pervasive dynamics. Significantly, Judge notes that most of us are 
largely unconscious of the ways in which we compulsively reinforce them, 
suggesting that “our collective mindset” might be fruitfully examined for its 
culpability in fuelling the ongoing cycles of violence plaguing our planet (2009). 
My earlier argument offers a liminal analysis of religious violence that is specifically 
inclusive and hence incommensurate with the Us-and-Them construction. But 
exclusivity is not the only hazard implicit in binary analyses. The tacit side-taking in 
Us-and-Them, Judge notes, “precludes exploration of more complex frameworks” 
(2009). Partiality over-simplifies issues rich with potential for more nuanced 
investigation.  
Among the pressing global issues that suffer from the absence of a more subtle 
analysis is the altercation between the Palestinian and Israeli factions in the Middle 
East. Judge believes that “binary logic” may be the stumbling block to progressing 
beyond fixation on the touted but thus far unproductive “two-state solution” to that 
conflict (2009). I suspect that this same binary logic obstructs innovation in the 
theoretical contemplation of religious violence. 
For cognitive scientist George Lakoff, constructs such as the “two-state solution” in 
the Middle East are among countless “frames”: mental structures that contain both 
emotional and intellectual content. Other such frames include “the war on terror”, 
“teenage drug abuse”, and “rags to riches”. Frames develop from neural activity 
sparked by repeated exposure to associated tropes, and they routinely impose 
narratives and judgements on our moment-to-moment experience (2009, 22). Ninety-
eight percent of this process occurs unconsciously, while the rational mind accounts 
for just 2 percent of our ideological convictions (197; see also Teehan 2015, 14).  
This framing applies as much to perpetrators of religious violence as to anyone else. 
The conscious justifications for their hostility to the Other are informed by a vastly 
more complex and extensive repository of unconscious activity. Following Lakoff’s 
argument, however, the same lopsided and dangerously occult unreason applies to us 
academic researchers. Like the religious extremists we study, we ourselves are driven 
by unexamined cultural, societal, and personal fixations. To free our minds from this 
unconscious control requires that “we must make the unconscious conscious” 
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(Lakoff 2009, 19). In other words, the practice of reflective interiority is central to a 
clear understanding of any phenomenon—including religious violence, its dynamics, 
and its perpetrators. 
Making the unconscious conscious entails a certain amount of discomfort. There are 
reasons, after all, why we bury certain material beneath the radar of consciousness. 
Extreme examples of such tendencies are evident in coping mechanisms associated 
with traumatic events, which include “repression, dissociation, splitting, 
displacement, and denial and fantasy” (Stein 1993, 73). Distress tends to trigger 
mental and emotional reactions that distort both our memories of the precipitating 
event and our attempts at relief. 
Following William James’s methodology in exploring extreme examples as best 
supporting the analysis of human psychology (1902, 40), I submit that the dynamic 
described here may extend beyond the arena of actual trauma. It may, in fact, consist 
in forms much subtler and more difficult to identify than in the cases of abuse and 
injury typically cited with respect to clinical repression. All of us carry the 
unconscious residue of past embarrassments, regrets, insults, and reversals. All of us 
preserve some sense of identity at the expense of complete historical transparency. 
By the same token, a price is exacted for allowing repressed material to surface. The 
discomfort associated with making the unconscious conscious is the discomfort of 
the liminal passage.  
In an article proposing a fundamental paradigm shift in the academic field of deep 
psychology, Robert Jay Lifton describes  
the deep uneasiness, bordering on despair, of large numbers of 
practitioners and investigators as they experience threats to the 
validity of the existing classical paradigm along with an absence of a 
new paradigm sufficiently powerful to replace it; the widely felt 
though often inchoate sense that we are losing rather than gaining 
ground in our struggles to cope professionally with the increasingly 
formidable social and psychological forces that confront us; and the 
atmosphere of chaotic eclecticism, within which it becomes difficult 
indeed to distinguish narrow dogma and intensified cultism from 
sustained commitment, superficiality from bold experiment, and 
excessive claim from genuine accomplishment. (Lifton 1975, 43) 
Lifton’s account may be considered a textbook description of a liminal passage. 
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Terms such as “deep uneasiness”, “threats to the validity of the existing … 
paradigm”, “absence of a new paradigm”, “inchoate sense”, “losing … ground”, 
“chaotic eclecticism”, and “difficult … to distinguish” all echo the descriptions cited 
above in Chapter Three.  
The distress Lifton so eloquently describes may not affect every pioneering 
researcher, but it is in our best interests to anticipate and prepare for such a 
possibility. As indicated in previous chapters, genuine transformation occurs 
precisely in dependence on the experience of liminality. An exploration of liminal 
dynamics may open significant and productive avenues in academic research.  
Here again, to recognise the “deep uneasiness” Lifton describes in the context of 
scholarly research is to engage in precisely the reflective interiority I have suggested 
in the context of religious fixation. Just as the perpetrator of religious violence might 
achieve some ventilation of dogmatic insistence through contemplating the barzakh, 
the bardo, or their equivalents in other religious traditions, so, likewise, might the 
scholar of religious violence cultivate a critical curiosity regarding her own views of 
right and wrong, good and evil, violence and non-violence. 
As I have argued, a shift from such binary logic to a more inclusive, less fixed 
analytical approach cannot be accomplished by cognitive means alone. Precisely 
because fixation on binary structures is a mode of being, access to deeper levels of 
ontological engagement are required to relax one’s grip on perceived certainties. 
Liminality—in the forms of the bardo and the barzakh, but also in a more general 
sense—invites us, as individuals, to explore possibilities of profound personal 
transformation. Since collectives comprise individuals, such transformation holds the 
promise of larger shifts in consciousness, which may in fact be the best hope of our 
survival as a species.275 
275 See, for example, Thomas Berry, The Sacred Universe: Earth, Spirituality and Religion in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2009) and Daniel Schmachtenberger, “Utopia or Bust: Designing a Non Self-Terminating Civilization”, interview with 
Daniel Thorson on Emerge podcast, August 5, 2019, accessed September 22, 2019, https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/daniel-
schmachtenberger-utopia-or-bust-designing-non/id1057220344?i=1000446185037. 
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The Value of This Study 
Terrorist organisations claiming religious inspiration were unknown prior to 1980; 
now, as we know, these are widespread. The proportion of civil wars based on 
religious conflict has risen from 22 percent in the 1960s to a current level of 50 
percent (Toft 2013, 337). Religious violence continues to escalate worldwide. A 
tremendous amount of scholarship has been generated in response to this 
phenomenon; its aetiology, historical significance, and philosophical underpinnings 
have been extensively explored. Fields as wide-ranging as political science, 
sociology, anthropology, and literature have been mined for potential solutions to the 
increasingly vexing problem of religious violence. The frightening escalation in 
religious tensions and conflicts worldwide suggests that, while much has been 
accomplished in our understanding of the dynamics of religious violence, the 
scholarship on the phenomenon is incomplete. 
I have sought, in this study, to suggest an analytical approach that may be applied to 
both those who perpetrate religious violence and those who study it. First, I propose 
that greater awareness of, education about, and attention to the liminal praxes 
embedded in religious traditions might influence the ways religious practitioners 
understand violence. The ontological implications of such praxes, in particular, may 
serve to moderate the ideological fixities underpinning the divide between Us and 
Them. The implicit non-duality of a liminally informed view could conceivably 
soften exclusivist positionalities, minimising the perception of confrontation.  
I realise that urging a fixated religionist to see the world through a novel lens is 
more likely to produce anamorphosis than it is a change of heart. Nonetheless, I 
propose that an insistence on a desired or ideal outcome is of as little value coming 
from the academic Us as it is from the violent Them. Most, if not all, changes in 
societal and cultural paradigms begin with an idea. This study offers one such idea. 
Second, though not secondarily, I argue for a shift of emphasis in the scholarship on 
religious violence: a shift, perhaps, “from analysis to form” (Lifton 1975); that is, 
from exclusive reliance on method to the same reflective interiority I have imagined 
entering the calculus of religious extremists. Following the thinking of both Lifton 
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and Lakoff in their respective fields, I propose that scholars of religious studies 
contemplate the impact of their own positionalities on the subjects of their research. 
This is not an original, or even a new, idea. Christine Morley, a scholar of social 
work who has written extensively on this approach, describes it as “self reflection on 
how internalized dialogue has been constructed, and can, therefore, be deconstructed, 
changed and reconstructed”. Significantly, Morley notes that such critical reflection 
is particularly useful in research that aspires to “emancipatory aims” (2008, 266). 
The goals of non-violence surely reflect this aspiration.  
I argue that one important aspect of critical self-reflection for academics in this field 
might be recognition of our influence on the activism that seeks to mitigate religious 
violence. Although a given scholar may not see herself as actively working to 
staunch the proliferation of religious violence, her work is assuredly contributing to 
the body of research employed by activists in the field. Any implicit, unexamined 
assumptions informing her work will likely enter into the analytical orthodoxy that 
eventually shapes the understanding of all involved, and thus also the means 
employed to curtail the incidence of violence.  
Not surprisingly, some researchers find any departure from a traditional, positivist 
theoretical stance in the social sciences responsible for “a great deal of intellectual 
and methodological turmoil” (Goodman 1998, 51). Melucci likewise recognises the 
“uncertainty” faced by researchers dedicated to “testing the limits of their 
instruments and of their ethical values” (1995, 62).The turmoil and uncertainty 
described here are, again, characteristic of liminality. Yet Morley argues that such 
distress notwithstanding, to embrace “a range of non-traditional, richer ways of 
knowing people’s experiences” is to free ourselves of fixed conceptual positions and 
tap into the potential for as-yet unexplored directions (2008, 266). 
In Lifton’s view, researchers confront a peculiarly difficult challenge in navigating 
the “psychohistorical dislocation” in their disciplinary paradigm shift while 
simultaneously bearing responsibility for making it intelligible to others (1975, 43). I 
submit that we scholars of religious violence face a parallel hazard: the difficulty of 
challenging extreme dualistic views of good and evil, right and wrong, Us and Them, 
while ourselves inevitably influenced by these same dualisms. Cultural repugnance 
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toward violence as bad/evil is pervasive and widely supported in both the popular 
media276 and academic research.277 Speaking of the activities of the so-called Islamic 
State, for example, political philosopher Simona Forti observes: 
If we were to write of its violence as being merely irrational or even 
barbaric, our condemnation wouldn’t resonate as strongly in the 
popular imagination. Presenting the violence in terms of “evil” not 
only ensures that the fight against it is imperative, it also places us, 
unreservedly, on the right side of moral history. (Evans and Forti 
2016) 
Forti goes on to argue that the complexities of morality and ethics challenge 
absolutism; and that even those actions that seem most unequivocally savage may be 
motivated by a sincere, if distorted, reverence for life. In her view, our best hope of 
resolving the problem of violence “is to critically question everything that happens 
before this utterly asymmetrical relationship between the perpetrators of violence 
and their absolute victims develops” (Evans and Forti 2016)—in other words, to 
interrupt the automatic leap into a dualistic, and thus oppositional, worldview. 
Although Forti’s caution here specifically addresses the bifurcation of perpetrator 
and victim, I submit that the same evil-versus-good construction applies to the 
perpetrators and scholars of violence. Those of us who study religious violence are, 
for the most part, confident of our location “on the right side of moral history” 
relative to the subjects of our research. Since, as argued earlier, dualistic thinking lies 
at the root of violence, it behooves those of us charged with clarifying the issue for 
others to examine the dualism in our own thinking—even in the face of the strong 
potential for losing our status as one of the righteous Us. 
I argue, therefore, that the same reflective interiority that may benefit those who 
perpetrate overt violence is incumbent upon those of us who seek to understand and 
mitigate that violence. We might begin with challenging the designation of “evil” in 
both popular and academic discourse. As scholar of political violence Brad Evans 
276 See, for example, David D. Courtwright, “Violence in America”, American Heritage 47 no.5, 1996, accessed   August 7, 2019, 
   https://www.americanheritage.com/violence-america. 
277 According to moral philosopher Susan Neiman, “the problem of evil is the guiding force of modern thought” (Evil in Modern Thought: An 
Alternative History of Philosophy [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015], 2–3). 
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points out, to call another “evil” is essentially an assertion of moral absolutism, 
which in turn shuts down meaningful communication (Evans and Forti 2016). 
Where to from Here? 
The two examples I have offered of liminality’s role in religious violence do not 
constitute my central argument. Rather, I wish to demonstrate the utility of liminality 
as an analytical lens in the study of violence, and specifically, violence in which 
religion is implicated. I hope to have laid sufficient groundwork to inspire other 
scholars to delve more deeply into the relationship of liminality to religious violence. 
Further, the barzakh and the bardo are only two examples of liminal passages 
embedded in established religious tradition. I expect that many such examples are to 
be found in traditions other than Sufism and Tibetan Buddhism.278 There may well 
be insights to be gained from the nuances available in those examples. In any event, I 
believe that the discovery and explication of liminal passages in a broader cross-
section of religious traditions will help drive home the message that religion is not 
antipathetic to ambivalence, uncertainty, and even chaos. Bringing more attention to 
this aspect of religious tradition, while it may not convince religious extremists of 
the benefits of relaxing their fixations, may over time begin to introduce some 
movement in otherwise static, monolithic understandings of religious orthodoxy. It 
may also help shift the locus of attention from conceptual fixation to the necessity of 
personal transformation: to an appreciation, in other words, of one’s mode of being 
as a compelling expression of spiritual authenticity. 
Finally, I suspect that the use of liminality as an analytical tool may help loosen 
academic logjams in fields other than that of religious violence. May this study, and 
responses to it within the religious studies arena, inspire the application of liminality 
as a barzakh between disciplinary domains, sharpening their respective boundaries 
while simultaneously encouraging recognition of those commonalities that may 
prove fruitful to all. 
278 The doctrines regarding Roman Catholic purgatory and Jewish Nehar di-Nur/Gehinnom may offer promising avenues of exploration. 
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